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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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10 DECEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA CRITICIZES REAGAN ATTITUDE TO ABM TREATY

PM281251 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Commentary by K. Markov under the rubric "Topics of the Day": "The ABM Treaty and 'Holy Writ'"]

[Text] In his television address on 22 October M.S. Gorbachev, returning perforce to his meeting with President R. Reagan in Reykjavik in view of Washington's distortions on this account, noted among other things that he was very surprised when the President set about trying to convince the Soviet side and him personally not to treat the ABM Treaty as if it were "Holy Writ."

President Reagan not only does not deny this incident but has himself referred to it publicly more than once. Thus, for instance, at a briefing for leading U.S. television observers on 14 October the President said: "As for the ABM Treaty to which he was constantly returning as if it were Holy Writ, I asked him on one occasion what was so wonderful about this treaty which forces our governments to tell the people that we will not defend them against a nuclear strike?"

The President thought it preferable to say nothing about the reply he got in Reykjavik but the world learned about it from M.S. Gorbachev's television address. He said: "And how would you like us to treat treaties? As a scrap of paper, perhaps?"

I would like to dwell in some detail on the matter of the sacredness of treaties (leaving the question raised by the President as to what is so wonderful about the ABM Treaty for a separate discussion).

The U.S. Constitution -- incidentally the world's first written constitution -- contains the following provision in its Article VI: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."

The meaning of this provision is absolutely clear: International obligations accepted by the United States are to be regarded as norms of the supreme law and must be observed as strictly as the country's Constitution itself.

You may say that is an internal matter for the Americans to sort out whether their President treats the U.S. Constitution as "Holy Writ" -- to use his comparison -- or whether he does not.

You are quite right. However, the sacredness of international treaties and the obligation of states strictly to observe them is more than just an internal legal norm which applies to a given country, in this case the United States, and its Constitution bears this out. It is simultaneously a most important international norm enshrined in the most important international treaty in the world today, or the treaty of treaties as it is sometimes called -- the UN Charter which the United States was among the first to sign.

It is not out of place to recall that the Helsinki Final Act includes among the 10 paramount principles, which the participant states (including the United States) pledged to follow in their relations among themselves and with other countries of the world, the principle of the conscientious implementation of obligations under international law.

Bearing all this in mind, how is it possible not to be truly surprised when the U.S. President asks you not treat as "Holy Writ" the ABM Treaty, which laid the foundation for strategic stability and makes it possible, provided it is unconditionally and strictly observed, to advance confidently toward a nuclear-free world.

The point here, of course, does not lie in verbal casuistry on account of "Holy Writ," especially in view of the fact that people take all sorts of attitudes to this document, as they have every right to do.

It lies in the same old problem -- namely, Washington's desire to undermine the ABM Treaty, or rather to crumple it up and throw it away like a scrap of paper because it prevents the United States from seeking superiority over the Soviet Union "on a legal basis" by trying to get weapons into space. If this were not so, if the U.S. SDI program did not exceed the framework of the ABM Treaty as people in Washington are claiming, then why should not the U.S. President also treat it as "Holy Writ?"

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CSO: 5200/1084

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA: U.S. PRESSURES NATO GROUP FOR SDI STANCE SUPPORT

PM240747 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Pressure on the Allies"]

[Text] London, 22 Oct -- The United States has resorted to its favorite tactic of putting pressure on its allies with the aim of forcing them to unconditionally support its unconstructive stand which led to the breakdown of accords in the arms control sphere at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

According to press reports, at the scheduled session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at present taking place behind closed doors in Gleneagles (Scotland), Caspar Weinberger, U.S. defense secretary, has channeled his "main efforts" into this. THE GUARDIAN notes that the Pentagon chief has tried, in particular, to secure the support of Washington's NATO partners for the American position regarding the "Star Wars" program, which is the chief obstacle in the way of reaching agreements on arms control. C. Weinberger, the newspaper reports, has insisted that work on this program must not be limited to laboratory research.

A number of West European members of the North Atlantic bloc do not agree with this, however. PA notes that Norway, Denmark, and Greece "expressed indignation" over the fact that the Reagan "Star Wars" program was an obstacle in the way of reaching major agreements in Reykjavik.

The stand taken by Washington's main West European ally, -- Britain, -- at the session was distinguished by its duality. On the one hand, as THE GUARDIAN observes, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher shows "far less enthusiasm than President Reagan" for the "Star Wars" program and speaks in favor of strict observance of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty provisions. At a press conference at the end of the first day of the session's work, George Younger, British secretary of state for defense, said that the British Government would like the unconditional elimination of all medium-range missiles deployed in Europe. On the other hand, the same G. Younger stressed that nuclear weapons must remain "a vitally important component" of the West's military strategy in the foreseeable future.

It is clear that the session in Gleneagles is characterized not only by Washington's pressure on its partners but also by an atmosphere of discord. Attempts by NATO defense ministers to demonstrate a "spirit of solidarity," as THE TIMES observes, are intended only "for the public."

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CSO: 5200/1100

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: BOGACHEV SEES 'MOUNTING OPPOSITION' TO SDI IN U.S.

LD311825 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Mounting opposition to Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" programme on the part of competent American scientists is compelling the advocates of the militarization of outer space in Washington to resort to new, although just as unconvincing, arguments in defence of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI).

According to a recent survey in the United States, 78 percent of members of the American Academy of Sciences — experts on mathematics, physics and other branches of knowledge connected with the SDI effort — assess the chances for the development of a reliable large-scale anti-missile defence of the U.S. within the next 25 years as "extremely low" or "low."

Only four percent of polled scientists maintain that the probability of SDI's success is greater than its failure. Senator William Proxmire said that the results of the poll at the National Academy of Sciences would be very seriously taken into account during congressional debates on the next year funding of the "Star Wars" programme.

Morbidly reacting to the scientific community's assessment of the prospects of developing an effective anti missile defence, President Reagan described the people opposed to the militarization of outer space as voting for higher taxes.

Meanwhile, it is the "Star Wars" programme which harbours the threat of the imminent growth of the U.S. state debt, currently exceeding two trillion dollars, with the ensuing rise of taxes to affect ordinary Americans.

In using the difficult economic situation in the U.S. for publicizing the "Star Wars" project, Reagan assures the voters that SDI can open up whole new areas of technology and industry, create new jobs and raise living standards in America and all over the world.

Hardly many Americans would take the bait and agree to spend their vacation in a hotel at the foot of a volcano about to erupt, no matter what unimaginable privileges and benefits they would be promised by the owners.

Only the future will show how America will react to Reagan's proposal for creating several thousand new jobs through turning the skies over our planet into a giant testing range of strike, including nuclear, weapons.

One would like to hope that common sense will ultimately prevail in the United States as well.

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CSO: 5200/1084

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: CHERNYSHEV VIEWS SDI IN LIGHT OF U.S. ELECTIONS

LD061521 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 6 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Speaking before senior White House staff after midterm elections in the United States, President Ronald Reagan has said with feigned optimism: "Overall, yesterday's election brought fairly good news, although we (Republicans) lost the Senate."

The remark makes one recall the once popular song "Everything Is in Perfect Order, Your Ladyship".

The President also spoke of his resolve to stick to his former course, most notably "positions-of-strength" policy, reiterating his slogan "Peace through strength".

"The bridge to real arms reduction and a just peace rests on two girders: military preparedness and the pursuit of advanced technologies like SDI," he claimed, without reckoning with facts or elementary logic.

But facts are not easy to ignore, while the laws of logic are not determined by the imperial thinking of these or other quarters.

Fact one. Ronald Reagan has himself made the elections a referendum on his policies, first of all on SDI. But the voters have shown no desire to accept this program as a panacea for all America's troubles as they see it as well as other military programs as adding to the gravity of not only external but also domestic problems of their country.

It is these programs that are responsible for the deficit of many billions of dollars and a federal debt of one trillion dollars and have adverse effects on the social and economic situation in the United States.

The country's militarization and the diversion of huge funds and resources to arms development and manufacture have impaired the standards of basic and applied research in civilian sectors and hence also the competitive position of American goods in world markets.

Washington has begun losing the lead in the economic field it has enjoyed among its allies.

It is an open secret that the sum total of the U.S. federal debt is roughly equal to the enormous funds spent by the Reagan administration over its tenure on arms.

Fact two. The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik has made it most plain to all nations that SDI is a nuclear-laser mine rather than a girder under the bridge to real arms reduction and peace.

All Washingtonian tales that "SDI has forced the Soviet Union to negotiate and make concessions" can now only be believed by those who have not been able to come of age in politics.

By contrast, the Soviet initiatives, said Senator Dale Bumpers, had created a new sentiment in the United States and touched off demands to reverse the nuclear juggernaut.

It is not the long-bankrupt U.S. "positions-of-strength" policy but the firm line taken by the Soviet leadership which has said a resolute "no" to the U.S. Administration's attempts to stage a joint funeral for the ABM treaty that has been the barrier to White House plans to bless a runaway arms race in all areas.

Fact three. People in the world, including the United States, have grown tired of twisted-logic claims that the route to disarmament lies through a buildup of newest and ever more deadly arms.

It is impossible to make such claims appear more reasonable even by replacing the word "arms" by "technology", as is the U.S. President's fond habit.

The U.S. Administration's position shaped by the chase of the will-o'-the-wisp of superiority, THE NEW YORK TIMES said, was provocative and damaging to America itself since it tended to fuel the arms race whose cost and danger were only comparable to its futility.

The lessons of history teach that supermanhood autohypnosis, which is an ailment Washington suffers, has always produced lamentable results.

The talking that the Russians must be dealt with from strength is nothing other than a dangerous mania.

New political thinking, without which no-one, not even the new-minted "supermen", can survive in the nuclear and space age, stresses the fundamental law of the times as the strength of policy rather than policy based on strength.

The Democrats' leader in the Senate, Robert Byrd, said: "The President is the one who made this a referendum on his policies and he did not get the mandate that he was seeking. This ought to be a message to him."

An extremely important and serious message has been delivered to the U.S. President in Reykjavik. Now another one comes from U.S. voters.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW: SDI WILL 'DESTABILIZE' STRATEGIC SITUATION

PM240915 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Oct 86 First Edition p 3

[Article by A. Mozgovoy: "'Dead End' of SDI"]

[Text] The stumbling block at the Reykjavik meeting was the obstructionist U.S. stance on the question of observing the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty limiting antimissile defense systems (ABM). Today that is obvious to all. However, the U.S. Administration is trying to dodge responsibility. People overseas are using various kinds of contrivances to prove that it was not the United States but the USSR that was to blame for the lack of concrete results from the Reykjavik dialogue. And stress is laid on the fact that the Soviet Union has allegedly decided to revise the provisions of the ABM Treaty. U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, for instance, claims that "the Russians insisted on radical alterations to the ABM Treaty in order to limit research (on the White House's "strategic defense initiative"--A.M.) to the laboratory." He is backed up by K. Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. According to him, "the Soviet side wanted to limit SDI to a framework that went considerably further than the limitations imposed on it by the ABM Treaty, and that was simply not on." Finally, the U.S. President himself has stated that the United States has the right to conduct research, development [razrabotki], and testing on the SDI program--and to do all this "in accordance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty."

Of course, the text of the ABM Treaty is not memorable verse or deathless prose. That is what those who are trying to present the Soviet Union as some kind of saboteur who intended to undermine the agreement in order to prevent implementation of the President's favorite brainchild--the "strategic defense initiative"--are counting on.

Let us look at the text of the treaty. It actually contains an Article IV which states that the limitations imposed by the agreement do "not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development [razrabotka] or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." But here it is a question not of antimissile weapons but merely of interceptor missiles, their stationary ground launch installations, and their support ABM radar stations--something which stems from Article II of the treaty. In accordance with the agreements, both sides cannot only hold tests but can modernize and replace such complexes and their components (Article VII).

The "Star Wars" program proposed by the White House and the Pentagon envisages the development [razrabotka], testing, and deployment of mainly quite different types of antimissile weapons (laser and particle beam weapons, electromagnetic guns, and so forth) designed for deployment in space. Yet Article V of the treaty states: "Each Party undertakes not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." Taking into account the nature of SDI, its provision can only be interpreted in one way: It prohibits the development [sozdavat], testing, and deployment of antimissile space weapons. And that is just what Washington does not want.

In order to sidestep Article V of the agreement, U.S. representatives refer to one of the agreed statements appended to the treaty. It permits the possibility of the appearance of ABM means based on physical principles other than those which existed at the time the treaty was signed. But the testing and deployment of such means is only permitted in the areas limited by Article III and the complexes themselves must be stationary and land-based.

So just what were the changes unacceptable to the United States that the Soviet Union was striving for? There were none. Moreover, aware of the adherence of the U.S. Administration and the President himself to SDI, our country agreed to the continuation of laboratory research and testing of potentially viable [perspektivnyy] ABM means.

Incidentally, unlike politicians, the U.S. military are more direct and to all intents and purposes admit that the SDI program contravenes the ABM Treaty. Thus, on his return from Reykjavik Vice Admiral J. Poindexter, the U.S. President's national security adviser, promised that "the Soviet side will make all agreements dependent on /OBSERVANCE/ (our emphasis--A.M.) of the provisions of the ABM Treaty."

Yes, in Reykjavik the Soviet Union demanded that the treaty be strictly observed, proposing that its fundamental provisions be maintained and strengthened by pledging not to be beyond the treaty framework for 10 years. If we follow elementary logic, under conditions of the reduction--and, in the future, total elimination--of strategic offensive arms and the destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe the creation [sozdavat] of a space shield would be simply stupid.

But people overseas talk with a stubbornness worthy of better application about the need to implement SDI in the interests of "defense and security." Nothing could be further from the truth than that allegation. SDI will only destabilize the strategic situation and make it worse than it is now. The "exotic weapons" deployed in space can be used not only for defensive purposes but offensive purposes too. "If a nuclear bomb is exploded in space and releases deadly X-rays which are focused into individual beams, it will be possible to almost entirely clear near-earth space of all Soviet satellites at a stroke," U.S. expert J. Miller stated boastfully. His words are an admission that space weapons are one of the elements of nuclear weapons whose elimination was discussed at Reykjavik.

Space weapons will be entirely automatic, otherwise they would be senseless-- that is, all the commands for their use will be given not by people but by machine, and at speeds measured in seconds rather than minutes. Thus, any mistake will inevitably turn into a global war. But even that is not all. In developing [razrabatyvaya] SDI, U.S. ruling circles are aiming to bring other states' space activity under U.S. control. Taking into account the automatic nature of "Star Wars" weapons, other countries would be forced to ask U.S. "permission" to put any objects into near-earth space. Needless to say, nobody will agree to that. And an endless race will start on the creation [sozdaniye] of weapons and counterweapons. Would the United States win that race? That is extremely debatable.

That is also understood by sober-minded U.S. politicians. "The reason why we signed the ABM Treaty is that we did not want to enter into competition with the USSR on defensive and offensive arms in space," Senator G. Hart stressed in commenting on the results of the Reykjavik meeting. "So I think that the President's actions can, quite frankly, be described in the following way: He has left us in a dead end as far as arms control is concerned... History shows that this was a mistake on his part."

One cannot fail to agree with the U.S. legislator's opinion. But there is a way out of the "dead end." It lies in an understanding of the realities of our time--an understanding which requires new thinking and untraditional political solutions. This approach is demonstrated by the Soviet Union. It is time for even the United States to jettison obsolete doctrines and ideas. Security problems cannot be solved by gambling on force. After all, it was not enough to save the countless legions of the Roman Empire from downfall.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA DERIDES CLAIMS OF SDI FEASIBILITY

PM301509 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by K. Markov: "The ABM Treaty--What Is So Great About It?"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's recent speeches have very forcefully emphasized over and over again the idea that the ABM Treaty is the basis -- of course, given strict observance of all its provisions by both sides -- for the process of reducing and then also eliminating strategic offensive arms, which is to lead mankind, in the final analysis and in a historically short time, into a nuclear-free world. The threat of mankind's self-destruction that exists today would thereby be totally eliminated.

The fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty is recognized both by the leaders of almost all countries, including the U.S. NATO allies, and by the overwhelming majority of prominent politicians and specialist in the United States itself.

Only the leaders of the present American Administration, who are striving to get rid of the ABM Treaty because it hinders the implementation of the notorious SDI, express bewilderment: "What is so great [grandioznyy] about this treaty?" What is more, they take the liberty of calling its very essence -- the sides' virtual rejection of the creation [sozdavat] of a defense against a nuclear strike -- "immoral."

At first glance it really could seem incomprehensible: From time immemorial a country's defense has been considered a sacred thing, so how can you renounce your right to defense? This right is incontestable and will always remain so. The question is how to realize it while conforming to specific circumstances.

The greatness of the ABM Treaty lies in the fact that it embodies the state wisdom and political courage of those who were able to understand and openly admit to their own peoples and the whole world that in the nuclear missile age the only sensible means and the very best of the possible means -- including the elimination of nuclear weapons as such -- of defending yourself against these weapons is to renounce defense -- that is, to renounce the creation [sozdaniye] of technical systems for the country's ABM defense.

Despite the seemingly paradoxical nature of this conclusion, it is perfectly intelligible to everyone who sincerely wishes to get to the bottom of a matter which at first glance might seem unintelligible.

In this case the crux of the matter is that, given the absence of territorial ABM systems, each side clearly realizes that, if it inflicted a nuclear strike on the other side, even an enfeebled counterstrike would cause it unacceptable harm -- there will be

no winner in a war. The creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM system by one side would inevitably make the other side fear that it is doing this in order, having delivered a nuclear first strike, to weaken a counterstrike to an "acceptable" level with the help of its extensive ABM system.

This in turn would make the other side either create [sozdavat] its own ABM system or substantially build up and improve its own offensive strategic arms or, most likely, do some combination of both. The result would be an endless spiral of the arms race, each twist of which increases the threat of nuclear catastrophe in a geometric progression.

The laws of logic which gave rise in 1972 to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems are timeless -- which is why the treaty was concluded as a termless treaty.

But, unfortunately, logic is not highly thought of in Washington today -- people there try to turn it inside out in their desire to somehow justify the policy of destroying the ABM Treaty and creating [sozdaniye] a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements. Their "logic" boils down to the following: If, they say, there was ever any point in the ABM Treaty, it was only because at that time the technical potential for creating [sozdat] an efficient ABM system did not exist. But now, they say, this potential exists, so this treaty has not only lost its point but has also become "immoral" because it hinders the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM system capable of defending people.

In connection with such arguments I recall M.S. Gorbachev's words that half-truths are very dangerous lies.

In this case no one will dispute the fact that science and technology have made great strides since the ABM Treaty was concluded. However, this is just a half-truth, worse than a lie. The whole truth is as follows:

First, if it is now possible to create [sozdat] a more efficient ABM system than was possible in the early seventies, then the need to preserve and, what is more, strengthen the ABM Treaty does not diminish but increases by virtue of the very reasons which gave rise to this treaty.

Second, the increased scientific and technical potential really can make it possible -- but only if the other side were to sit with arms folded, which it is stupid to expect -- to create [sozdat] a space "shield" from under which its owner would threaten to inflict a disarming nuclear strike.

However, in the common opinion of the greatest scientists, including American ones, it is impossible to create [sozdat] a shield that would be impenetrable by a counterstrike, not to mention a massive first strike, which it is supposedly intended to defend against.

Realizing that the debunking of the myth of the miracle-working space "shield" threatens to undermine the relatively broad support which, it has to be said, SDI enjoys among Americans as a result of their massive propaganda indoctrination, the White House and the Pentagon are making special efforts to prevent this. The U.S. President personally has also joined in these efforts.

Thus, on addressing young astronauts (American schoolchildren with an interest in space travel) recently, President Reagan deemed it a suitable occasion to try to justify in their eyes his behavior in Reykjavik, where he "stood up" for SDI, which promises them a supposedly cloudless future. And to ensure that the young astronauts did not take it into their heads to doubt his plans, the President told them how in 1926 a certain professor of physics who, according to him, was very authoritative in his own sphere called the idea of a flight to the moon "foolhardy" and "infeasible in principle," referring to the fact that even nitroglycerin -- the most powerful explosive at that time -- "possesses only one-tenth of the energy needed to overcome the earth's gravitational pull."

The President told the kids this (but what he said was, of course, intended not just for kids' ears) in order to disgrace today's nonbelievers who, he said, resemble that professor of physics.

But here is a case in point -- we do not know whether the American young astronauts told the President (any Soviet schoolchild with an interest in space travel would certainly have told him) that the professor, whom he called "very authoritative," was definitely very backward in his sphere even for those times. For as early as the end of last century K.E. Tsiolkovskiy had provided mathematical substantiation and in 1903 also technical substantiation of the possibility of interplanetary flights with the help of liquid-fuel rocket engines. The first rocket with an engine of that type was launched precisely in 1926 -- not just anywhere but in the United States, and by none other than the American scientist R. Goddard. Of course, between that first rocket and the launch of the first Soviet earth satellite scientists and technicians still had a lot of work to do. But only someone not very competent in such matters could declare in the same year of 1926 that it was "infeasible in principle" to overcome the earth's gravitational pull.

It would be possible just to joke about such a thing if it had not given rise to a very serious question: Do those whom the President calls "the best minds in the United States" and who assure him of the feasibility of SDI not resemble that not very competent but, in the President's opinion, "very authoritative" professor? And this is far more dangerous than the delusions of the 1926-model professor about the infeasibility of a flight to the moon. His delusions did no one any harm. But the delusions (even if everything was accounted for by delusions) of the present "best minds" and of those who consider them as such could cost mankind very dear -- in both the literal and the figurative sense.

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CSO: 5200/1084

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR NEWSPAPERS CRITICIZE U.S. SDI STANCE

Korionov Hits Advocates

PM051232 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 86 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA political observer Vitaliy Korionov article: "SDI and American Desires: Why Should the Vital Interests of All Mankind Suffer Because of the American Military-Industrial Complex' Appetites?"]

[Text] The whole world knows now that in Reykjavik there was an opportunity to reach agreement on cardinal problems of international security! If that opportunity was not taken, there is only one reason: The American side put its notorious "strategic defense initiative" above the vital interests of all the peoples, including the American people.

After Reykjavik, the broad international public and many political circles became well aware that the "Star Wars" program was the main obstacle on the path to the radical reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear arms. But in Washington there is no ray of light, no sign of sobering up. The time since Reykjavik has been wasted. The military-industrial complex and the political and militarist circles which serve it are clinging stubbornly to SDI. Representatives of the administration glorify day and night this venture, which is so dangerous to peace and the future. It is presented as some kind of universal means of establishing "American" interests.

What are these "interests"? Why are people across the ocean constantly pushing the "Star Wars" program, trying to draw the allied countries into its political, economic, technological, and military-strategic snares, and urging mankind with all their might toward the bottomless abyss of new spheres of the arms race? There is no secret about this, just as it is no secret that the SDI program is the brainchild of the military-industrial complex and the most reactionary circles of the United States and that it reflects the interests of those forces, and not the American people.

Back in the days when "Reagan's team" was preparing for the "march on Washington," one of its supporters declared: "There is no inherent reason why the United States should not be able to develop a superior military potential in space... The United States must regain its sense of a divine mission."

When the "Star Wars" program appeared, its apologists started expounding the true aims of that militarist program more openly. "We cannot reach agreement with the Russians about a clear sky, we must build more arms and site them in space," they declared. Nor did they conceal the fact that SDI is designed to create weapons for a first strike from space. Remember, for instance, the admission by (Keros), author of many pieces of research in the sphere of U.S. military space programs: "For the United States, the creation of antisatellite forces would be pointless unless it was planned to carry out a first strike and start a nuclear war."

It is equally obvious that SDI has nothing in common with the White House's officially proclaimed goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The irony is that to bring the components of the "nonnuclear space shield" into operation you need nuclear pumping. De Wind, chairman of the American Natural Resources Defense Council, notes: "Merely the development [razrabotka] and creation [sozdaniye] of a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser will require around 200 nuclear tests." Hence Washington's stubborn reluctance to follow the USSR's example and stop nuclear tests.

SDI is also the instrument of designs aimed at destroying the international system of treaties and agreements putting restrictions on the unrestrained arms race which was created with such difficulty in the seventies. The blow is aimed mainly against the ABM Treaty, which broke the tragic cycle of the race for defensive and offensive arms.

The nature of SDI, which is profoundly hostile to the cause of peace, is inseparable from the hegemonist designs of U.S. imperialism. In conditions where U.S. positions in the world arena are growing weaker, American monopolies see SDI as an instrument for ensuring U.S. technological leadership among the other states of the nonsocialist world, and that includes the "brain drain" and the drain of leading technology from the West European countries and Japan to American laboratories.

It is an obvious fact that SDI and imperial desires, SDI and attempts to ensure military superiority, SDI and Washington's claims to diktat in world affairs -- these are inseparable "Siamese twins." But it remains a fact that the present Washington administration either will not, or cannot, or for some reason does not resist the demands of the military-industrial complex and other notorious pushers of "Star Wars." On seeing this deplorable picture, millions of people throughout the world cannot help wondering: Is the U.S. Administration really so profoundly dependent on the forces of the military space monopolies that it cannot lift a finger without their consent? What kind of an administration is that?

But if that is indeed how things stand, another question arises: Why should the world suffer as a result of the selfish aspirations of military magnates and their political supporters across the ocean, who would like to make all mankind hostages to their SDI, their dangerous policy? Imperial desires -- that is what determines the position of those circles, which claim some kind of "right" to play with the fate of billions of people. But the world today is not such that you can count on that.

Naturally, mankind's peace-loving forces see the struggle against this highly dangerous plan of Washington's as the first line of the defense of world peace and the peoples' freedom and independence. The Soviet Union counterposes to the American ruling circles' militarist platform the precise, clear program which it put forward in Reykjavik, whose main proposals are: the reduction of strategic arms, the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, and the banning of nuclear tests.

The peoples' vital interests cannot be reconciled with a situation where the future of peace and life on earth are dependent on the predatory aspirations of those whose intention is to dominate the planet, threatening it with weapons from space.

Kornilov Condemns 'Militarism'

PM060855 [Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 November 1986 First Edition carries on page 1 under the headline "In The Power of the 'Weapons Kings'" a 1,600-word Yuriy Kornilov "International Review" on the deep involvement of the U.S. military-industrial complex in the "Star Wars" program. Noting the military corporations' opposition to public pressure for cuts in military spending, the article cites arms control and disarmament agency director K. Adeluan as saying that "abandoning SDI would mean killing the goose that lays the golden egg." Kornilov maintains that "the monopolies engaged on realizing SDI have very close links not only with the White House and the military but also with the U.S. Congress," and he continues: "Militarism now permeates all spheres of U.S. life, and the arms-manufacturing monopolies, generals, state bureaucracy, ideological apparatus, and science establishment, coming together in the military-industrial complex, continue to appear in the role of the most zealous champions and organizers of the policy of adventurism and aggression. These forces oppose any progress at Soviet-American talks on disarmament problems. They choke any shoots of the new political thinking that accords with the realities of the nuclear age and applaud the U.S. President's negative stand and obstructionist tactics."

It is known that the cruiser and the destroyer which have arrived at Qingdao and which are based at the Japanese port of Yokosuka are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1100

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA REBUTS ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR SDI

PH061243 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 86 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor G. Tsagolov under the rubric "The Echo of Reykjavik": "SDI: The Great Social Swindle"]

[Text] Every day on U.S. television you can see U.S. space devices using laser beams to destroy Soviet missiles supposedly invading U.S. skies. Another burst in the propaganda campaign in favor of SDI is under way. Having exhausted the military-political "arguments," whose flimsy and dangerous nature has become particularly obvious since Reykjavik, the advocates of space militarism have lately been trying to advertise another aspect of the White House's favorite brainchild, namely its social aspect. Efforts are being made to convince the ordinary American, who is not very well versed in the finer points of politics and strategy, that SDI will bring him economic prosperity, do away with unemployment, and so on and so forth.

General J. Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative organization, stated in Congress recently that the gain which can be expected from SDI will be significant in "all sectors of our economy." He is echoed by Congressman K. Kramer. U.S. President R. Reagan is not loath either to hold forth on this theme.

The U.S. press is full of claims that SDI, while protecting the "free world" against the "Soviet nuclear threat," will also be a powerful driving force for scientific and technical progress which will enable U.S. society to accomplish a qualitative leap into the 21st century ahead of time. It is being claimed that the creation of the notorious "space shield" will provide an extraordinary boost to the entire economy, guarantee long-term prosperity, and generously provide civilian sectors with technological innovations. During a recent visit to the United States the author of this article was frequently involved in polemics on this subject at editorial offices, scientific centers, and universities and during meetings with representatives of U.S. business circles.

The ideas of the "beneficial" role of militarist measures are by no means new. They were championed on the eve of World War II by one of the pillars of bourgeois economic science P. [as published] Keynes, who wrote that "evil could breed good... if the United States decided to channel its resources into arms production."

The subsequent decades have shown that the most that military injections can do is to provide a temporary boost resulting in a shortlived upturn in a number of economic sectors. However, the parasitical nature of military expenditure is inevitably revealed with the passage of time because, as K. Marx once noted, military expenditure

"in purely economic terms is tantamount to a nation throwing part of its capital overboard."

The SDI program makes the bankruptcy of the ideas advocating "prosperity through armament" more obvious than ever. The present militarism is hitting working people's living standards and working class socioeconomic gains particularly hard.

Where are the trillions of dollars for SDI to come from? Primarily out of the pockets of ordinary Americans. Taxes are bound to rise. The U.S. state debt, already 2 trillion dollars, will also increase. This will place a heavy burden on several generations of Americans, who will be forced to pay for Washington's present military adventures.

While satisfying the appetites of the military-industrial monopolies and the Pentagon without a murmur, the administration is trying to curb the record growth in the budget deficit by cutting back expenditure for education, health care, and other social needs. SDI will, without any doubt, lead to another offensive against the social programs that even today resemble a shrinking shagreen skin. Certain U.S. economists are afraid — with good reason — that SDI will produce a new wave of inflation, sharp price rises, and consequently a decrease in U.S. working people's real incomes.

Can SDI somehow alleviate mass unemployment? Promises claiming that it can are a deliberate deception. It has been proved that the same amount of capital invested in the military sector creates only about one-third of the jobs it would create in the civilian sector. Meanwhile the SDI program, even compared with other militarist programs, requires unnaturally high expenditure for scientific research and design, development, and testing work.

The Hughes Aircraft aerospace complex in California, where spy satellites are made and SDI research is being conducted, employs only 8,000 people of whom 7,700 are engaged in laboratory research. And only 300 people work on the "shop floor." By siphoning off the best scientists and engineers into military research and development, SDI will contribute to a deceleration of the growth rate in civilian economic sectors which will, in turn, further swell the army of the unemployed.

Thus, "Star Wars," rather than easing the working people's position, will make it more difficult. It will only serve to enrich General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, Rockwell International, Boeing, and other aerospace concerns and also a certain section of engineers and military specialists.

The gulf between military and civilian work is now so great that the creation of new consumer goods on the basis of SDI developments is not very likely. Most modern military technology is far removed from the civilian needs of the mass consumer market. And even if SDI does produce some spin-off from the nonmilitary sectors, it will still have cost several times more than direct investment in civilian spheres.

Describing the pernicious socioeconomic effects of militarism, U.S. scientist L. Dumas writes: "We are basing our actions on the false premise that the development of increasingly complex weapon systems ensures our national security. We must stop the construction of all the systems that the Pentagon and its suppliers are thirsting for. We must show political will and substantially reduce the burden of militarism. This is the only way to return the nation to genuine prosperity and security."

The debate about SDI is widening constantly in the West. However, no matter what propaganda tricks and hypocritical promises of social prosperity its advocates resort to, more and more Americans are becoming aware that the "Star Wars" program is the main obstacle in the way of eliminating nuclear missile arms and achieving lasting peace and consequently can only serve to undermine any kind of prosperity. This has become particularly clear since the meeting in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1084

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: CHERVOV ANSWERS QUESTIONS ON BOOK ON SDI

LDO51626 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1115 GMT 5 Nov 86

[From review of KOMMUNIST, No 16]

[Text] Colonel General Nikolay Fyodorovich Chervov is Chief of Directorate at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and candidate of military sciences. KOMMUNIST prints his review of a book by a group of Soviet scientists entitled "Space Weapons: the Security Dilemma" [KOSMICHESKIYE VOORUZHENIYA: DILEMMA BEZOPASNOSTI].

[Begin recording] [unidentified interviewer] Nikolay Fyodorovich, why was it that as a military man you decided to review a book by scientists?

[Chervov] The grounds for this decision lie in the fact that in the book the Soviet scientists examined a highly topical problem connected with the U.S. plans to create space weapons. For 3 and 1/2 years now the U.S. Star Wars program has had the whole world in a fever. The U.S. Administration is trying to convince the world public that the SDI program is one of defense aimed at destroying ballistic missiles.

In actual fact that is not the case. SDI is a military program aimed at creating a large scale antimissile defense system with space-based elements and at developing new types of weaponry and deploying it in space. The space weaponry which is being created in the Star Wars program has the characteristics of offensive weaponry.

First, it can be used for the sudden destruction of the most important space installations of another country -- early warning satellites, communications satellites and others -- in order to blind that other country, catch it unawares and thus subvert it or completely deprive it of the opportunity to take actions in response to a nuclear attack.

Second, space weapons such as lasers, electromagnetic beams and self-guided missiles have a long range, up to 4,000 or 5,000 km. Can one really consider weapons with a range of 4,000 or 5,000 km to be defensive? Of course not. This is multipurpose weaponry. It is capable of destroying installations in space and from space it can destroy installations on earth. Scientists confirm that an industrially developed country can be flung back into the Middle Ages in just a few dozen minutes as a result of a strike from space.

The statements from Washington's representatives to the effect that SDI is for defense purposes amount to deception of the public. What is at issue is the acquisition of the capacity to deliver a first strike and thus to achieve decisive military superiority

over the Soviet Union and other countries in order subsequently to blackmail them and impose its will on them.

For my part, naturally it was interesting to see how Soviet scientists view the problem of space weaponry. The book's authors confirmed with factual material the idea that in its aggressive military policy the United States has now gambled on space and has embarked on a major venture. Using space weaponry it is trying to make the United States invulnerable in a nuclear conflict it unleashes and thus to save itself from the horrors of nuclear war and place other countries under threat. What Washington strategists are dreaming of is the illusory hope of victory in a nuclear war and of establishing world domination.

This idea indeed is confirmed by the Soviet scientists in the book I have reviewed.

[Interviewer] Nikolay Fyodorovich, tell me please which legal aspects of the conformity of SDI to international law are discussed by the authors of this book?

[Chervov] The book puts forward arguments showing that Star Wars plans are incompatible with international law. The SDI program is in very crude contradiction of the ABM restriction treaty, firstly because it is leading up to the creation of an antimissile system for defending the whole of the country's territory and furthermore, as is stated by the U.S. Administration, even of allies of the United States, something that is banned by an article of the first ABM Treaty; second, because we are talking about a space based antimissile system that is banned by Article Five of this treaty. Therefore the implementation of SDI will lead to the elimination of the ABM treaty.

Furthermore, the SDI program proposed the use of small and medium strength nuclear explosions in space for pumping X-ray lasers. And that will lead to the undermining of other multiaspected agreements, in particular the 1963 treaty banning tests of nuclear tests in three environments, including space and also the 1967 treaty on principles for state research into the use of space. These treaties ban the launch into earth orbit of any installations carrying nuclear weapons. The 1977 convention banning military or any other hostile use of means of influencing the natural environment will be violated.

Finally, the 1968 treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons will be violated.

Thus the U.S. Star Wars threatens the entire international legal system in the areas of disarmament and security. This is dealt with in quite a lot of detail in the reviewed book by Soviet scientists. [end recording]

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CSO: 520J/1084

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

UK SCIENTISTS JOIN IN BOYCOTT OF SDI WORK

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 27 Oct 86 p 8

[Article by Colin Randall]

[Text]

SCIENTISTS opposed to President Reagan's "Star Wars" programme claimed yesterday that more than half the physicists in 24 British universities had now joined a boycott of research work linked to the project.

Among more than 500 signatories to a pledge to refuse any funding arising from the programme—officially the Strategic Defence Initiative—are three Nobel prize winners, 22 Fellows of the Royal Society and at least ten university heads of department.

The scientists argue that although starved of cash for research, they should turn down offers of "easy money" for participating in a programme seen by them as technically dubious, a threat to world security and an obstacle to super-powers arms control.

But the Ministry of Defence later challenged a suggestion from the boycott organisers that the advisory committee inviting inquiries about the research must be experiencing a disappointing response.

A Ministry spokesman said 40 academic institutions, including universities, were among some 400 British bodies which had already expressed interest.

Nearly 70 of the total figure were actively seeking work and nine contracts worth £25,700,000 had been awarded so far.

Deeply misguided

He added: "There is nothing new in academic opposition being expressed. If people don't want to get involved, it is up to them."

Leaders of the boycott campaign had earlier emphasised at a London press conference that they were voicing their opposition not to any form of military research but specifically to the "deeply misguided, dangerous and enormously expensive Star Wars programme".

In the British contribution to an international drive by scientists rejecting "Star Wars", the pledge was circulated in 30 science departments at 24 universities. Out of a possible 1,051 scientists, 545 agreed to sign.

Prof. Tom Kibble, head of physics at Imperial College, London, said: "Although my own field of research is very far from anything that could have any relationship to SDI, many

members of my department are working on subjects that could have very direct relevance."

Space violation

"At a time when research funding is very difficult to get, it is hard to refuse money of any kind and it is therefore remarkable that so many have signed this pledge."

Prof. Kibble, who described himself as one of many scientists who would happily work on other military research, said few believed that making nuclear weapons impotent or obsolete to be realistically possible on the time scale envisaged by President Reagan.

Dr Leslie Allen, a laser physicist and deputy Rector of North East London Polytechnic, said SDI was "really a nonsense". Conventional lasers would be unable to respond to the massive level of power requirements involved, while the programme also represented a violation of a number of space and arms treaties.

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CSO: 5240/016

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC JOURNAL CITES SDI AS MAIN OBSTACLE

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 29 No 45, 10 Nov 86 p 10

[Article by She Duanzhi: "Twists and Turns After the Summit"]

[Text] U.S.-Soviet relations since the Reykjavik summit are still characterized by both dialogue and confrontation, a situation that is likely to continue for a long time to come.

The past three months have seen many surprising, often dramatic, turns in US-Soviet relations.

On August 23, Gennady Zakharov, a Soviet employee at the United Nations, was arrested by the US on espionage charges;

On August 30, Nicholas Daniloff, an American journalist for the *US News and World Report*, was arrested in Moscow and charged with espionage;

On September 12 the two were released into the custody of their respective embassies and later allowed to go home;

On September 17 the US expelled 25 Soviet diplomats working for the United Nations;

During the weekend of October 11-12, President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held a summit meeting in Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland, with "disappointing" results;

On October 15, the first meeting since the Reykjavik summit between the US and the Soviet Union on disarmament began in Geneva;

On October 19, five American diplomats were expelled by the Soviet Union;

On October 21, the US expelled 55 Soviet diplomats in retaliation;

On October 22, the Soviet Union announced the expulsion of another five American diplomats, along with the withdrawal of 260 Soviet employees from the US embassy in Moscow and the US consulate in Leningrad;

Finally, on October 23, the US called a truce in the diplomat expulsion war.

It is clear that so far reason has prevailed in US-Soviet relations whenever there was a risk of dangerous collision. What is it, then, that makes their relations so turbulent and, yet, at the same time, prevents them from coming to blows?

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) advanced by President Reagan in 1983 seems to be the main obstacle that stands in the way of reaching substantial agreements on nuclear disarmament between the US and the Soviet Union. During the Reykjavik summit, after mutual concessions, agreements were reached in principle on intermediate-range missiles and

strategic offensive weapons, and on a nuclear test ban. The finalization of these agreements was, however, prevented by a fatal dispute over SDI. The precondition for the Soviet concessions on nuclear arms reduction was that the SDI programme must be confined to the laboratory for the next ten years. This proposal was rejected by the US, which views the SDI as a powerful bargaining chip and a defensive shield.

Following the summit came a propaganda war. Each accused the other of undermining the summit. Words like "disappointment" and "failure" filled the newspapers. But soon the tone changed. Both sides shifted the emphasis onto the brighter side of the summit. Reagan indicated that the invitation to Gorbachev to visit the US was still valid and the door to negotiation was still open. Gorbachev described the summit as "useful" and "hopeful." But then came the expulsion war.

The strong pressure for peace from the people of the world, including those in the United States and the Soviet Union, plays a big role in keeping the two superpowers working together for a world free of nuclear weapons. The negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union are of world concern because its security is in fact in the hands of these two countries. Any achievements towards nuclear disarmament are welcome, while setbacks or deterioration in US-Soviet relations always meet with the strong

opposition of world opinion. Both leaders must take into account the people's desire for peace. This is one factor containing confrontation within certain limits and keeping the negotiations going.

Another important factor is that both have domestic economic problems. The Soviet Union has long been bedevilled by the heavy burden of its huge military expenditures in the arms race with the United States, which has seriously delayed national economic development and the improvement of the living standards of the people. It cannot afford a new and more costly round of the arms race, especially one in space. According to *Baltimore Sun*, the US also has problems: its huge budget deficit and mounting debts. Therefore both sides feel a need to control the arms race. Hence the importance they attach to removing any obstacle to negotiations.

On the whole, the basic pattern of the relations between the US and the Soviet Union remains unchanged. Both suspect the other of trying to gain military superiority—this is the reason their relations sometimes go sour. Yet they do share something in common—a wish to find rules to restrain the endless arms race, which neither of them can afford.

The year 1986 has been declared a year of peace by the United Nations. The United States and the Soviet Union have the main responsibility for safeguarding world peace. At least they are now talking to each other. ■

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CSO: 5200/4017

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: WEINBERGER PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATION AT SUMMITS HIT

Sturua Attack

PM191651 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 2

[Melor Sturua article: "Caspar Weinberger's 'Four Principles'"]

[Text] A few days ago Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger spoke at a Women's National Republican Club in New York. What did the Pentagon chief talk about the the Republican Amazons? According to his own words, his speech was devoted to "the way to conduct talks with the Soviet Union." It cannot be denied that this is an exceptionally topical theme since Washington's inability and unwillingness to conduct talks with the Soviet Union on the basis of equality and mutual security is one of the main reasons for the disarray in international relations today. With hindsight it is possible to say that Weinberger's speech was devoted to the diametrically opposed theme, namely how not to conduct talks with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Weinberger opened his speech on a somewhat anecdotal note, recalling the 1955 summit talks. "It was like this," Weinberger said. "President Eisenhower was coming to the end of an important speech. He had just put forward our proposal for 'open skies' when, suddenly, according to Eisenhower's words 'without any warning, simultaneously with my closing words the most deafening peal of thunder which I had ever heard rang out,' and the lights went out in the hall. After a short while the lights came back. Clearly, struck by this sign of providence, or possibly because he took this incident to be a clear demonstration of U.S. technical superiority, the Soviet chairman replied that his government was interested in our proposal!"

Telling this story to the Republican Amazons, Weinberger added with feigned regret: "We have not always been as successful as this." However in this fable of Weinberger's, morals fare as badly as facts. Let me remind readers that the plan for "open skies" pursued the aim of legalizing U.S. espionage. Despite the "deafening peal of thunder", the Soviet Union rejected this provocative plan. (Incidentally, the correctness of the Soviet stance was graphically and convincingly borne out by the U-2 spy plane affair. That indeed was a bolt out of the blue!)

As a second example of the ability to conduct talks with the Soviet Union Weinberger cited President Reagan's "No" in Reykjavik. Both in the case of Eisenhower, "the thunderer" and Reagan, "the negator" we have classical examples of the negative way of conducting talks with our country. It was precisely these two opening cords which set the tone for the rest of Weinberger's speech.

In it, the head of the U.S. military department formulated -- to cite his own words -- the "basic rules of the game" or the "four principles," by which the Reagan administration is guided "in talks with Moscow." Let us take a look at Mr. Weinberger's "four principles" one by one.

Principle Number One. "We must not," Mr. Weinberger said, "take on trust the idea of moral equivalence, that is the idea that there is no difference between the moral standards of the United States and the Soviet Union." Mr. Weinberger may be surprised by this, but we could not agree more with him on this point. There can be no mention of moral equivalence between the land of the Soviets and the United States. Our countries have different sociopolitical foundations and different ideals. What moral equivalence can there be between the world's first socialist state where exploitation of man by man has been abolished forever and the world's gendarme! Incidentally, the example cited by Weinberger confirms this, but by no means in the manner which he intended. He compares U.S. aggression against Grenada with the internationalist assistance which we are giving to Afghanistan. The Pentagon chief has a short memory. Our troops are in Afghanistan at the invitation of that country's legitimate government whom they help in the struggle against the counterrevolution and external aggressive forces. The United States invaded Grenada, toppled that country's legitimate government, and restored a counterrevolutionary regime there placing power in the hands of its puppets.

Indeed, the moral and political principles which form the basis of our systems are not only not equivalent, they are diametrically opposed. However, guided by new, rather than Neanderthal thinking, we must admit that there is a sphere which offers scope for talks. It is the preservation and consolidation of peace. In our age, the nuclear-space age, it is no longer possible to resolve moral and ethical disputes or sociopolitical contradictions by means of arms. The civilization's self-destruction is too high a price to pay for this. In conducting its affairs in the international arena and especially in talks with the United States, the Soviet Union is guided precisely by this new way of thinking. Geneva and Reykjavik are convincing evidence of this.

Citing Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, Weinberger passed on to the second principle. Cutting out Weinberger's verbiage, this principle could be described as the "position of strength" policy. Interpreting, or rather turning the facts of international life upside down, Weinberger claims that it was only the "position of strength" policy which forced the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. Yet it is well known that it was the Soviet Union which was the moving force behind all the Soviet-American summits, including the latest one in Reykjavik. It did this not in deference to Washington's strength, but because it heeds the voice of reason, it heeds the demands of the peoples thirsting for peace.

To speak to us in the language of force is wasting time. Even the distant predecessors of Mr. Weinberger came to realize this when they organized the intervention against young Soviet Russia almost 70 years ago. U.S. political leaders since then have had more than one occasion to see this for themselves. Fist law is not just immoral, it is also ineffective.

Here is Weinberger's Principle Number Three. This is how it is formulated: "We must remember that the decisionmaking system in the Soviet Union is very different from ours. There are no real elections and no public opinion in the Soviet Union." Again, as we can see, a half-truth is developed into complete lies. Of course, the system of decisionmaking in the USSR is different from that of the United States since their sociopolitical systems are different. But the Pentagon chief's subsequent arguments are nothing but well-worn anti-Soviet clichés. In this case they act like a boomerang. The Soviet leaders' foreign policy has the support of Soviet public opinion, of the people who demand peace, who demand general and complete disarmament. It is this support which gives our proposals their moral strength. What can be said about the link between Washington's policy and the demands of the U.S. public? I will confine myself to citing one highly illustrative example: As is known, the overwhelming majority of Americans favor an immediate ending of all nuclear tests.

What is more, so does the supreme legislative body, the Congress. Yet what is happening? Nuclear explosions in Nevada follow each other in quick succession and to the accompaniment of their reverberations and with their help new types of mass destruction weapons are being created and the militarization of space is under way.

Weinberger's second claim, the claim that all decisions in the Soviet Union are made by "two or three people," while in the United States it is all but a nationwide assembly that does the decisionmaking does not hold water either. What has been said before is sufficient to refute this claim. While in the Soviet Union the principle of government is collective leadership, in Washington it is secrecy. The latest eloquent example of this is "Irangate," the scandal about the secret U.S. arms deliveries to Iran. These deals were arranged by a small group of the military within the National Security Council in the White House. Neither Congress, nor the State Department, and nor even the Pentagon headed by Mr. Weinberger were told about them. Incidentally, "Irangate" is no exception. Let us recall the tragedy of Chile which was plotted in secret within the CIA, let us recall the undeclared wars against Nicaragua and Afghanistan, let us recall the notorious provocation in the Gulf of Tonkin when Congress was twisted around a little finger and made to sanction the bloody war in Vietnam.

Finally, Number four, the last of Weinberger's Principles: "We must always take a long-term view because it is much easier for the Russians to make long-term plans than it is for democratic countries." Here, too, a half-truth is used as bait in the trap of a big lie. Yes, indeed, our foreign policy is based on long-term planning; unprincipled zigzags and waverings are not characteristic of our policy. The highway of our foreign policy is the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy of peace which dates back to the Decree on Peace and whose present-day version is embodied in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January Statement, the Statement which points the way to a world without wars and weapons. What do we see in Washington? Unscrupulous and dangerous vacillation, lack of respect for existing accords, a desire to outwit and outmaneuver partners in talks for the sake of narrowly egoistic aims. Accords are reached, but treaties fail to be signed, treaties are signed, but they fail to be ratified, and so it goes on, and on, without end.

Weinberger needed the Fourth Principle in order to pour cold water on the optimistic realists who rightly believe that broad accords to strengthen peace are not just possible in principle but that essentially they are overdue. "Because Americans are prone to being impatient, the sometimes feel discouraged when talks drag on, and therefore there are always demands that agreements be signed," Weinberger declared. What about public opinion then to which he is so fond of referring? Public opinion always wants to go too fast, the Pentagon chief claims in an effort to justify Reagan's negative stance in Reykjavik and to deflect just criticism from his patron. What Weinberger means by the long-term outlook is a policy of procrastination and delays, a policy of shelving the most topical and vital problems of the present time, a policy of trying to justify the fatal passiveness of the U.S. Administration in questions of preserving peace and its feverish activity in the sphere of the arms race.

So this is what Caspar Weinberger's "Four Principles" look like. They are needed by Weinberger and his ilk merely to prop up the edifice of U.S. imperialist domination of the world which they are building. Way back, Weinberger failed in his attempts to join the Air Force because he had a fatal shortcoming -- he always came in to land much sooner than was necessary. Now the man whom they did not trust with an aircraft has been entrusted with the entire U.S. war machine. Weinberger's "Four Principles" are not just a dubious navigational aid, but also an extremely dangerous one.

Ovchinnikov Attack

PM181500 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[V. Ovchinnikov "Rejoinder": "Primitive Formula"]

[Text] The Pentagon chief delivered a speech in New York on a subject which would appear to have more to do with the State Department than the Defense Department: How to conduct talks with the Soviet Union. The speaker began, according to custom, with an introduction. For some decades, he said, the Americans have witnessed how NOT [capitalized work printed in boldface] to conduct talks with Moscow. And then, in Reykjavik, the President taught everyone a lesson...

What is instructive about that lesson? In Weinberger's opinion, you must follow four rules in dealing with the Russians. First: exclude any idea of "moral equivalence." The most serious error is to believe that the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union can have "common hopes and aspirations."

The second rule embodies the cult of strength. The United States, the Pentagon chief states bluntly, must become strong before starting talks with the Soviet Union. Otherwise it can never achieve agreements which meet America's interests.

Weinberger's third rule recommends taking into account the fact that it is easier for Soviet leaders to adopt decisions in the course of talks. (If you remember the U.S. Administration's profound dependence on the military-industrial complex, here one can, perhaps, agree with Weinberger.)

Lastly, rule four: When conducting talks, take a long-term view. The Russians, he says, can plan their actions far in advance and regard that as an advantage. The Americans feel discouraged when talks drag on. Reagan, he says, only had to show implacability on the question of SDI for the public to start making a fuss about "lost opportunities" and "dangerous consequences." From all this Weinberger concludes: Patience and determination to restore U.S. military might -- that is the key to successful talks with the USSR.

Those are the views of the head of the military department of the leading capitalist power. It is pointless to seek even a glimmer of a new way of thinking, even a hint of an awareness that security in the nuclear age can no longer be identified with force, that for the USSR and the United States security can only be mutual, and in global terms it can only be universal. Nor is there any sign of an awareness of the inescapable truth that for all the contradictions of the modern world, peoples and states have a common interest: to prevent nuclear catastrophe and deliver mankind from death.

Weinberger's "four rules" smack of primitive anticommunism from the arsenal of Truman, who at one time tried in vain to blackmail the Soviet Union with the American monopoly of atomic weapons. Indeed, history also teaches us that some people do not learn from history.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

REPORTAGE OF GORBACHEV 12 OCT PRESS CONFERENCE

PRAVDA Second Edition Version

PM201231 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 86 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Press Conference"--capitalized passages printed in boldface]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave a press conference in Reykjavik on 12 October for the journalists covering the Soviet-U.S. meeting.

Addressing the representatives of mass news media, M.S. Gorbachev declared:

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, comrades! I greet you all.

About an hour has passed since our meeting with U.S. President Mr Reagan ended. It went on for slightly longer than we had planned. This was necessitated by the work in hand. I would like to apologize to you for not arriving for the press conference at the scheduled time.

You already know that the meeting was held on the initiative of the Soviet leadership. Naturally, however, there would have been no meeting had there been no agreement on Mr Reagan's part. I would, therefore, say that it was our joint decision to hold the meeting in Reykjavik.

Now the meeting has ended. It is said at times that a face is blurred seen from close up [reference to quotation from poet Sergey Yesenin, used figuratively to mean that the importance of an event can be assessed only when it has become part of the past]. I have only just emerged from the meeting which, especially at its last stage, took the form of heated discussions. I am still in the grip of impressions from these discussions. Nonetheless, I will attempt right away not only to share my impressions with you but also to work out what actually happened. Even so, these will be initial impressions, initial assessments, an initial analysis. The entire meeting will still have to be evaluated substantively.

A major meeting took place, and you will appreciate this when I describe its contents and the problems which were the subject of very broad, very intensive, and very keen discussion at the meeting.

The atmosphere at the meeting was friendly. We had an opportunity to express our opinions freely and without restrictions. This enabled us to gain a deeper understanding on many major problems of world politics and bilateral relations, and primarily on problems which are at the focus of the entire world public's attention, on questions of war and peace and ending the nuclear arms race — in short, on the entire package of questions contained within this subject.

I regularly read the world press and, over the past few days I saw what a broad response was generated by the news that it [the meeting] was being held. Much was said in this regard about the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and about the U.S. President; there were questions whether they were not rather in a hurry, whether there was a need for such a meeting, who made concessions to whom, who outdid whom, and so on and so forth. [paragraph continues]

But you know, the reason which provided the starting point for our proposal to the U.S. President to meet without delay and for his decision to respond positively to this invitation is highly significant.

Now, I would like to turn back to Geneva, when we met for the first time. That was a major dialogue and now, after the passage of quite some time, this still remains our assessment of the Geneva meeting.

At that time, if you recall, we recognized the special responsibility borne by the USSR and the United States for the preservation of peace, and we jointly declared that a nuclear war must never be fought and that there can be no victors in it. This is an admission of vast importance. We also declared that neither side would pursue military superiority. This is also a very important conclusion.

Almost a year has passed since Geneva. The Soviet leadership has remained loyal to the pledges it gave there. Having returned from Geneva, we extended our moratorium: It was to have been in force in our country until 1 January this year. Silence has reigned on our testing ranges for 14 months — is this not evidence of our commitment to the Geneva accords and our responsibility for the fate of peace? Even so, these were not easy decisions to make, bearing in mind that the explosions in Nevada went on, and are taking place also now. On 15 January we made a major statement substantiating a program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century.

Last June the Warsaw Pact states submitted a major comprehensive program for large-scale reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. This is also a major step, taking into account the anxieties expressed by West Europeans and the United States.

Drawing lessons from the Chernobyl tragedy, we put forward the initiative to hold a special session of the IAEA General Conference in Vienna. It did take place, and you know its results — they are extremely promising. Now we have an international machinery making it possible to solve many of the most important questions of the safety of nuclear power engineering.

In other words, during the past period — and I think that I would not exaggerate by thus assessing our policy, because I speak of facts and not just of intentions — we have done everything to help shape a new thinking in the nuclear age. We note with gratification that the shoots of this new thinking are springing up, especially in the European field. In particular, this was displayed by the success of the Stockholm conference.

Maybe I will end with this the list of specific actions which we undertook, guided by the spirit and letter of the accords with President Reagan in Geneva. I think that the facts themselves will enable you to appraise the seriousness of our attitude toward them.

Still, why was the meeting in Reykjavik necessary, what were the motives behind this initiative of ours?

The point is that the hopes of major changes in the world situation, hopes which sprung in all of us, started fading soon after the meeting in Geneva. And not without reason, I think. Very much, maybe even too much, was said at the Soviet-U.S. talks; there were, as I told the President yesterday, 50 to 100 options of all kinds of proposals. This alone already gives rise to doubts about the fruitfulness of the discussions taking place there. [paragraph continues]

Had there been one or two, even three options, which would have made possible to somewhat narrow the discussion and concentrate the quest in some important directions, it could have been expected that the quest would have ended by coming to some specific agreements and proposals to the governments. But nothing of the sort is happening in Geneva, even though the main questions of world politics are being discussed there.

Lately these talks, to put it simply, have been idling and have come to a virtual standstill. The arms race has not been halted, and matters are increasingly obviously approaching a point beyond which a new spiral of this race with unpredictable consequences — both political and military — becomes inevitable.

Our major initiatives, of which I spoke earlier, have generated a broad response among the world public. But they have not encountered the requisite understanding from the U.S. Administration.

The situation has deteriorated, alarm has started growing again in the world. I think that I am not exaggerating — even you yourselves are witnesses to this: The world is in turmoil. The world is in turmoil and it demands of the leaders of all countries, first and foremost of the great powers and primarily the Soviet Union and the United States, political will and determination capable of halting the dangerous trends.

And so, something had to be done to overcome this course of events. We drew the conclusion: A new impetus is needed, a powerful impetus, in order to turn the process in the necessary direction. Such an impetus could be given only by the leaders of the USSR and the United States. This was precisely why, replying to President Reagan's 25 July letter, I decided to invite him to an immediate meeting. I wrote: The situation is such that we must put all business aside for a day or two and hold a meeting without delay.

This letter was handed to the President by Comrade Shevardnadze.

And so, now this exceptionally important meeting has taken place. We assumed that much would depend on its outcome. Of course, we did not come to the meeting empty-handed.

What did we bring to Reykjavik? We brought an entire package of major proposals which, were they to be adopted, could really bring within a short time, I would say, a breakthrough in all directions of the struggle to limit nuclear weapons and to really avert the threat of nuclear war, they would make it possible to start moving toward a nuclear-free world.

I proposed to the President that we give right here, in Reykjavik, instructions to our foreign ministers and other appropriate departments to prepare three draft agreements which the President and I could later sign during my visit to the United States.

THE FIRST -- ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS -- to reduce them by at least 50 percent. With a view, moreover, to completely eliminating those deadliest of weapons already by the end of this century. We proceeded from the premise that the world expects really major steps, profound reductions, and not some kind of cosmetic steps merely to pacify public opinion for a limited period. The time has come when there is real need for bold and responsible actions in the interests of the whole world, including the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Of course, the Soviet and U.S. delegations which would have been instructed to prepare the draft agreement on strategic weapons would have had to balance properly and honestly a reduction in their historically established structure. We are talking about the triad recognized way back during the elaboration of SALT II. But when we started discussing this question with the President, we again received in reply everything that has figured at the Geneva talks -- all the same levels and sublevels, a lot of arithmetic, to put it briefly, and everything in order to confuse the essence of the question. At that point we introduced the following clarification -- to cut by half each part of strategic offensive weapons: ground-based strategic missiles, submarine-based strategic missiles, and strategic bombers:

The U.S. delegation agreed to that. Thus, we reached accord on a very major issue.

Let me, moreover, draw your attention to the fact that here we made serious concessions. You evidently remember that when we put forward the proposal on 50-percent reductions in Geneva we also included medium-range missiles in the numbers of strategic weapons, because they could reach our territory. Now we gave up this demand, and we also deleted from the agenda the question of forward-based means.,

And so, thanks to these major concessions, there was agreement in Reykjavik on strategic arms reductions.

OUR SECOND PROPOSAL CONCERNED MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS. We proposed that instructions be given to prepare an accord also on this type of weapon, having in mind a rejection of all hitherto discussed options -- interim, temporary, and so on -- and a return to the former U.S. option, in other words -- to completely destroy U.S. and Soviet

medium-range missiles in Europe. Moreover, in contrast with our Geneva proposals, we now left completely aside the French and British nuclear potentials. Even though, you understand, this was a great concession on our part. After all, these two countries are allies of the United States and possess a nuclear potential which is continually being built up and improved. Their entire military activity is closely coordinated within the NATO framework. We are perfectly well aware of this. Nonetheless, we eliminated this obstacle to accord.

To go on, there was concern regarding Asia. Here we also offered a compromise: Let us get down to talks right away, sort out complaints, and find a solution. We understood that the question of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km would inevitably arise. We also submitted a proposal on this question: Let us freeze these missiles and embark on talks about their fate.

There you have the major measures which we wanted to see [khoteli poyti]. It seems to me that the Americans did not expect this from us, but they engaged in discussion and frankly declared that this did not suit them -- to withdraw their missiles from Europe. They started inviting us again to the interim option. But we insisted on Europe's complete liberation from Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles.

In the course of the discussion on this question we drew the U.S. President's attention to the fact that he was, to all appearances, renouncing his brainchild -- the "zero option," which he persistently offered in the past, and now he was being met halfway.

The discussion continued right until today, a sharp discussion, and we decided to take yet another constructive step: [paragraph continues]

We declared that given the implementation of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe we agree to leave 100 warheads on our medium-range missiles in Asia, and the Americans -- and equal number of their same missiles on U.S. territory. Finally we reached agreement also on this type of nuclear weapon even though, as I already said, our major concession was also helpful here.

Movement must begin. I have said this repeatedly. Bold and original solutions are needed! If we were always to turn to the past for advice, to use what applies to completely different times, not giving any attention to where we are today and where we will be tomorrow, and that there may not be any tomorrow at all, if we were to act in this fashion there would be no dialogue at all. Is it not necessary to make a start somewhere? We offered [posli na] this step even though, I repeat, this is not easy for us.

AS REGARDS THE READINESS TO OFFER [poyti na] DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE FORMULATED THE QUESTION AS FOLLOWS: SINCE WE ARE ENTERING A SPECIFIC STAGE IN THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THERE MUST BE ABSOLUTE CLARITY AS REGARDS VERIFICATION [kontrol]. Verification [kontrol] must be more rigorous. The Soviet Union advocates triple verification [kontrol] which would ensure each side's complete confidence that it would not fall into a trap, a snare. We confirmed our readiness for any forms of verification [kontrol]. In view of this stance of ours, this question was also taken off the agenda.

The following is another problem linked with the fact that we are embarking on practical elimination of nuclear weapons: Each side must have guarantees that during this period neither one of them will start seeking military superiority. In my view, this is a perfectly fair, legitimate formulation of the question — both from a political and a military viewpoint.

From the political viewpoint: If we were to start a reduction, then show concern to ensure that all the brakes which are now in effect and stand in the way of the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of weapons are not only preserved but also reinforced.

From the military viewpoint: Concern must really be shown to ensure that, while the process of reduction is going on, one of the sides does not secretly prepare, capture the initiative, and attain military superiority. This is impermissible. That goes for the Soviet Union, too. But we are entitled to make exactly the same demand of the U.S. side.

This is why we formulated the question as follows: In a situation when we are entering a stage of real and deep reductions, when a 10-year period — and this is how this entire situation appeared to us at the meeting — would see the elimination of the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and the United States, it is necessary not only to dismantle the mechanisms constraining the arms race, but also to strengthen them, and primarily such a mechanism as the ABM [Treaty]. Our proposal boiled down to the following: We would strengthen the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration with an identical pledge by the two sides that they would not take advantage of the right to withdraw from the treaty over these 10 years. These will be precisely the 10 years when the nuclear potential's reduction would be taking place.

A correct, logical formulation? Logical. Serious? Serious. Does it accord with the interests of both sides? Yes, it does. We emphasized in our proposal that during the 10 years all the ABM [Treaty] demands would be rigorously observed, that only research and tests within the laboratory framework would be allowed.

What did we want to say by this? We know the commitment of the U.S. Administration and the President to SDI. Our agreement to the continuation of laboratory tests would have given the President an opportunity to see through [do kontsa dovesti] his idea and to clarify [vyясnit] what SDI actually is. Even though, I must say, it is already clear to many people and to us what it really is.

It was right at that point that a real duel began between the two approaches in world politics toward questions like the termination of the arms race and the banning of nuclear weapons. The President insisted right through the end that America should have the right to research and test everything concerning SDI not only in laboratories but also outside them, including in outer space. But who could agree to that?

So it turned out: We were on the brink of making major historic decisions, because all previous documents so far — ABM, SALT I, SALT II — talked only about arms limitations, while now [the talk was about] significant reduction. Insofar as the U.S. Administration, confident in its technological advantage, is striving, as we now convinced ourselves once more, to break through to military superiority via SDI, it attempted [poshat na] to bury the almost-reached accords which we had already agreed [soglasovali]. The only thing left to do was to give instructions to elaborate treaties and procedure — how to implement them practically. All this could have been signed in Washington during my visit.

I told the President: We are missing a historic chance. Our positions have never before been so close. On parting, the President told me that he was disappointed and that I, he said, had come unwilling to sign an agreement, an accord. Why, he said, are you, because of just one word, showing such rigidity of approach toward SDI and the tests problem? I replied: The point is not the word but the essence.

The U.S. Administration's approach toward SDI is the key to understanding what it has in mind. It has in mind what the U.S. military-industrial complex has in mind. The administration is in its power, and the President is not free to make such a decision.

We accomplished breakthroughs, resumed discussions, and I saw that the President was getting no support. This is why the meeting failed, why accord failed, at a point when we were already close to achieving a historic outcome. This was the dramatic situation which developed at the Reykjavik meeting at the point when, despite the highly significant concessions on our part, we failed to reach agreement.

Even though our dialogue with the United States has been difficult in the past, it did continue after Geneva. I told the President my view of what our meeting during my visit to the United States ought to be. This view is not a condition, but an appreciation of our responsibility, both mine and the President's. Responsibility dictates that the future meeting in Washington must be approached in precisely this way.

What is needed is a fruitful meeting. It must really lead to tangible results and radical changes, especially on such a burning issue as nuclear arms control, ending the arms race, and eliminating nuclear weapons. I have written to the President in letters and I said at our meeting: You and I, Mr President, must not allow our meeting in Washington to fail. This is why I suggested that we meet without any delay, and this is what happened here in Reykjavik. We have something constructive to contribute and seek agreement on in Washington, serious proposals, serious draft solutions.

I cannot let myself even think -- not for one minute -- that the meeting in Washington may fail. What, generally speaking, ought people to think then -- in the Soviet Union, in the United States, and all over the world. What kind of politicians head two such vast states, with which the fate of the entire world is linked to a considerable extent? They meet, exchange correspondence, this is already their third meeting, and they cannot agree on a single thing! I consider that such an outcome would be simply scandalous, with unpredictable consequences.

We cannot let this happen. It would generate disappointment all over the world, not just in our countries. This, in fact, is the intention behind the Washington meeting, what kind of meeting it must be and with what results. This was the understanding that prompted us, I repeat, to take the initiative of holding a working meeting here, in Iceland, in Reykjavik, so that we can sort everything out in a businesslike fashion, carefully listen to one another, and try to find points of contact and joint approaches which would accord with the interests of our two countries, the interests of our allies and the peoples of all countries.

Yet the Americans arrived here empty-handed, with the mothballed package from which the Geneva talks are already suffocating. In order to break out of the prevailing situation, lead the process talks to a new stage, and really solve questions, we made the proposals which I have already described to you. You also know now what actually happened.

So, what is to be done in the future? The United States remains a reality, and what a reality; the Soviet Union also remains an impressive reality. You may know that the hero of one of our Russian writers intended to "close down" America. We do not suffer from such a complex. America is a reality. But not only the USSR and the United States -- the whole contemporary world is a reality. Now it is impossible not only to gain prestige but, and this is the main point, to solve problems without taking into account this reality of today's world.

If there was one thing that we did feel at this meeting, it was the shortage of new thinking. Once again we were faced with the specter of the pursuit of military superiority. Last summer I met with Mr Nixon, and he told me then: On the basis of my vast experience in life and politics, I have the right to draw the conclusion that the pursuit of this specter has taken us far. Now we do not know how to find our way out of the obstacles created by the stockpiled mountains of nuclear weapons. All this complicates and poisons the situation in the world.

I nevertheless think that everything that took place here -- and after all, there were almost ready accords, we only failed to formulate them -- is highly significant. We submitted our proposals as a package. I think that you understand why this was done. The actual path which we traveled here, in Iceland, the path to such major accords on such significant reductions of nuclear arms -- this is already an enormous experience that has been gained here, these are enormous gains.

I think that both the U.S. President and we must still think over the entire situation which ultimately developed here at the meeting, turn once more to the questions that were discussed, and attempt to bridge what separates us. After all, we have already reached accord on many points, we have gone through a great deal. It is possible that the President must consult with Congress, with political circles, and with the U.S. public.

Let America think it over. We will wait, without withdrawing our proposals which we have published, and we have essentially offered to reach accord on them. This is first.

Second, I think that all realistic forces in the world must act now. All people living on earth -- in the socialist world, in the capitalist world, in the developing world -- now have a unique chance to finally embark in reality on terminating the arms race, destroying it, and averting the nuclear threat from mankind. This was the task to which our proposal to the President was subordinated: Let us reach accord that, immediately following the conclusion of the Reykjavik meeting, our representatives sit down for talks on banning nuclear explosions. Moreover, we were flexible in our approach, we declared that we perceive this as a process during which it would be possible to also examine at some stage, maybe even on a priority basis, the question of "thresholds" of nuclear explosion yields, and the question of the annual number of nuclear explosions, and the fate of the 1974-1976 treaties, thus approaching the elaboration of a full-scale treaty on the complete and final ban of nuclear explosions.

We were close to finding a formula on this question, too. Incidentally, we said at the meeting: We do not demand a moratorium of you. That is up to you. You are accountable to your Congress, to your people, as to whether, following the start of talks, you will continue to explode or will join our moratorium. That is up to you. But let us sit down for full-scale talks to elaborate an agreement on the complete and final banning of nuclear explosions.

Thus, we also draw closer on this point. But when the rupture on SDI occurred, the entire discussion came to a halt and all quest ceased. We terminated our meeting.

I think that we and the Americans must now think over everything, and also world public opinion must think over the prevailing situation on the main question perturbing the peoples of all countries — the question of war and peace, of the nuclear threat. I do not think I am exaggerating in thinking that everything we offered to the President meets the interests of the U.S. people and the peoples of all countries. If anyone does not think so, then let him heed the demands of the U.S. people, the Soviet people, and all people.

Having come here to the meeting, I said that the time for actions had come. Indeed, this is the time for actions and we must not waste it. We will act. We will not deviate from our line of peace and struggle against the arms race, for banning and liquidating nuclear weapons, for averting the threat from the entire globe. I am convinced that we are not alone in this struggle.

This is what I would like to say to you now, right after the conclusion of the meeting. Obviously I could have said more, had I had more time to think over everything that occurred. But it seems to me that I expressed myself completely clearly and definitely on all questions.

During the conversations with the President we also touched on many other questions. We spoke on humanitarian questions, and immediately encountered specific problems. Two groups of experts were at work. You probably know this. One of them was headed on our side by Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev, chief of General Staff, and on the U.S. side by Paul Nitze. They worked virtually through the night.

The group on humanitarian questions was headed on our side by Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, and on the U.S. side by Assistant Secretary of State Mrs Ridgway.

An interesting exchange of opinions also took place there. The certain amount of mutual understanding which occurred there could have become a component of a final document. But since the main component collapsed, the entire process was halted.

As you see, generally speaking the meeting was interesting, important, and highly promising. But, for the time being, it ended in this fashion.

Let us not despair. I think that the meeting has brought us to a very important stage, the stage of understanding where we are. It showed that accords are possible. I am convinced of this.

Thank you for your attention.

Do you really still have questions even after my so detailed speech? Fire away. We will sit here until dawn.

Question (Czechoslovak television): Mikhail Sergeyevich, you have said that a historic chance has been missed here, in Reykjavik. When, in your opinion, might a new chance arise?

Answer: You know, I would give an optimistic answer to this. Because much has already been done both on the eve of the meeting and at the meeting itself. If — both in the United States, at the White House, and in our Soviet leadership — we think everything over again from realistic positions and display responsibility, then the possibility of solving the questions already raised has not yet been lost.

Question (Japanese NHK TV company): Does this mean that the dialogue with the United States, with the Reagan administration is still continuing? Or do you think that there is very little opportunity left for a productive dialogue with Reagan?

Answer: I think that the need for a dialogue, however difficult it might be, has now increased still more.

Question (PRAVDA): Mikhail Sergeyevich, what do you think? Why, for all that, did the American Administration undertake to wreck the talks by making such an irresponsible decision and ignoring world public opinion?

Answer: In my opinion, America still has to determine its position. It seems to have not yet done so. This, so we felt, affected the President's standpoint.

Question (Australian Broadcasting Corporation): You have said that President Reagan is a captive of the military-industrial complex. Does this mean that the next 2 years will be fruitless? Do you have any hope that the next U.S. president will not be a captive of that complex?

Answer: Despite what the military-industrial complex is now and despite the weight it carries in America today, let us not overestimate its potential. The decisive word in any country belongs to the people, including the American people.

Question (Icelandic radio and television): Following the negative result of the meeting, will the Soviet Union try to counter the American SDI program with anything, and will it launch its space arms program at full power?

Answer: I think you have understood the purport of the Soviet position. If we have now approached the stage where we are beginning a deep reduction of nuclear weapons — both strategic weapons and medium missiles — and we were already arriving at an accord with the Americans to do this over 10 years, we have a right to demand to be guaranteed that nothing unexpected or unforeseen will happen during this period. This also includes such a sphere as ABM defense, and particularly its space echelon.

I told the President that SDI does not bother us in the military respect. In my opinion, few people even in America now believe that such a system can be created. Moreover, if America eventually decides to do this, our reply will not be symmetrical. Indeed, I told the President: You know that I have already been made your colleague in SDI. He was surprised. It turns out — I said — in connection with the fact that I am so sharply critical of SDI, and this gives you a most convincing argument that SDI is needed. You simply say: Since Gorbachev is against it, this means it is a good thing. You pick up applause and finance. True, cynics and skeptics have emerged who say: But suppose this is a crafty scheme by Gorbachev not to get involved in SDI himself but to ruin America. So, let them figure it out themselves. In any case, SDI does not frighten us. I confidently state this because it is an irresponsible thing to engage in bluffing on such issues. There will be an answer to SDI. Asymmetrical, but there will be one. At the same time, we will not have to sacrifice much.

But where does its danger lie? First, there is the political danger. A situation is at once created which introduces uncertainty and fans mistrust of one another and suspicion. And then there is no likelihood of reductions in nuclear weapons. In short, to thoroughly tackle the reduction of nuclear weapons quite a different situation is needed. Second, there is still the military aspect. Through SDI it is possible to arrive at new kinds of weapons. We can also state this competently. And arrive at a totally new stage of the arms race, with very serious consequences.

It turns out that, on the one hand, we reach agreement to begin reducing nuclear weapons, which today are the most dangerous and terrible weapons. But, on the other hand, we are to bless research and even carry it out in space, in order to create the latest weapons. This runs counter to normal logic.

Question (THE WASHINGTON POST): You have just held another 2-day meeting with President Reagan. What impression did you gain of the President as a politician? Do you believe that he shares your sense of responsibility for the destiny of the world?

Answer: I gained the impression that Mr Reagan and I can continue the dialogue and engage in a search for solutions to major, urgent problems, including those of which I have spoken.

Question (Danish television): With regard to the unsatisfactory results of this meeting, does this mean that there will be no progress on the question of banning nuclear tests and on other questions discussed yesterday and today? Is a nuclear test ban linked with other questions that were examined in your talks?

Answer: I have already answered this question. We believe that this does not cut short either our contacts with the Americans and the President or, still less, international relations. The search continues and will continue. And what has happened here in Iceland must make everyone feel all the more that it is necessary to join in the common struggle to normalize the international situation and to seek ways out of dead-end situations, including those discussed here in Reykjavik. In fact, one of the dead ends arose here, too. But I am an optimist.

Question (GDR television): You have said that the meeting did not produce results. Does this mean that it was useless? Do you believe that peace has become more reliable after the Reykjavik meeting?

Answer: I think you have thought out your question well. I always like the precision of our German friends' expressions, including their thoughts. It is, of course, sad and disappointing that we have completed the meeting without reaching agreement on questions to which we seemed to have found approaches. Despite this, I would not call the meeting useless. On the contrary, it is a step in a complex and difficult dialogue in search of solutions. For, in general, we are seeking difficult solutions to difficult questions. Therefore, let us not sow panic through the world. At the same time, the world must know everything that is happening and not feel that it is a detached observer. The time has now come for vigorous actions by all forces.

Question (American ABC TV company): Mr General Secretary, I do not understand why, when you and President Reagan had an opportunity to reach an agreement on nuclear arms reduction, the Soviet side did not consent to SDI research. For you yourself said in Geneva in the past that you are ready to pay a big price for reducing nuclear arms. And now, when such opportunities existed, you missed them.

Answer: Your question already contains an element of criticism, so I will answer it in detail.

First, the U.S. President came empty-handed to Reykjavik. The American delegation, I would say, brought us trash from the Geneva talks. And it was only thanks to the Soviet side's far-reaching proposals that we were able to get close to very major accords (mind you, they were not formalized) on reducing strategic offensive arms and on medium missiles. Naturally, we hoped that under these conditions -- and I think this is perfectly clear to a politician, a military person, and simply to a normal person -- if we sign such major accords, it is necessary to ensure that nothing happens to wreck this difficult process, toward which we have been working for decades. I have already said what we have in mind. I will add: The American side has long been undermining ABM. It has already cast doubt on SALT II, and it would now like in Reykjavik to organize the funeral of ABM, and to do so with the participation of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. That will not come off. The whole world would not understand us. And I am convinced of this.

If we also start attacking ABM -- the last mechanism that has done so much, for all that, to curb the arms race process -- then we are worth nothing as politicians. But it is not enough to preserve it when deep nuclear arms reductions begin, it must be strengthened. [paragraph continues]

And we have proposed a strengthening mechanism: not to use for the 10 years during which we will reduce completely and destroy the nuclear potential in our countries -- not to use the right to pull out of ABM.

At the same time, so that no one seeks -- neither the Soviet Union to overtake America in space research and forge ahead or to achieve military superiority, nor America with regard to the Soviet Union -- we have said that we are for laboratory research and testing but against going into space with this research and testing of parts of space ABM defense. This is our demand. Thus, our demand in this instance was also constructive and took the partner's positions into account. If they agreed to this, the administration would get an opportunity to resolve its questions within the framework of laboratory research, but without attempts to create a space ABM defense. I think there is iron logic here, as children say. It is also necessary to learn from children sometimes.

Now let us let the women have a say.

Question (THE GUARDIAN): Is the Soviet Union planning any new initiatives with regard to West Europe after what has happened in Reykjavik?

Answer: I think West Europe hears what I say, and if it thinks about and studies our proposals carefully, it will see that they accord with West Europe's interests. We are far from indifferent to the interests of West Europe, where the shoots of the new thinking are striking root and where responsibility for preserving and strengthening our common "European home" is growing.

Question (NEWSWEEK): What are your intentions regarding a trip to Washington? You have said that it is necessary first to secure one or two agreements. Is it possible to reach such agreements before you arrive in Washington on a visit?

Answer: I think that, despite all today's dramatics, we have not gotten further away from Washington but closer to it. And if the President and the American administration heed my proposal to continue studying everything discussed here in Reykjavik and consult those circles and they consider it necessary to consult, I think that not all is lost. There are opportunities, underpinned by what we had here in Reykjavik, to arrive at agreements which would make a meeting in Washington real and possible. And it could produce results.

Question (American CNN TV company): Mr Gorbachev, you said in your speech that President Reagan must think about the situation and consult with Congress, consult with the American people. Do you believe that American public opinion will support the Soviet approach on this plane?

Answer: Let us wait and see.

Question (RUDE PRAVO): I have a question for you as a politician and jurist. What, in your opinion, are the priorities in questions of human rights in the nuclear missile age, and what role can the human factor play in resolving the question of war and peace?

Answer: I see you are a philosopher. I too used to study philosophy, and I have now begun being interested in it again. I think that when we speak of human rights, we must remember that today the question of preserving peace and diverting the nuclear threat from mankind is the top priority. [paragraph continues]

If there is peace, there will be life. And we will sort out the problems somehow. There are more and more educated people and educated peoples in the world. The peoples will sort everything out. Therefore, when we speak of human rights, I would put in the first place the human right to life. That is the first point.

And the second one -- the human factor. In the nuclear age (and I see this precisely as a manifestation of the new thinking) the threat of war poses in a new way also the question of the role of the human factor in the matter of preventing it. Nuclear war will affect everyone, regardless of where it begins. Only ill-wishers believe that all antiwar movements and all who come out in defense of peace are the result of Moscow's intrigues. Today women, children, and men of all ages are rising up, taking each other by the hand, and demanding a halt to the dangerous tendency to slide toward nuclear war. The role of the human factor under these conditions is increasing significantly.

Question (IZVESTIYA): The White House has frequently said a great deal to the effect that Soviet ICBMs pose the chief danger to America. In Reykjavik we proposed eliminating this chief danger to America over 10 years. What is your impression, why did the other side prove not ready to remove this chief danger and divert it from its country?

Answer: You are very right to have raised this question. This argument has been used for many years: The Soviet Union, they say, is not serious about disarmament and ending the arms race since it does not take account of America's concern in this plane.

As you see, we have proposed making radical reductions. And we put the question very pointedly. There is a triad of strategic arms recognized both by us and by the Americans. We have proposed reducing this entire triad of strategic armed forces by 50 percent in the first 5 years. This is a major step.

But, at the same time, we told the Americans that we too have a concern. For in the United States the greater part of the strategic forces is deployed on submarines. That is approximately 700 missiles on which there are almost 6,000 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. And the submarines, as is known, cruise in the seas and oceans around the Soviet Union. From where will they make a strike? This is no less dangerous than heavy ground-based missiles.

In short, when they do not want to solve questions, they seek problems and create artificial obstacles. However, here in Reykjavik we have cut the ground from under such invented obstacles. This is what is important. For we took a very big step by dropping, as I have already said, the reservations concerning medium missiles, which for us are strategic weapons. And we have also dropped forward-based means from the reckoning. This is our goodwill. But the Americans, nevertheless, did not meet us halfway.

They think that through space they will achieve military superiority over us and realize the idea of one President who said: He who holds sway in space will hold sway on earth. This shows that we have to deal with imperial ambitions.

But the world today is not what it was before. It does not want to be and will not be the domain either of the United States or of the Soviet Union. Each country has the right to its own choice, its own ideology, its own values. [paragraph continues]

If we do not recognize this, then there are no international relations. Then there is chaos and law of the fist. We will never agree to that.

America is probably very nostalgic for the old times, when it was militarily superior to us -- for we emerged from the war weakened economically.

There is evidently nostalgia for the past in America. Nevertheless, we will wish our American partners to be aware of today's realities. They, too, must do so. Otherwise -- that is, if the Americans do not start thinking in today's terms and proceeding from present realities -- we will not make progress in the search for correct solutions.

Question (Bulgarian television): As I understand it, the Geneva talks are not ending, and the Soviet leadership intends to give the Soviet delegation a mission to seek a solution to the questions which have not yet been resolved?

Answer: You are right.

Question: Do you think that the same instructions will also be given to the American delegation after Reykjavik?

Answer: I hope that this will be precisely so.

Question (CTK news agency): What influence, in your opinion, will the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting have on the all-European process?

Answer: I think that at this very crucial time both the politicians and the peoples of Europe will be equal to it. The times demand actions and not just grandiloquent statements followed by nothing concrete. The world is tired, the world is sick of blather, the world needs real progress: disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think that this trend will grow. I hope particularly for the wisdom and responsibility of Europe's politicians and peoples.

Question (American NBC TV company): As I understand it, you are directly calling on other members of the international community to act as a kind of lobby to influence the United States and make it change its opinion?

Answer: We know how developed lobbyism is in your country and how the political process goes in America. Perhaps that was why it was difficult for the President to make a decision at this meeting. But when it is a question of strengthening peace and taking real steps to that end, when joint efforts are needed, this concerns everyone and not just the United States and the Soviet Union, so it is necessary to speak not of lobbyism but of a sense of responsibility, of the peoples' common sense, of understanding of the asset of peace, and the need to safeguard it. Therefore, it is insulting to accuse peoples or movements advocating peace of being lobbyists in favor of the Soviet Union. It is a question of people taking a political and civic stance.

Question (the Icelandic newspaper MORGUNBLADID): I work as a newspaper publisher in Iceland. Did the decision to come to Reykjavik pose any difficulties for you? With Iceland a NATO member? At the same time, as is known, our government has advocated declaring the north a nuclear-free zone, and I would like to know your attitude to this.

Answer: I would like to end on this topic, and I will gladly take advantage of the question put by a representative of Iceland's press. I wish to remind you that it was we who suggested Iceland as a possible place to meet. Therefore, we had no difficulties on that score.

I wish to thank the Government and people of Iceland for using their potential -- human, organizational, and material -- to help in organizing this important meeting. We are grateful for this, and we felt good here. I have gained a lot that is interesting from information from Raisa Maksimovna, who had many meetings with Icelanders. All these contacts were very interesting. The friendly atmosphere and the great interest in our country are gratifying. We are grateful to Iceland and the Icelandic Government for what they have done. We wish your people prosperity.

As for the last part of your question with regard to the fact that the Government of Iceland wants to declare the north a nuclear-free zone, we welcome that.

Dear friends, I thank you for your attention. I think you and I have spent our time usefully. I wish you all the best.

Correction to Television Coverage

The following correction pertains to the item from Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 12 Oct 86 which was published under the headline GORBACHEV 12 OCTOBER NEWS CONFERENCE ON SUMMIT OUTCOME and the subhead "Television Version" in the WORLDWIDE REPORT: ARMS CONTROL for 3 November 1986, JPRS-TAC-86-086 on pp 10-26:

Page 17, paragraph 7, add: ...an impressive reality.

But the world is also a reality, and now it is impossible not only to earn authority but above all to resolve problems in the world, if one does not take into account the realities of the present day world.

And, well, we sensed, at this meeting, the lack of a new way of thinking. Once again this specter appeared; of the pursuit of military superiority.

During the summer I met with Mr Nixon and, in a conversation, he said to me at that time: I have reason, based on my enormous political and life-long experience to say that this pursuit of this specter has taken us far out of our way, and now we do not know how to get out of these obstructions which consist of the accumulated mountains of nuclear weapons and so forth, and all of this complicates and poisons the situation in the world.

I think, nevertheless, that everything that has taken place -- and after all, accords have taken place, the only thing is that it did not prove possible to formulate them because we posed and brought this question and our proposals in a package. I think that you understand why this was done. Nevertheless, the very path which we have traveled to such major accords about major reductions of nuclear weapons is in itself a great experience which we have acquired here. The gains we have acquired here, in Iceland, in Reykjavik, are enormous.

I think that it is necessary for the President of the United States and for us to consider further the whole situation which has ultimately arisen here at the meeting, and to come back again and attempt to step across the divide between us.

We have already reached accord on much, we have come a long way. It is possible that the President needs to consult Congress, political circles, and the American public. Let America consider. We shall wait, and not retract the proposals which we have announced. In essence we have reached accord on them. That is the first thing.

Second, I believe that all realistic forces in the world should now act. All of us, living in the socialist world, the capitalist world, and the developing world, all of us have a unique opportunity now to finally set about ending the arms race, banning nuclear weapons, destroying them, and removing the nuclear threat from mankind. In this connection we presented the following proposal for the President: To sit down straight away and reach accord that, immediately after our meeting in Reykjavik, full-scale negotiations be initiated on banning nuclear explosions.

Furthermore, we made the proposal in this way: This will be a process during which we could consider at some stage, perhaps even as a matter of prime concern, the question of thresholds, of the power of nuclear explosions, the number of nuclear explosions per year, and the fate of the treaties of 1974 and 1976, and we would proceed toward the drafting of a full-scale treaty on a total and final ban on nuclear explosions. I can tell you that we were close to finding a formula on this matter too, because after all, here, too, everything is logical. Incidentally, we said to the U.S. side: We are not demanding a moratorium from you; that's your affair. You answer to your Congress and your people; whether you continue your explosions, when we start our negotiations, or join our moratorium, is your affair; but let us begin sitting down to full-scale talks to draft an agreement on a total and final ban on nuclear explosions. Along the way we shall also consider the questions you speak of, that of verification, thresholds, and the number of nuclear explosions, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties. All that can be considered.

We were moving closer together, but when the breakdown came over antimissile defense, all discussion was broken off, and the whole quest came to a halt, and we ended our meeting.

I think now.... (supplying dropped paragraphs)

CSO: 5200/1089

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: BURLATSKIY 'OPEN LETTER' TO PERLE ON REYKJAVIK

PM211515 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Oct 86 p 14

[F. Burlatskiy "Open Letter to Mr Richard Perle, Whom I Had the Pleasure of Meeting at the U.S. Press Center in Reykjavik": "What Does America Want?"]

[Text] Sir:

I have decided to address this letter to you personally for two reasons. First -- I noticed you while I was at the U.S. Press Center in Reykjavik during one of the regular briefings. That was at a point when poor Mr Matlock and his colleagues were wriggling beneath the hail of merciless questions from merciless U.S. and European journalists. Suddenly, looking behind me, I saw a man standing modestly at the very end of the hall, leaning his shoulder against the door frame, hands crossed on his chest, and now and again smiling a charming but typically American, toothy smile. I asked one of my colleagues who he was, and was amazed to hear his answer: "Richard Perle." Mr Weinberger's famous assistant secretary of defense! Right then, looking at you, I thought to myself: "There he stands, the real man of business. Why should he submit himself to trials on the rostrum when the strings moving the puppets are in any case in his hands?" I was introduced to you. You favored me with the very same smile, and thus I gained the moral right to discuss the results of Reykjavik with you now.

Second -- I wanted to congratulate you personally on the success because you, and I am deeply convinced of this, are one of the few people in Reykjavik who felt a real sense of gratification with the zero result from the meeting between the leaders of the two nuclear giants in the contemporary world.

I imagine that, for you personally, this may have been the zenith of your entire life. Other advisers of the U.S. Presidents, who were inclined toward reaching various accords with us, are in disgrace. One American told me that the President himself had tears in his eyes when, after the last session, he came out of the house where the talks were being held. [paragraph continues]

I would like to believe that this was really so, although another American remarked that this was contrived for television. But confess, Mr Perle — after all, you are an honest person, one of the few who bluntly and openly oppose any disarmament accords — are you celebrating a victory? Is it a lie that you feel as if you have ridden back to the Pentagon on a white charger?

I am prepared to believe you, Mr Perle: Maybe you would not be against a reduction of some, mainly obsolete types of U.S. nuclear missile weapons in exchange for a radical reduction of our ICBM's. But if I understand your position correctly, you are totally unwilling to support any restrictions on arms upgrading, let alone on the SDI program. Or is that not so?

Furthermore, I am convinced that you are celebrating also for another reason — the tactics governing talks with us. I can almost hear you now, repeating at sessions in the White House, in Congress, in the Pentagon, and in the Department of State: You see, we were right! You can talk with the Russians only from a position of strength. This is the only language they understand! It is necessary to pressure more, to be more offensive, to spend even more on the SDI program, to bomb Libya a few more times, and then the "Russian bear" that used to frighten us in the past will come begging to us of his own accord. I was even told about the existence of some report, compiled by some Sovietologist for the U.S. leadership, which proves that, in the event that the present pace of military competition is stepped up, the Soviet economy would disintegrate totally by 1996.... I suppose that this phenomenal assessment is close to your personal views. Is that not so?

But you see, it is still not quite clear to me: What does America think of Reykjavik? And, generally speaking, what do the Americans want? Do they think that their President, having returned empty-handed after the Soviet leader's sensational proposals and concessions, really did a good job to America's advantage? Or that he brought back in his case — together with the papers prepared by you or by Mr Weinberger himself — just a pyrrhic victory?

I know that the Americans are gamblers. They love to score points. In boxing, in rugby, in baseball, in politics. But — and here I am forced to resort to a Russian idiomatic expression — "You shouldn't throw good money after bad." It is, after all, necessary to be aware of what has been staked on a horse, of what game you are playing, with whom, and at what time! It is, after all, necessary to understand that at such a moment, the moment of truth, it is impossible to play with marked cards — at a moment when mankind, exhausted by nuclear fear, yearns for just one or two decisions, inspiring hope of freedom from the degrading sense of helplessness in the face of an inexorably growing catastrophe.

Not to take advantage of such a unique opportunity to conclude such a unique accord because of an illusory and absurd hope of having one more go at cornering the "Russian bear," forcing it to lick its paws, ruining the USSR, displaying America's strength, and swaggering in this role! Yes, history assigned to Mr Reagan, it really placed in his hands, a unique opportunity to build his own pedestal of a peacemaker, something of which even Mrs Nancy Reagan dreams, as people in your country write. But, carried away by the usual desire to win by even a tiny score, to gain just a few points in the usual game with which everyone is really fed up, he sacrificed this opportunity.

I was also amazed by the jokes of history itself. With whom do we have to do business when the fate of all human kind is being decided? How can one not recall the saying of the ancients: [paragraph continues]

"History repeats itself twice — once as tragedy, the next time as farce." It is, alas, probable that the reverse may also apply — first as a farce, and then.... What then? Could it be that tragedy is really inevitable? Could it be that this is what America wants? Could it be that this is what it expects from its President?

You may, of course, say: This is rhetoric, not a single American, including the President himself and probably you personally, wants a nuclear war. I am prepared to believe this. Then, something else probably has to be assumed: Something which was said to me by a German — West German! — journalist, from the Social Democratic press, it is true. He said following M.S. Gorbachev's press conference: "America needs a new Caribbean crisis to have it experience again the reality of the nuclear threat and return to honest talks." What he was referring to was the 1962 missile crisis, probably aware that in the last few years I have been particularly interested in studying the lessons of the Caribbean crisis. And here is the main conclusion I have drawn and about which I have written: At that time the USSR and U.S. leaders discovered within themselves sufficient common sense and courage to reach a compromise and avert the immediate nuclear threat. And, incidentally, via very personal and even secret diplomacy. It was indeed after this crisis — which, I am convinced, was a shock and a terrible warning for both sides — that the favorable process of curbing the nuclear arms race began. John Kennedy's tragic death interrupted this process. But it did not halt it. It was resumed time and again after long breaks. And we must never forget that its beginning was made at that particular dramatic moment.

I do not believe that America needs a new nuclear crisis to understand the need for the great historic compromise being offered to it by the Soviet Union. I do not believe that the American people, with their famous common sense, pragmatism, and talent perceive the stockpiling of increasingly monstrous military toys as the only means of self-salvation. Moreover, I do not believe that such a stance is fully shared by the U.S. establishment. On the contrary, we are perceiving that the internal struggle within it is being constantly exacerbated: So where is the difficulty? Why were our countries' leaders unable to reach agreement in Reykjavik?

Allow me, Mr Perle, to tell you my thoughts on this subject, and primarily to express my feelings. I am deeply disappointed but not shocked, since I have not given up hope. Actually, there was definite disappointment among all of us who were in the hall at M.S. Gorbachev's press conference, where we learned about the results of the talks — we, the Americans, the Europeans — both West and East, the Japanese, and the representatives of all other countries and continents. I am deeply disappointed because "happiness was so possible, so close." The sides' positions drew more closely together than ever before during the 20 years that I can remember.

Just think over the opportunities that were missed: to agree on a one-half reduction of the entire triad of strategic arms; on the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe; on the reduction of the nuclear missile potential in Asia; on the start of talks to limit and then completely ban nuclear tests; on the development of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. This entire gigantic structure of arms limitation started tottering the moment matters reached the point of observing the ABM Treaty we have concluded. In your eyes, you are the guardians of the laws while we are the constant violators of rights. How did you manage to shake this entire structure with the help of such a lever — the open and blatant violation of an elementary norm of international law: *Pacta servanda sunt* [printed in Latin] (treaties must be observed) [paragraph continued]

The Pentagon's favorite brainchild — SDI, which serves as a cover for the entire program for a new round of the arms race on an unimaginable scale — became the main stumbling block in the way of victory in the cause of disarmament.

I am also disappointed by something else, and at this point, to avoid being tactless, I will cite some U.S. figures. Mr O'Neill, speaker of the House of Representatives, a most astute man whom I briefly met at a reception in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, expressed not so long ago his own bewilderment — how can I put it more mildly, I am even embarrassed to repeat his words — at the U.S. President's methods of working. I constantly read in your press that Americans are perturbed by the erosion of political leadership in your great country. Very much depends on advisers. On Mr Shultz, Weinberger, and you, Mr Perle. Maybe this is precisely where the greatest threat lies? The threat of not understanding the partner, his intentions, and his objective, the threat of hasty decisions. The threat of turning the grim business of war and peace into a game, just a game....

Now allow me to give some advice to you, Mr Perle, and through you to the other advisers of the U.S. President. I understand well — you are intoxicated by the new and imposing technological potential being acquired by the United States, the West European countries, and Japan. You want to use this potential by any means in order to consolidate America's might further still, to try to impose your control on other countries and peoples. But allow me to remind you of the simplest conclusion drawn by thinkers of the past: Politics is the art of the possible, while emotions are the worst adviser in politics. Let alone intoxication, be it narcotic or technological. It leads to overestimation of one's own strength, to missed opportunities. It detaches from reality and dictates spontaneous and mistaken decisions.

Could you really expect to talk with the Soviet, the Russian people in the language of strength? Despite our might? Despite the existence of strategic parity? Despite our potential to mobilize resources which were so underestimated by Hitler's strategists and were so misjudged by the U.S. strategists who launched the nuclear competition after the end of World War II? Come to your senses! Take at long last at a tranquilizer, it will bring you to your senses and restore your sense of reality.

If we were to attempt to define briefly the main result of Reykjavik, I think that the following would be most accurate: The supremacy of the new thinking. As is well known, the very idea of the new thinking was declared by our country's leadership before the present Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. It was before this meeting, mainly in the course of this year, that practical solutions emerged in outline aimed at a goal which was formerly considered completely unrealistic — the complete elimination of nuclear weapons all over our planet.

Now our partners and even our critics abroad have seen that the new thinking is not some kind of declaration or propaganda trick, it is not an attempt to win over world public opinion and turn it against the U.S. Administration or to break its alliance with its NATO allies; it means specific, precisely formulated, absolutely businesslike, and realistic proposals placed on the negotiating table of the two nuclear giants' leaders.

So, how about the U.S. side? Now, of course, it is easy for us to revert to the customary tone of criticism of the White House leadership. There is nothing clever in this, especially since, as the overwhelming majority of political leaders and mass news media in the modern world admit, Washington bears the responsibility for the fact that agreements have not been reached already. [paragraph continues]

But let us look more broadly at the Reykjavik talks. Then we admit with certain gratification that, on some important questions, the U.S. side also moved from the standstill position it had maintained for a prolonged period before that.

The term compromise, and particularly the term concession, acquired a new sound in Reykjavik. Even before this meeting our country had proved that it is not afraid of making unilateral concessions, as is evidenced by the prolonged moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. In Reykjavik the Soviet leadership took steps to meet the U.S. side halfway which literally shook the West. Some people in the world may say: Did we not go rather too far long this path, are we not displaying some kind of weakness, are we not thus creating a temptation for the Americans to harden the policy of strength, the policy of pressure on us?

But, in world politics, just as in ordinary life, there are concessions — and concessions. Imagine two physicians in consultation by the bedside of a seriously, almost hopelessly sick person. One offers to administer a potent, every risky medicine in the hope of saving the patient's life, the other suggests that nothing be done, thus trying to avoid responsibility in the event that that patient dies anyway. Should one ask who is right in such a case?

Contemporary mankind is seriously suffering from nuclear disease. This tumor is growing year by year, swallowing vast resources and funds, and becoming increasingly threatening for mankind's life. What, in these circumstances, does it mean to make a concession in order to eliminate the cancerous tumor? Does it mean displaying weakness? No, it means displaying not only nobility, not only wisdom, but also exceptional and extraordinary daring commensurate with the prevailing situation. This is especially valid because a solution depends on accord between the two sides, because the consultation must end in consensus, in other words in agreement. We must convince the White House, we must convince all the Western partners of the need to pool efforts in order to excise the cancerous tumor. Here we also have a certain risk, because for more than 40 years now nuclear deterrence has been one of the means of preventing a new world war. But this risk is tens and hundreds of times smaller than the risk of the universal destruction of mankind and modern civilization.

Yes, all of us — Soviet people, Americans, peoples in East and West — must approach relations with one another in a new, a completely new fashion. So that through joint efforts we can erase the nuclear page from the world history of mankind.

Now we are all keenly interested in one specific question: Is it altogether possible to hope for successful arms limitation talks with President Ronald Reagan? Is this not an illusion? Could it be that we have to wait for time to pass — fortunately, we do not have to wait too long — and a new administration to come to the White House? Incidentally, that was the advice given to us — even publicly — by some U.S. experts, supporters of the Democratic Party. I will be frank — for me personally, this is a very difficult question. No matter what reply I give, I would still not be completely certain. After all, the problem is, in fact, not Mr Reagan.

The time, the historical moment in which we are living — this is the real problem. We are facing a challenge openly presented to us by America: to launch a new and fantastic round of the arms race in space and modernization of all types of weapons — on the surface, under ground, on the seas, and under water. [paragraph continues]

Maybe this is the most difficult problem mankind has ever encountered in the history of its existence on earth. Because the choice which will be made today could prove fatal for us all. It is here, it is right here, that we have the secret behind the unbelievable efforts, the great insistence, the persistence and flexibility displayed by our leadership in talks with almost the most conservative U.S. President of the entire postwar period. Not a position of weakness, as sagacious advisers in the White House imagine, but a position of reason and a sense of responsibility.

In conclusion, I have no desire to analyze (which means to criticize) President R. Reagan's statements in Reykjavik. On the contrary, I want to emphasize something else: Following M.S. Gorbachev, the U.S. President declared that the door remains open, that efforts on arms limitation will continue. Obviously, it depends on both sides to ensure that the sensational accords which emerged in preliminary form at the talks in Iceland are not erased. Then the Reykjavik zero could turn into a 10.

Much will probably depend on the U.S. President's advisers and on U.S. public opinion. I want to say that Soviet scientists, journalists, and all Soviet public opinion will work in the direction of achieving agreement between our two countries on all fundamental questions of nuclear disarmament and the consolidation of international security.

So, what are your intentions, Mr Perle, yours and your colleagues?

P.S. I would like to suggest to THE WASHINGTON POST that it print my letter and express the hope that Mr Perle will deem it possible to join in a dialogue with us.

/8309

CSU: 5200/1089

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: ROUNDTABLE ON SUMMIT, SALT, SDI

LD010114 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 31 Oct 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program presented by foreign affairs commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev; with political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; Igor Surgachev, not further identified; commentator Pavel Kasparov; international affairs journalist Aleksandr Lyutyy, and Sergey Pravdan, not further identified]

[Excerpts] [Lavrentyev] In the past week our editorial office has received an unusually large number of letters representing a sort of response by Soviet people to the Reykjavik meeting. They express with great emotion and interest the hope that it will nonetheless be possible to promote the cause of peace and force the U.S. Administration to take account of the will of peoples and stop avoiding the solution of pressing problems. Letters supporting our government's course aimed at finding a cardinal solution to the problems of disarmament have been sent in by Comrade Sokolova from Moscow, Comrade Mokin from Sverdlovsk, the Baranov and Yudin families from Chelyabinsk, Mariya Nikolayevna Krivenkova from the villages of Berezovskaya in Volgograd Oblast, Pavel Vasilyevich Ignatyev from Kostroma Oblast, and many others. But there are also letters, the writers of which, such as Mikhail Vasilyevich Yerumchak from Kiev, are indignant at Washington's obstructionist position and ask whether there is any point at all in doing business with the U.S. Administration. I will ask political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin to answer this and a number of other questions on the same topic.

[Shishlin] That, of course, is a serious question and, I think, even to some degree well-founded, because we have had experience of relations with this administration for many years, and unfortunately it has to be noted that over the last 6 years that the current administration led by President Reagan has been at the helm we have not been able to sign a single agreement with the United States that would be aimed at limiting arms, not to mention curbing the arms race. But as far as the dismantling of the existing arms control mechanism is concerned, in this respect the current administration has had success.

I don't know how these remaining 2 months of 1986 will go, but Washington has had the intention of dismantling the 1972 interim agreement, which was called SALT I, and of scrapping the SALT II treaty, which in fact was never ratified by the U.S. Senate. What is more, the current U.S. Administration has been weakening and gradually undermining the ABM Treaty, as a result of the intensive schemes to realize the ambitious Star Wars program, or, as it is also called, the strategic defense initiative.

However, returning to the question of whether there is any point in doing business with the current U.S. Administration: Although I repeat that this is a serious question and it is worth asking, the response to it of course, can only be to reject it. There are certain political situations — and we are in one such now — when the word no is simply unacceptable. We do have to do business with this Administration, but we also have to proceed from the fact that there is no time to lose, and not as much time to talk as to act. I would like to draw the listeners' attention to the fact that the Reykjavik meeting in fact showed that the possibility of trying to reach agreement, even with the current U.S. Administration, does exist. True, after Reykjavik the U.S. Administration was emitting contradictory signals, but I get the impression that all in all it was somehow disoriented by the impressive and large-scale proposals submitted by the Soviet Union, because the U.S. President and his entourage clearly had the impression that there could be a meeting in Reykjavik, that there could be talk about certain things, that the date of a new full-scale Soviet-U.S. meeting could be fixed, and that they could rest at that.

But something different happened. Reykjavik was turned by the Soviet Union, or in practical terms by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, into the channel of very profound, specific, working discussions. Then, when these working, businesslike discussions got off the ground, it became clear that it was possible to negotiate for agreement. And in fact we were, as they say, 5 minutes away from reaching a fundamental accord, had it not been for the stubborn adherence by the U.S. Administration to this SDI program, the Star Wars program. So we must do business with the current U.S. Administration. We must not lose what was gained in Reykjavik. We have to pursue our work now on the basis of what was done and what was implemented in the Icelandic capital.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, our letters also contain this question. Our proposals are clearly in the interests of West Europe, but the European NATO allies of the United States are suddenly for some reason starting to play up to Washington. What is the reason for this: bloc discipline or something else?

[Shishlin] That question requires quite a lengthy explanation, but I will try and give a more or less brief reply. First, this Atlantic discipline, or North Atlantic solidarity — call it what you like — is a reality, a political reality, and we could expect nothing else from the West European countries with regard to their approach to the U.S. position. So this is nothing new, it's nothing phenomenal: It's quite a routine thing for the NATO countries, when developments reach an acute turning point, to demonstrate, to use a phrase, a united front. But we mustn't just look at the surface of these events. The United Front is indeed a reality, but at the same time it is to some degree a myth, because the West Europeans have different interests from the United States. If the United States pursues here, there and everywhere an imperial policy, a policy of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, then the West European partners of the United States may sacrifice West European interests within the framework of a global confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist world. These fears make themselves felt in the political action, the political steps, that are taken by the West.

What I have in mind in this case is not, for example, meetings such as the recent session of the Nuclear Planning Group in some little place in Scotland, where of course overall NATO discipline is highlighted. What I have in mind is the bilateral talks that we and the other European socialist countries hold with our West European neighbors. Danish Prime Minister Schluter, for example, was recently in Moscow, and

his talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were, in his own assessment, fruitful and simply gripping. That is exactly so, because whether it is Danish Prime Minister Schuelter, or the leader or any other West European country they discover in talks with representatives of the socialist section of Europe that we have common interests, and these common interests are not limited to interests of preserving peace in this fragile European home of ours; they also include the need to develop peaceful, businesslike cooperation and a joint approach to pan-European problems.

So I think that while we can say there is a bloc discipline, we must nevertheless not put everything down to bloc discipline and see in the political picture of Europe today only this bloc discipline. Generally speaking, the opposition political parties in West Europe are feeling freer in this matter, more confident. They are reacting in a more lively way, as it were, more positively to the action by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik. In government circles, too, of course, there is an understanding of the fact that the Soviet Union really is striving for a nuclear-free world, and not some time in the remote future, but right now, being of the opinion that practical work must be started on dismantling these unwieldy military machines that have been pieced together over the decades.

So what I think is that now, after Reykjavik, not only has the door not been slammed in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, but neither has a single door been slammed in the relations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries with the West European countries.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, was there any progress in Reykjavik during the discussion of regional conflicts? This problem interests, among others, Comrade Zavyalov from Moscow.

[Shishlin] Naturally at the forefront in Reykjavik were issues connected with limiting and curbing the arms race. Indeed the discussion there was about a qualitatively new approach, when it was not simply some sort of limits or sublimits to the nuclear arms race that were made the most important topic. There really was discussion about a radical reduction, and I think that henceforth the discussion will be only about a radical reduction of nuclear weapons. However, the question of regional conflicts and ways of overcoming them was also raised during the talks by the leaders of the two states. The Soviet Union is in favor of overcoming regional conflicts. It is ready to discuss them in the most detailed and thorough way, guided in fact by two principles: first, the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and second, strict respect for the right of peoples to freely choose their own path to the future and their own social system. However, it appears that the United States is not in fact ready for this.

The United States is still guilty of the policy of neoglobalism, which is continually manifested in the specific acts taken by the United States on the international scene. Whether you take Central America, or the situation around Afghanistan, or the situation in the Middle East, or the situation in southern Africa, we discover everywhere that the United States is trying to build up its military presence or the economic and political pressure on one country or the other to have everything performed according to U.S. scenarios. But it cannot be that way, because U.S. policy is aimed, whether Washington wants it or not, at taking the political situation back to somewhere that it was before, when essentially they want to turn back the processes of social development, and this has no prospect. Of course, social processes may recoil, they may deviate from their path, but in the final analysis the process of the social development of a society on its national soil is, of course, unstoppable. In the final

analysis the danger of regional conflicts lies in the fact that their boundaries become dangerously blurred. These regional conflicts affect both international relations as a whole and Soviet-U.S. relations. So the elements of some sort of mutual understanding, the elements of restraint, are just simply necessary here. In Reykjavik in fact there was an understanding that consultations, the dialogue, the discussion of regional problems -- and the most acute of all the regional problems that exist in the world -- must be continued. I believe that such discussions, even when they don't lead to a direct result, are of course simply necessary to cool down as much as possible the hotbeds of our world.

[Lavrentyev] Thank you, Nikolay Vladimirovich. I would like to say that there are very many letters relating to the Reykjavik meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States. Because of time constraints we have not had the opportunity to answer all the questions, but we will try to answer a question that has been asked most often. I mean the question about what SDI is. Our permanent listener Aleksey Mikhaylovich Alikoy from Tomsk asks us to explain this word. SDI is an abbreviation for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative -- a program for setting up an antimissile defense with space-based elements. In everyday speech it has become known under a different name, the Star Wars program. In fact, the Americans have given it this label themselves, to be more specific, it was Senator Kennedy.

The Star Wars program, or SDI, as I will be using the official name, plans to set up the means of interception of ICBM's in all sections of their flight route: at the beginning when the missile engines ignite, in the postlaunch stage when the warhead of the missile is being divided into individual warheads, in the middle stage when the warheads are flying freely in space and at the concluding stage when they reenter the atmosphere near their targets. This idea of SDI meets the task by its author: to set up an antimissile defense that will come near to being universal.

In order to carry out this program new types of weapons are required. These are, first of all, weapons based on directed energy beams, chemical, [word indistinct] and x-ray lasers, neutral [as heard] particle generators. Some of them are to be deployed on earth, others in space, and another group are to be delivered to the area of interception by special missiles. It is proposed that large mirrors and lenses will be sited both in space and on earth to reflect and focus directed beams. Another category of space weapons is new types of homing missiles including space-based ones -- that is, they will be stationed on satellites.

What I have talked about is only part of the program, but it gives a general idea. It is not difficult to see that this is a program to create a new class of weapons. Its implementation is a new twist in the arms race spiral. In Washington they keep saying that these weapons are, as it were, assigned for defensive purposes. But first they can be used at anytime for offensive purposes as well. One has to be extremely naive to derive one's security from such assurances. Second, the very idea that they have proposed is faulty. It is suggested to strengthen U.S. national security by creating new types of weapons, whereas it is the weapons that they already have that have put this security under a question mark. Our position, as you know it, is different. Strengthening national security in the nuclear missile era can only follow the path of liquidating nuclear weapons and preventing the militarization of space. [passage omitted]

[Lavrentyev] Sergey Lvovich Potchevalov, a listener in Moscow, asks us to talk about the Voice of America radio station. Who molds its political face and determines the content of its programs, he asks. International affairs journalist Aleksandr Lyutyy replies to Comrade Potchevalov:

[Lyutyy] On Washington's Independence Avenue, not far from Congress, there is a gray and rather gloomy-looking 8-story building. On one side of the entrance is a sign saying Department of Health and Human Services. On the other side it says Voice of America. Yes, two departments with very different functions are accommodated in the same building. During my journalistic work I have had to visit the Voice of America several times. When I went there for the first time, the fact that these two departments were neighbors amazed me. However, appearances are not important. The building on Independence Avenue, which is bristling with aeri-als, houses the studios of the main radio-mouthpiece of Washington's foreign policy propaganda.

But this is the external side of things, so to speak. Let us now discuss the content of Voice of America's broadcasts and the people behind its programs. The radio station is the responsibility of USIA. The head of USIA is a close friend of President Reagan, a very well known and rather odious character called Charles Wick. I have had several conversations with Mr Wick. On these occasions he recalled, almost with pride, that the statutes of Voice of America oblige it to be objective, accurate and balanced in its dissemination of information, which should reflect the views of a wide range of circles in U.S. society.

Does it in fact adhere to these criteria? Hardly. Voice of America is a means for disseminating the views of U.S. ruling circles, the views of the most right-wing, bellicose, anti-Soviet forces in that country, and not just disseminating but foisting them on the rest of the world. You want an example? Here's one. The radio station is currently broadcasting a steady flow of commentaries, rejoinders and selections from the U.S. press that boil down to the argument that if anyone tried to achieve agreement on nuclear armaments at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, it was, of course, the U.S. side. But the Russians, on the other hand, were inflexible and ruined a possible accord. The argument as just as false as it is unoriginal. It was circulated by the administration immediately after Reykjavik. In the Voice of America's program on this subject you will not, of course, hear any recognition of the fact that, in shamelessly pretending that the Soviet proposals are its own and blaming the USSR for the failure of the meeting, the administration is trying to whitewash itself in the eyes of the U.S. public opinion and to earn cheap dividends in advance of the elections.

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CSO: 5200/1109

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI, SPADOLINI ON U.S.-USSR RELATIONS

AU291104 Rome ANSA in English 1019 GMT 29 Oct 86

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, Oct 29 — The Reagan administration's major interest in its Star Wars project is as a guarantee against "eventual Soviet temptations" to resume the nuclear arms race once nuclear arsenals have been destroyed, according to Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti.

Answering parliamentary questions yesterday, Andreotti admitted however that the Soviet Union "sees things differently". He also said that the Reykjavik summit had "broken new ground" between the two superpowers.

"They managed to bring closer together positions which, a few months ago, seemed irreconcilable", he said. "They evoked the hypothesis of reducing their forest of missiles to the point of full dismantlement, starting with those deployed in Europe".

According to Andreotti, the solutions dealt with at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, if put into effect, would "revolutionize the very foundations of security as applied after World War II".

Also answering questions, Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini said Italian backing for the Star Wars project — also known as the Strategic Defense Initiative — had always been limited to "the technological part", and did not imply a view on its strategic purposes, "which must still be verified".

"It is important, in this sense, that the United States should confirm its willingness to exchange technological and scientific information with the Soviet Union", he argued.

"This would also be a sufficient guarantee for the Soviet Union as well".

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CSO: 5200/2448

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI, PRESS ON SHULTZ-SHEVARNADZE MEETING

Andreotti Sees Meeting as 'Failure'

AU070935 Rome ANSA in English 0900 GMT 7 Nov 86

[Text](ANSA) Vienna, November 6 — The failure of American Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to come to any agreements, during their "mini-summit" here, is no cause for alarm, according to Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti. He went on to say that several hours of meetings were not enough "to raise any temperatures" and that it was necessary to be "more pragmatic".

Shultz and Shevardnadze met for over seven hours, between Wednesday night and Thursday morning, on the side lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe being held here. It was the first time the two foreign affairs chiefs have met since the failed Iceland summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

According to Andreotti, there are a variety of reasons to explain the failure of this "mini-summit" including: Soviet irritation over the long list of human rights violations in Eastern Europe presented by Shultz in his address Wednesday and the defeat of Reagan's Republican Party in mid-term elections which may tempt the Soviets to adjust their policies in the event that the future U.S. President may be more yielding. The Italian foreign minister also expressed Europe's growing impatience with the exclusive way the two superpowers are dealing with problems such as disarmament, where Europe is "up to its neck". [sentence as received]

Papers Comment

AU061318 Rome ANSA in English 1245 GMT 6 Nov 86

[Text](ANSA) Rome, November 6 — The distance between the United States and Soviet positions on disarmament and other issues was examined in editorial comment in the Italian dailies Thursday on the meeting in Vienna Wednesday between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, on the sidelines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

La Repubblica of Rome said that the talk, the first high-level contact between the superpowers since the Reykjavik summit October 11 and 12, ended as "another zero-to-zero match" and underscored the Soviet view that the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative makes real dialogue with the U.S. "impossible".

The Italian Communist Party daily *L'Unita* told readers that, "the U.S. and Soviet Union came together to talk to each other again but from positions which are still far apart." The paper said that Shevardnadze was especially tough with the Western European governments for failing to distance themselves from Reagan's policies.

La Stampa of Turin said that the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Vienna was officially "a meeting-clash but perhaps it would be more exact to call it a clash-meeting" because aside from the bitterness displayed in public the two sides may have found a margin of understanding.

Il Giorno of Milan said that at the end of the opening U.S.-Soviet meeting in Vienna, "the general impression is that the post-Reykjavik process will be as slow and difficult as that which led to the improvised summit in Iceland".

Il Giornale, another Milan paper, summarized the talk in the lines: "negotiations between the superpowers will continue, the channels for dialogue are open and the two sides have declared their good will. But the positions are immobile at the point at which they were suspended one month ago in Reykjavik between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev".

Il Messaggero said that at Vienna, "first came the accusations then the dialogue. Shevardnadze reiterated the candid Soviet version of the events in Reykjavik, a magic hour in which anything could have happened and then failure because of American intransigence". Shultz, on the other hand, "was heavy, detailed, implacable" in listing the cases in which human rights have been "trampled" in Eastern Europe in defiance of the Helsinki agreements of 1975, the paper said.

Pesa Sera of Rome referred to a "hiccup dialogue in Vienna" in which talks were resumed but for which the prospects are not good at present.

Il Manifesto of Rome, to the left of the official Communist Party position, said that with the foreign minister and secretary of state brought face-to-face, "disarmament and human rights came to the foreground."

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CSO: 5200/2448

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALIAN PRESS QUOTES KAMPELMAN ON MEETING WITH CRAXI

PM281108 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 23 Oct 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Kampelman Briefs Craxi on Status of Negotiations"]

[Excerpt] Yesterday's talks at the Chigi Palace between Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva negotiations, lasted 1 and 3/4 hours. The U.S. negotiator arrived in Rome on a lightning visit to brief the Italian Government on the impact that the Reykjavik summit has had on the negotiations under way in Geneva between the United States and the USSR. Following his conversation with Craxi, Kampelman spoke briefly to journalists, agreeing to answer a number of their questions.

The man negotiating on Reagan's behalf with Karpov on all aspects of disarmament included in the three baskets (strategic nuclear weapons, medium-range missiles, and space defense) said that he had again "observed the full value of close consultations with the allies." Kampelman added that he was "struck" by his exchange of opinions with the Italian prime minister — "a very capable and well-informed person."

"We spoke at length about the Reykjavik meeting, about space defense, and about the difficulties that exist with the Soviet Union. We covered the whole range of the most topical issues," Kampelman said. Someone asked him whether any reference was made to the anxieties expressed to Reagan by Chancellor Kohl about the possibility that a future accord to eliminate Euromissiles could decrease Europe's deterrent capability. "We did not go into it in detail," Kampelman replied, "and in any case you are acquainted with the American position, which reflects that of NATO: We would prefer a world without SS-20's and equivalent missiles on the western side. This is our aim and I believe it is really important to achieve the elimination of nuclear missiles."

How was the subject of SDI discussed? "We talked about it a great deal," Kampelman said: "Mostly and in particular I gave Craxi information and further details about the exchanges of assessments between Reagan and Gorbachev on this matter." "We believe," the chief U.S. negotiator said, "that SDI has led to serious disarmament negotiations. We believe it is the responsibility of all governments to investigate whether it is possible to develop a defense against these terrible missiles, and this is what we are doing. The Soviet Union is seriously involved in the antimissile defense field and we want to ascertain, and are ascertaining, whether such a defense is possible, because we believe that people expect such a defense from their government."

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CSO: 5200/2448

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER SEES ARMS ACCORD AFTER RESOLUTION OF DANILOFF CASE

Bonn DIE WELT in German 24 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Berndt Conrad: "The Disarmament Situation: More Than We Thought: On the One Hand, Danilooff, On the Other, Some Rapprochement"]

[Text] President Reagan's UN speech reveals the contours of a dual American strategy. These are its components: firmness in the Danilooff case, but readiness to negotiate and even optimism about disarmament.

In other words, if the Danilooff case could be successfully cleared up, the chances for disarmament and arms control (and thus for a successful second summit) would probably be greater than appeared possible a short time ago.

At the United Nations, the President essentially elaborated the same suggestions that he had communicated to Gorbachev on 25 July. And the President dressed up his initiatives with complements to the Soviets, which suggest a substantial narrowing of the gap between the two.

This is true particularly for intermediate-range weapons. Moscow has clearly given up on making a reduction agreement in this area dependent upon American concessions on SDI. Washington, in turn, is ready for an interim agreement which provides for a drastic reduction on both sides as long as elimination of all intermediate-range weapons is not yet attainable.

Secretary of State Schulz and Foreign Affairs Minister Shevardnadze agreed in Washington on the possibility of such an agreement. Its basic principle must be equal upper limits on both sides. If that were to prove feasible --and at the moment there are some indications that it will--then the Europeans in particular might be satisfied. For the resulting increase in stability on a lower level would be to their advantage, while preliminary concessions on the part of the West, still envisioned by Social Democrats and Greens, would not worsen the situation.

In the case of strategic offensive weapons, Reagan has acknowledged the fact that the Soviets showed a positive attitude to the American idea of radical reductions. The President continues to aim for a 50 percent reduction, but is also open to intermediate solutions which take Soviet interests into account. His evaluation, "There has been movement," indicates that there are definite opportunities in this area too.

The situation of the SDI project is more complex. It is certainly still Gorbachev's goal to convince the Americans to give it up. And it is just as certain that Reagan will not let himself be deflected from the principle of strategic defense. Nevertheless, the President has proposed a multi-stage plan. The gist of it is that at least for a period of 7 and 1/2 years, no space weapons will be put in place.

In detail, the situation is that the United States and the USSR are to undertake the responsibility of restricting themselves to research, development and testing of strategic defensive weapons up until 1991, in accordance with the ABM treaty. In the second stage, a new treaty is to guarantee that each side which wishes to set up a defensive system after 1991 will present a plan to its treaty partner; this gives that partner a share in the advantages of the defensive system and also provides for elimination of all offensive missiles.

A 2-year negotiating period is to follow. If these negotiations lead to no result, either side may set up a defensive system after a further 6-month delay.

It is true that this plan does not correspond to Gorbachev's demand for a 15-year moratorium in setting up an SDI system, but meets it halfway with 7 and 1/2 years, and affords the basic advantage of an agreed-upon form of regulation. Gorbachev's response appears not to have been as negative as TASS's propaganda.

In the matter of an atomic test ban, Reagan again did not adopt the Soviet moratorium proposals. But for the first time he took up the question of the inclusion of new limits for atomic tests in a missile-reduction agreement.

In exchange he named two conditions. First, the Soviets are to agree to additional verification in connection with the two test limitation agreements of 1970; second, they are to accept a program for the reduction and finally the elimination of atomic weapons. This places the demands for cessation of testing on a more realistic basis.

What answer Shevardnadze brought back from Gorbachev is still in the lap of the gods. Reagan's aides speak of a "serious proposal" by the Soviet leader, and the President himself agreed to a "serious and careful examination."

Guarded optimism may then very well be appropriate--assuming that Gorbachev could bring himself to clear up the Daniloff case.

9337/12948
CSO: 3200/2407

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER SPONSORS SOVIET-WEST GERMAN DISARMAMENT ROUNDTABLE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 31 Oct 86 pp 33-39

[Roundtable discussion by Georgi Arbatov, director of the US-Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science and member of the Soviet delegation at the Reykjavik summit; Valentin Falin, Soviet Ambassador to the FRG and member of the Soviet delegation at Reykjavik; chairman of the board of the Soviet news agency Novosti from 1971 to 1978; Colonel-General Nikolai Chervov, director of the treaty department of the Soviet Defense Ministry; Lothar Ruehl, State Secretary in the FRG Ministry of Defense; Volker Ruehe, Vice Chairman and foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag; Christoph Bertram, diplomatic correspondent for DIE ZEIT; Theo Sommer, Editor-in-chief of DIE ZEIT, at the Novosti Press Agency in Moscow, 15 October 1986: "After Reykjavik: Where Do We Go from Here?--Astounding Rapport Between East and West in the Shadows of SDI"]

[Text] Was the Reykjavik summit a failure or a success ?
3 days after Reykjavik, DIE ZEIT conducted a forum in Moscow
with experts from the Soviet Union and the FRG to discuss
the future prospects for disarmament.

[Sommer] How did the summit go ? What was the Soviet position that was presented to the U.S. President at Reykjavik ?

[Arbatov] Mikhail Gorbachev was quite amazed--and as for me, I was even downright shocked when I heard the statement by President Reagan that the American proposals at the Reykjavik summit were not accepted and that therefore an historic transformation in our relationship failed to take place. We, all of us, had the distinct feeling that the Americans came to Reykjavik with empty pockets. All they really had was a cosmetically enhanced variation on the question of intermediate-range missiles and a very duplicitous, characteristically Hollywood-type position on nuclear testing. For all that, the Americans fell victim to their own propaganda. It seems they were fully convinced that we would not be bringing any new proposals on military issues with us because of the big differences between our party leadership and our military. This apparently is the reason why they did not do any preparatory analysis on this issue at all and so the proposals submitted to them by Gorbachev disarmed them.

The meeting of experts which was then scheduled, I must say, was an amazing meeting. The American side was represented by just about their entire team, including Nitze, Adelman, Linhart, Perle, Kampelman and a number of others. Our group was far smaller; but it was headed by Marshal Akhromeyev. We sat together throughout the night, for a total of 10 and $\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Twice, the Americans took a break--once for 40 minutes and once for 1 hour 40 minutes. They simply had nothing new to say.

Marshal Akhromeyev referred to the proposals we had submitted and asked for American suggestions. This was met once again by embarrassed silence. Then they passed notes to each other and at times poor Paul Nitze, the head of the American delegation, read the text of some of these scraps of paper out loud although they were meant expressly for his own information.

After one of these breaks and some behind-the-scenes dispute, they returned and said "Here are our strategic arms proposals." Akhromeyev then asked them: "Gentlemen! In what way are these [proposals] different from your previous position? We have brought many new things with us and we are in an entirely new situation. In what way is what you are submitting to us here different from your old proposal?" The pause that followed lasted about 7 minutes. Not even in the theater have I ever seen anything like this. But maybe it was just a coincidence--because there is a Russian proverb which says "one has to measure a thing seven times before one actually cuts it." And in the end, it was cut off at the wrong point after all.

I think the Americans were not ready for an agreement and if the problem of the Strategic Defense Initiative had not existed--in fact, SDI did not come up until the end--they would have hit upon some other obstacle. At any rate, they put up insurmountable barriers every step of the way--with respect to strategic weapons, intermediate-range weapons; with respect to all issues. And whenever we found avenues to help overcome these obstacles, new obstacles were erected. The way I see it, the Americans conducted the negotiations along two tracks from the very beginning. They were negotiating with us and--no less difficult--among themselves.

[Sommer] How will things proceed from here on

[Arbatov] Our proposals are on the table. And it is Gorbachev's conclusion as well as that of our leadership that it is no longer possible to continue playing the game in which we have allowed ourselves to become involved in Geneva. No one can understand what is being talked about there for months. The thing is not making any headway; it has not for years--not only in Geneva but also in Vienna. It cannot go on this way. We have a clear goal and in order to reach it we are prepared to sacrifice a lot. But we are asking for a clear answer. The Americans would certainly have no objections to taking advantage of all our concessions and leaving the rest for some other time. But that we cannot agree to. The proposals are on the table as a package. Whether any changes are possible I do not know. Perhaps; but they could hardly apply to anything of significance.

What is happening in Vienna is a disgrace for all of us. Negotiations are underway there; there is a draft treaty on the table which calls for a reduction of less than one percent of the soldiers of the two blocs in Central Europe--and we cannot get it signed! That is a disgrace; it is a betrayal of mankind. Things cannot be allowed to go on this way. We have now made far more radical proposals and it will not remain at that.

[Falin] Why was no agreement reached? The point of departure of the Soviet side was the agreement reached in Geneva "to prevent an arms race in space and to put an end to it on earth." In Geneva, agreement was also reached on the precept that war--particularly nuclear war--is not a means of settling problems, and that also applies to problems between the USSR and the United States; that there can be no victor in a nuclear war and that neither side will try to attain military superiority.

In Reykjavik, the incompatibility of two philosophies became apparent. On the one side, there was the philosophy of the policy of strength, represented by the U.S. administration. On the other side, there was the philosophy of good neighborly cooperation and not just unilateral but comprehensive security, represented by the Soviet side. And that is the reason why it was not possible in the end to arrive at a common denominator; the reason why an historic opportunity was not realized.

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership does not feel that Reykjavik ended in catastrophe and that everything has come to naught; nor do we feel that we are standing at the start of an irreversible deterioration of Soviet-American relations. An historic opportunity did exist; for the present it was not realized. Nevertheless, Reykjavik was not without results. As Mikhail Gorbachev said at the press conference after the conclusion of the talks, the Reykjavik meeting has in fact brought the two sides objectively closer to one another. What was proposed by the Soviet side must be accepted by every objectively and rationally thinking person as a sincere and effective attempt to open the way to negotiations.

[Chervov] Prior to the Reykjavik meeting, a great deal of work was done on both sides to bring the two positions closer together. Toward this end, we met on various levels. Two meetings of experts took place in September and October--one in Moscow, the other in Washington. Without a doubt, the meeting of the two foreign ministers was of great significance for the preparation of the Reykjavik meeting. In principle, each side had detailed knowledge of what the other side thought.

At the most recent meeting of the experts in Washington, for example, Richard Perle flatly stated that the Soviet Union is behind in technology and that is why it wants to throw obstacles in the path of U.S. technological development and that is why it is trying to put a stop to SDI.

And Richard Perle, who does not hide his feelings and thoughts, said quite straightforwardly: you will not be able to keep up with us in space in any event!

Now if the American side had thoroughly analyzed the meeting of the experts and the foreign ministers' meeting, they would have come to the conclusion that Mikhail Gorbachev would not come to Reykjavik emptyhanded--because already in these meetings we no longer brought up the forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. We agreed with the Americans to the extent that sea-based cruise missiles would be subject to separate limits which are not taken into account in the overall maximum limits. We made it clear to the American side that we stand ready to place radical limits on heavy intercontinental missiles. In connection with the intermediate-range missiles, the U.S. experts were told that the question of the English and the French missiles will be dropped. The meeting of the experts already made it clear to the American side that the Soviet Union was prepared for radical change.

But at the same time we made it perfectly clear that even the testing of components of a missile defense system in space must be forbidden under all circumstances. It can only concern research and testing in the laboratory. In addition, of course, testing of land-based missile defense systems permissible under the ABM Treaty may be carried out. But we made it clear to the Americans that there would be no compromise as far as SDI was concerned.

[Ruehe] The positions which the Americans represented in Reykjavik were alliance positions which had been worked out previously within the alliance. In that sense, the criticism voiced here--if it were justified--would be directed at the alliance as a whole.

We heartily welcomed the fact that prior to Reykjavik and in Reykjavik itself both sides moved toward each other and that we were able to discover new aspects on the Soviet side--not only in terms of style but also in substance.

But the Americans did not come with "empty pockets." The fact is that they were carrying in their pockets the carefully worked out Western alliance positions.

[Arbatov] That is not true.

[Bertram] That is not really the way it looked.

[Ruehe] As far as we could tell, the Reykjavik meeting was to be a pre-summit for the main summit in the United States. For all intents and purposes it was clear from the start that this could not be a summit of decisions. This summit could and should provide extra momentum to the ongoing negotiations and perhaps spell out instructions for the chief negotiators so as to make their work easier.

But from what you have said here one might conclude that the Soviet side may have tried quite intentionally to turn this preparatory summit into a substitute summit--a summit of decisions.

[Arbatov] What was discussed were not treaties but directives to the foreign ministers to prepare the meeting in Washington.

[Ruehe] Well that raises the question whether it was really wise to try to clear up all the issues at once in one package on a single weekend.

Mr Arbatov, when I hear you say that the proposals are still on the table as a package, then that sounds as though the Soviet Union has reverted to positions which it gave up about a year ago--particularly with regard to establishing a linkage between the various areas.

I am fully aware of the connection between SDI and the issue of disarmament as regards the strategic systems. There is a contextual relationship there. But that connection does not exist between it and other disarmament issues. At the Geneva summit, the Soviet Union, too, expressly distanced itself from linkage and untied the package insofar as readiness to arrive at a separate interim solution on intermediate-range systems is concerned. I would view it as a step backward on the part of the Soviet side and as detrimental to the chances for negotiation, if this were an integrated package once again and would remain to be one in the future.

You owe us a clear answer on this issue: Is the Soviet side still ready to reach agreement--in the intermediate-range area; on nuclear testing; on conventional armaments and on chemical weapons--while leaving the especially difficult problems of SDI, ABM and the strategic systems aside?

I would plead for a step-by-step policy so that we do not run the risk of stumbling and I would like to repeat my question as to what you mean when you speak of a "package." Is the Soviet Union taking back some of its positions?

[Falin] If the attempt by the United States in Reykjavik to use SDI for the purpose of placing a lock on the entrance to a process of genuine arms reduction is a NATO position, then I have an even dimmer view of the future than before.

Treaties are not concluded in order that they can be interpreted by anyone to his particular liking but in order that they be fulfilled. So, if Article 5 of the 1972 ABM Treaty states that the development and testing of space-based components is outlawed but if NATO as a whole declares that this is only a wish and not a binding stipulation, then this raises the question of what possible purpose there is in concluding such agreements in the first place.

[Ruehe] The alliance position is as follows: The research conducted by the United States under the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty is justified--namely in the interpretation offered thus far by the American side to its alliance partners. Nothing else should be added to this. In other words, one should not try to expand the treaty; nor should one try to make the treaty more restrictive. If there are grey areas and open questions they should be discussed by those who signed the treaty.

The research conducted by the Americans so far, between 1983 and October 1986--would that have been compatible with the formula the Soviet Union is after at this time, i.e. laboratory research only ?

[Falin] The new American interpretation is such that the treaty not only permits research and testing in the laboratory but also out in the open and that includes outer space. This American interpretation does not correspond to the provisions of the treaty and if you concur in this American interpretation, then you are destroying the 1972 treaty together with the Americans. We accommodated the Americans in significant ways when we said we are prepared to accept laboratory research. They take our concessions. They take note of our readiness for compromise and then demand additional concessions which will be to their advantage. That is not the way to proceed.

[Sommer] What the Soviets offered in Reykjavik--is it now on the table as a package that cannot be untied ? Is it the way General Secretary Gorbachev said in his speech that in the absence of a limitation on SDI, in the absence of an abandonment of SDI "everything else we tried to create collapses ?" Does this mean that you will block all other negotiations so long as Reagan does not abandon his SDI position ?

[Falin] I do not want to expand on the subject of why the intermediate-range missiles were taken out of the overall negotiations some time ago. It was a technical matter. One did not wish to wait for the negotiations regarding SALT III but resolve the problem of the intermediate-range missiles prior to that point. For technical reasons, in order to speed up the chances for an agreement, we therefore concurred in separate negotiations on intermediate-range missiles. They were conducted on a different level by a different group but everyone knew that there was a contextual relationship between them even if no legal linkage had been established.

Now why was the Reykjavik proposal submitted as a package ? There are various reasons for that.

The issue on the one hand is the zero option for Europe. If that solution is adopted the power relationship in real terms will shift to the West's advantage because the English and French missiles are not touched. In fact it even permits an enlargement and modernization of this capability. The forward-based U.S. systems are not touched either. In terms of the number

of warheads on intermediate-range missiles and comparable weapons systems the West would then enjoy substantial superiority. The Soviet side concurs in this and states its readiness to take such a significant step, i.e. the zero option for intermediate-range missiles. But all this is counted in the computation of the overall power relationship, of the sum total of all components which make up the capability of both sides. Our proposals do not constitute a legally binding linkage but address the realities.

Secondly, the issue is the intermediate-range missiles in an albeit artificial but nevertheless actual relationship between Europe and Asia. As far as we are concerned, Asian security problems were, are and will continue to be separate from European security problems. Nevertheless, we have made our proposal for the solution of the overall problem--according to which 100 warheads on intermediate-range missiles will remain in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and 100 American warheads will remain on United States soil.

It is a question of future negotiations how things will develop and how, at the same time, one proposal or another can be implemented. But it is also a question which also hinges on SDI in certain respects.

I can only say one thing: Although SDI does not exist as a functioning system, it is already claiming victims. Its first victim was the possibility of achieving drastic cuts in the most important strategic systems and the possibility of bringing about drastic changes in intermediate-range missiles.

[Sommer] My impression of what you are saying is that there is an SDI proviso attached to the intermediate-range solution found in Reykjavik.

[Falin] I did not say that. I said it is a package containing three elements: strategic missiles, intermediate-range missiles and SDI--or more precisely, the ABM Treaty and the problem of calling a halt to nuclear testing.

[Arbatov] And that is a package and not a menu from which one can choose whatever one likes.

[Bertram] In October 1985 in Paris, your general secretary surprised a lot of people when he said "we separate the negotiations about intermediate-range weapons from SDI." In his 15 January statement he proceeded to reiterate that point. For a year, in other words, the Soviet Union has led us to believe that it was prepared to agree to a separate solution to the intermediate-range missile problem no matter what happened to SDI. Does all of this no longer hold true ?

[Falin] No, that is not correct. You are not calling for a solution of the intermediate-range problem under the conditions that were spelled out in Paris. What you are really calling for is an agreement under the conditions of Reykjavik where everything else is pushed aside.

[Bertram] At that time, separate negotiations with the French and British were proposed--and no Asian reduction.

[Ruehe] Would we be doing you a grave injustice if we called this an all-or-nothing policy ?

[Falín] That would not be correct at all. What we are dealing with are various models to solve a problem--more radical ones and not so radical ones.

For another thing, you understand that dropping the problem of the French and British arsenals creates very substantial problems for us in that the intermediate-range missile problem is split up by us, as it were, into the part which we are now resolving at the Soviet-American level and the other part which concerns the capability of other countries but which remains unresolved. You are trying to make the problem appear to be a purely Soviet-American problem. But you are pretty well aware of the fact that this is not so because, as you well know, an English submarine--particularly the new Trident 2--carries enough warheads that they will suffice in themselves to destroy all the cities of more than 100,000 population in the European part of the Soviet Union. You know that and then you tell us that it is a matter of little consequence.

[Ruehl] When did you tell the Americans that it was a package and not a menu ? Did you do so prior to Reykjavik ?

[Falín] We said it in Reykjavik.

[Ruehl] Mr Falín has pointed out the extent to which the Soviet side in Reykjavik modified its negotiating position with regard to intermediate-range missiles in order to make an agreement possible. These changes are to be welcomed because by doing so the Soviet Union has in fact moved some obstacles to one side (I hesitate to say "removed," judging by what we were told subsequently; so I will leave it at "moved to one side") and thereby opened the way to a balanced, expedient and sensible agreement.

For its part, the United States has made proposals which make it possible to reach an interim agreement that will bring us close to the zero option which the West has espoused since 1981.

We have supported these U.S. negotiating positions and will continue to do so in the future. Just the same, we must take the special conditions of security in Europe even after the removal of the Soviet long-range intermediate missiles of the SS-20 variety into consideration.

For reasons of their own security and equal treatment of the United States and Soviet Union, the West European allies have always demanded that the American forward-based systems (FBS) be excluded from a treaty and that European security interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union be safeguarded.

Mr Falin has said that because the Soviet Union left the forward-based systems as well as the British and French weapons out of the negotiations about such an agreement, it did something to its own disadvantage, so to speak, and altered the existing power relationship to its disadvantage. I think that this is the wrong way to look at it because the Soviet Union has never included its longer-range combat aircraft--which carry nuclear weapons or are equipped to carry them--in these negotiations so that the entire nuclear offensive air capability of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Western Europe--and also, by the way, vis-a-vis the American forces in Western Europe--has never yet been taken into account by any Soviet proposal.

It would now be necessary in further negotiations which may take place sooner or later to make it clear (also on the Soviet side) that leaving out the forward-based systems does not amount to a unilateral Soviet concession but that it reflects a continuing reality which consists in the fact that the Soviet Union has always excluded its comparable weapons systems facing the American forces and bases in Europe and all West European NATO member nations so that equivalence on both sides can be attained. We would view it as a step forward if this equivalence based on the reality of deployed air forces and their nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis Western Europe were to be accepted as a working hypothesis for European security.

A second remark refers to the British and the French weapons systems. We, too, welcome the fact that the Soviet Union is now ready to drop its demand to include, count or indirectly list these British and French weapons. This British and French potential represents less than five percent of the strategic nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. That does not make it negligible--I would not go so far as to say that; but in computing capabilities in arms control negotiations it does represent a marginal quantity--independent of the offensive capability connected with it and the threat it poses to Soviet territory. But this very capability is identical to the national deterrent capability of the two West European nations, Great Britain and France. And to list these weapons which both did not rule out as a possibility from the start does presuppose substantial reductions in the American and Soviet strategic offensive arsenals.

I mention this because Mr Falin has again pointed out that now, after Reykjavik, a separate agreement on intermediate-range missiles can only be had on the basis of the prior conditions. In the interest of meaningful negotiations in the future, I can only make an urgent plea that the Soviet position on this issue remain the same as it was in Reykjavik and that the Soviet Union does not go back to the old position which made the listing of the British and French systems an albeit indirect condition.

[Ruehe] There are no English or French representatives sitting at this table. But both countries have always said that if the world powers undertake drastic steps toward disarmament, they are prepared to do the same. But you cannot expect this to take place simultaneously--the arsenals are too small for that--or that they take the lead. But once what we have been talking about here has actually happened, there is absolutely no doubt but that the English and French will fall into line and would limit their arsenals and disarm.

[Ruehl] I would now like to go into the question of Europe and Asia. For the NATO member nations, the deployment of SS-20s in Asia was an a priori subject of negotiations and their limitation was an integral part of any agreement they were and still are striving for. That is why we take note of progress in the American and the Soviet position on this issue, too; in the 100:100 reduction worldwide, including total removal of long-range intermediate systems from Europe by both sides.

As a consequence, of course, the strategic and political significance as well as the operational capability of Soviet land-based short-range systems would be enhanced in relative terms. As far as we know, the Soviet Union has a little over 700 such systems with a range of between 300 and 1,000 kilometers. Aside from the 108 American Pershing IIs which replaced the old Pershing Is, we have more than 72 Pershing Is in the German armed forces. And that, of course, is not the kind of strength ratio that can be made out to be to the Soviet Union's disadvantage.

That is why we demand that these weapons systems must also be subject to arms control--the goal being to reduce the 150 to 500-kilometer-range systems to low levels with equal maximum limits. In our view, it is indispensable to enter into negotiations about weapons of this range immediately following the conclusion of an interim agreement. The interim agreement would have to include a binding commitment to continue the negotiation process.

[Arbatov] I can understand that you welcome all Soviet compromises and concessions and that you support all of the American hardheadedness at the same time. You are partners in the alliance; you are participants in everything; you are not referees and you are not observers standing off to one side. But we are prepared to discuss these questions with everyone.

First, on the subject of Europe. It is correct to say that Europe--even in the absence of intermediate-range missiles (what you call INF)--remains significantly vulnerable. In World War I, it was the "Big Berthas" that were used to bombard Paris. A cannon could also be built today that would cover the entire territory of the FRG. Neither you, nor we will enjoy complete security as long as we have not liquidated all nuclear weapons and have drastically reduced the conventional weapons.

We can appreciate this problem and we therefore believe that the weapons with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers should be frozen immediately and that negotiations on them should begin. In other words, we are not refusing to deal with this problem because we are in favor of a nuclear-free Europe and a nuclear-free world.

You referred to a step-by-step policy. We have been moving step by step since 1969, Mr Ruehe. But it turned out that we were moving in different directions. It was like in "Alice in Wonderland." The faster she ran, the longer she remained in one place. It was these step-by-step negotiations that Gorbachev referred to when he spoke of the "old rubbish in mothballs." We have had any amount of that; that does not get us anywhere. And after I took part in that nighttime session in Reykjavik I now have a better understanding of why that is so. As a matter of fact, I am more and more inclined to believe that there is such a thing as harmful negotiations. By this I mean negotiations which are part and parcel of the arms race.

Step by step--that is all well and good and of course we will have to move step-by-step because we cannot do everything at once. But time is constantly getting shorter. Just take a look at the development of submarine missiles. In addition, many other weapons systems are under development. That is really taking us into a world where an agreement will be impossible; into a world without trust, a world in which our life will depend on chance and, in some instances, on senseless accidents. That can put an end to everything

[Ruehl] Of course Mr Arbatov is right in saying that Europe remains vulnerable--in more ways than one, as a matter of fact. We can feel this vulnerability and that is why we cannot assign so much priority to the nuclear issue that we would only be negotiating about nuclear weapons while we would not negotiate about the conventional armaments and the offensive capabilities which are particularly discernible to us in the structure of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. That is why we agree with the Soviet side when it says that conventional forces must be dealt with. We have been saying that for a long time.

[Sommer] What reason did you have to expect the Americans to meet your demands with respect to SDI in full ?

And let me ask another question. Why wasn't anyone able to come up with a solution at the last moment--not an "all-or-nothing" solution but an agreement, let us say, on a definition of how much research is permissible to be worked out by a special committee and to try and discuss the ridiculously small time differential of 2 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years--between 7 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years and 10 years--one more time ? Why did the Iceland meeting have to end so abruptly on that Sunday evening ?

[Arbatov] We took into consideration that the President has his favorite toy. I even came up with a way to help him save face--by telling him go ahead and continue working on the development; in the next 10 years you will still not be able to deploy anything in outer space.

As far as not allowing any tests in space is concerned, that was in strict conformance with the ABM Treaty. We did not wish to destroy the ABM Treaty; we did not wish to take part in its burial.

Why was there no one at the last moment to work out an agreement on research? I think that a lot has been said on this subject already. We made an offer for a step forward. We could not go any further than that. We stated our readiness to agree to research and testing. We could not go further than that because if we had, then the entire issue of eliminating nuclear weapons during that particular period of time would have become unreal and impossible for us. That was clear to the Americans as well.

One more thing: if the Americans felt that there was not enough time; if the American President tells us tomorrow that he has changed his mind and is ready for an agreement, Gorbachev will welcome it and send the President a big flower bouquet--or at least to his wife for having convinced the President that such a solution makes sense.

[Sommer] And what do you say to the argument that the Soviets made all those magnificent offers only because they knew that they would be turned down?

[Arbatov] You are asking whether it was a "trap." I would say that we made very substantial concessions in our proposal. We did not ask the President to state publicly that he had made a mistake or that he was not smart enough when the SDI project was submitted to him. The real issue was that the Americans were talking about 7 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years--even the President admits that they will not have anything in the space of 7 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years--but that we offered 10 years because the American side will not have anything in 10 years either and because we had proposed a great deal more for reduction.

We felt that our concessions would make things easier for the President because he would be able to say: I believe in SDI; we will continue to work on it and in 10 years we will see whether it works or not. But at the same time we agreed that we will liquidate all nuclear weapons in the interim. Even if the President had said--although it is not true--that his SDI project had helped to make the Russians more flexible, we would not have reacted. In other words, it was not a trap, even if attempts have been made to portray it as such.

What I have neglected to mention thus far is the American offer to let us share in the SDI technology. But given the present American position, not even a small child in our country would believe that. The business firms in the FRG know full well how much pressure is brought to bear on them to keep them from selling even uncomplicated technology to the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances, who can believe in such a proposal ? If this kind of thing is put forward as an argument in a serious conversation, it gives you the impression of an undignified trick.

[Ruehl] No one among us in Europe believes that the United States will be in the technological, financial and organizational position in anything like the foreseeable future to put up a dense, enduring, continent-wide or even a very large, widespread missile defense umbrella. And no one believes that this kind of technology would have to be or, in fact, would be effective against other types of offensive weapons of which Mr Arbatov has spoken.

We are extremely skeptical as far as the overall realization of such possibilities is concerned. Our questions refer to a far greater extent to what one might call the management of this dimension of the strategic relationship between the two world powers--and of course in and around Europe. This strategic dimension of future technologies: how can stability be achieved ? how can the dynamics of armaments be limited ? how can a balance in strategic arms be achieved--with the goal of reducing these armaments ? That is the point of our questions.

[Falin] You are asking why the Soviet Union is afraid of SDI. We are not afraid of anyone; not even of our wives. Therefore we are not dealing with the question here of whether we are afraid when we say that this system of thought is unacceptable to us. We cannot accept this system of thought.

Let me turn the question around: why has this phantastic idea been turned into a stumbling block ?

As the general secretary has said, the Soviet Union shares the view of a lot of people in the United States and in Western Europe who do not believe that SDI can be realized--at least not in the shape in which this program was originally announced. In this sense, the program is not a cause of particular concern to us, given the armaments in existence today.

The significance and effectiveness of SDI--even if its effectiveness is relatively minor--could increase disproportionately if the program is at all implemented in a time of drastic cuts in central strategic systems because then this program will have to withstand a much smaller number of warheads than is the case today. Given drastic cuts in delivery systems and warheads, this type of SDI program would fit very well into the concept of a first strike in the Soviet view. This analysis is provided by the computer.

But there is another aspect to this as well. The President has stressed a number of times that fundamentally new weapons systems will be developed within the SDI context, including weapons systems that are based on new physical principles. And just as the atomic bomb altered military doctrines in 1945 and at the same time profoundly transformed political

doctrines and political thinking, new weapons that will come out of the research work going on today will inevitably alter the system of military doctrines and military thinking and, as a result, the very policies of nations.

Some elements of this transformation are already recognizable today. So a control of arms development will virtually no longer be possible; the arms race will become uncontrollable. The time available for making decisions will be reduced even further. Even today, the early warning time amounts to just a few minutes; following the deployment of American intermediate-range weapons it has been cut down in Europe to eight to 10 minutes. Once weapons are deployed in outer space, that time will be reduced to 30 seconds. No one, no statesman--no matter in what social system--is capable of reaching an adequate decision in that space of time and of taking all the factors into account.

Questions of war and peace and, as a result, of the fate of civilization will then be decided by machines. Are we prepared to have our fate depend on machines? That is the fundamental question which we must answer today and not at some time in the future. And for this very reason the Soviet Union is so adamant with regard to the issue of SDI and nuclear weapons testing today.

[Arbatov] Why don't you ask the Americans why they attach such great importance to SDI that they wreck the chance for a treaty because of it even though, by agreement, no nuclear weapons against which this system would be directed would exist any more long before any SDI components (I am not even speaking of the whole system) were deployed in space? Why do the Americans insist on it just the same?

Because they are afraid of a "madman" brandishing nuclear weapons? This argument I cannot buy. A madman will not have any ballistic missiles and because of a madman one does not decide to spend billions on a system. Now there are some who say that the Soviet Union is hiding something. I think we could harbor the same suspicion vis-a-vis the Americans. But once both sides possess an ABM system, the situation will get even worse because then someone could make use of his weapons because he will be convinced that he can use them with impunity. Why are the Americans staking everything on one card?

[Bertram] If the U.S. President gets completely caught up in SDI, it is not absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union to follow suit.

The primary objective of SDI is to destroy the other side's satellites, i.e. to blind the other side and once the other side has lost its satellites to take advantage of the situation and launch a surprise nuclear attack or to blackmail the adversary. Secondly, all the weapons developed in accordance with SDI will have a range of some 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers. For some reason, one shies away from using the word "weapon." The

Americans have assigned some harmless names to it. One says "technology" these days; the word "arms" is not used. Given this kind of range, one is forced to ask what type of defense weapons these are.

In my view, calling SDI a defensive weapon is just playing games with words. It is an offensive weapon and it is designed for the solution of offensive operations. In conjunction with the nuclear arsenal for offensive purposes this smacks of aggressive intentions. The central aim of SDI is to achieve decisive superiority over the Soviet Union--because on the nuclear level it does not work. Whatever program the Americans think up, they do not achieve superiority! On the contrary; there is nothing but expense and loss of security for the United States. That is why the path via outer space has now been chosen.

[Ruehl] You are aware of the fact that the FRG government supports the American research program into the possibilities for strategic defense. This political support is dedicated to a defense initiative, not to an offensive strategy to achieve strategic superiority or to pose an offensive threat to the Soviet Union or other countries with weapons systems either nuclear or post-nuclear, i.e. employing revolutionary technology.

We cannot see how such a shift in strategic stability from offensive nuclear weapons to what essentially are non-nuclear defense systems might serve as a first strike strategy. From the descriptions provided by our American allies (which are what we must go on) we can only see that they would only use this defense system against missiles already launched--provided that they succeed in transforming this type of technology into an operational defense system. However, the logical and actual precondition for the operational use of these defense systems would be a massive missile launch. All this must also be seen within the context of the reaction time issue; the question of identifying launched missiles and their weaponry and the question of control, including human control, over such a system.

I will not deny that the acceleration of technological development creates a dynamics in the face of which the political decision-makers should pause to examine whether they will use every new technological discovery as a tool. In this regard, I would even go part of the way toward your concerns--but then again not as far as you.

The strategy of the United States and of the North Atlantic Alliance--and I assume the strategy of the Soviet Union as well--is not directed toward a nuclear first strike. The chances of delivering such a first strike are incomparably smaller than the obstacles that stand in its way--and that goes for both sides. The obstacles are to be found in the sea-based arsenals, in the possibilities for deploying mobile land-based missile systems and the possibilities for deploying combat aircraft.

Of course it is necessary to take the political will of the strategy into consideration and not just the technological possibilities. The political intent of American strategy and of Atlantic strategy in general, however, is not to prepare a war of aggression--much less a first strike assault to disarm the Soviet Union--but the preservation of stability in order to prevent war. It is within this system of coordinates of course that the thinking and the research into the strategic defense initiative must be seen.

We have heard you say here that you view this as an attempt to establish American world hegemony. I must tell you that I cannot follow the logic of that argument. No matter whether and how you succeed in reaching agreement with the Americans on a compromise on strategic defense, you will be doing whatever you can to take military advantage on behalf of the Soviet Union of these technological possibilities insofar as you gain access to them and you have also been preparing and partially implementing similar programs for some time, as far as we can tell.

[Chervov] But I have already said that no common basis exists between SDI and defense. SDI is an offensive system, an offensive strategy and there are only verbal statements to the contrary but no facts that would disprove it.

SDI is not peace. SDI is not defense. SDI is preparation for war and today SDI is an obstacle to disarmament.

I know, of course, that the CDU and the CSU have said and are saying that SDI was the main lever and incentive to move negotiations forward. But the truth is that SDI has now become the main obstacle to negotiations. SDI undermines the entire negotiation process.

One cannot defend Star Wars and uphold the ABM Treaty at the same time. SDI and ABM are incompatible. The ABM Treaty is the basis of Soviet-American relations; the basis for the stability of the world political situation. It is not SDI that means stability; it is the ABM Treaty which strengthens stability in the international situation. If the ABM Treaty breaks apart, a game without rules will begin.

President Reagan has declared that the ABM Treaty must be replaced by another treaty. What kind of treaty should that be? It is tempting for you to ascertain whether the Soviet Union is creating a system similar to SDI. But let me tell you: we have no such programs; we are not creating an SDI. We have in fact proposed to the Americans that everything that is done in this field be forbidden--and we open the doors of our laboratories and place everything under control.

You say that the Soviet Union already has a missile defense system. Yes, we have deployed one all around Moscow. That is permissible under the ABM Treaty.

[Ruehl] But aren't you also testing laser weapons ?

[Chervov] There is always talk that there are super laser weapons at our Sary Shagan test site. There is nothing of this kind there and the Americans know that perfectly well. There is in fact a laser facility there and tests are conducted. But these are not laser weapons and this also has nothing to do with the development of x-ray, chemical or other laser weapons. The American side knows perfectly well that there is laser equipment there which is being tested for the control of outer space and for the control of all presently existing cosmic objects; for the determination of coordinates; for the determination of their orbits and so on. In addition to what I am telling you here there is nothing in Sary Shagan. We have also shown photographs of this to the Soviet-American consultative committee meeting just now in Geneva.

You are calling SDI a technology; we are calling it a weapon. That is the fundamental difference. And please believe us, SDI is not aimed at strengthening stability but leads to a destabilization of the international situation. And once the SDI components are deployed outside the laboratory, we will be approaching a limit beyond which the unforeseeable will happen.

One must remain faithful to treaties; one must observe the provisions of the ABM Treaty; one must maintain strategic parity--that is stability. SDI leads to the violation of that stability.

[Chervov ?] As far as I have been informed, the FRG government has consistently supported the Soviet initiative for a halt to nuclear testing. Chancellor Kohl did so directly in January of this year. But now the FRG government appears to have done an about-face; it now holds to an entirely different position. My highly esteemed colleague Ruehe, for example, has been among those who have reiterated the American position by saying: "As long as there are nuclear weapons, there will have to be nuclear testing." What is the basis for your change of position with regard to nuclear testing ?

[Ruehe] The German position on the nuclear test issue has not changed. We continue to hold to the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty. But we will have to talk about how one gets there. Toward that end, Chancellor Kohl has proposed a step-by-step solution because interim steps must be taken and parallel to these the verification procedure has to be improved. As a first step--and the U.S. President has proposed the same thing--the unratified treaties of 1974 and 1976 should be incorporated into the ratification process and at the same time the talks between the Soviets and the Americans should be stepped up.

[Chervov] What is it that stands in the way of a ban on nuclear weapons testing? Why isn't it possible to ban such tests immediately? Why is such a long-range goal talked about? Why does it have to be postponed like this? Why can't nuclear tests be halted immediately?

[Ruehl] We continue to hold to the goal of a complete halt to all nuclear weapons testing. That has been described as a long-range goal by the chancellor. It is not up to us to shorten the way. We do not have any nuclear weapons; we do not conduct any nuclear weapons tests. But we support a policy which makes nuclear weapons tests superfluous.

Secondly, one cannot look at the question of calling a halt to nuclear weapons tests as an entirely separate matter from the reduction of existing nuclear weapons. It is the policy of the FRG government to call attention to the connection between the two and, while being committed to the abandonment of nuclear weapons testing, not to disregard the demand for a substantial reduction in nuclear arms.

Thirdly, I have voiced some doubt about whether all the nuclear powers--I am not talking about the Soviet Union and the United States alone although they are the two leading nuclear powers--will really desist from conducting certain nuclear weapons tests for any length of time as long as they maintain nuclear weapons arsenals. The fact is that those powers who do maintain nuclear weapons arsenals and use them as a means of nuclear deterrence will repeatedly carry out specific nuclear tests for an extended period of time. On this subject the chancellor has said that there may be a possibility to limit the [test] series; to lengthen the intervals between the series; to exchange information beforehand for as long as this situation continues where significant nuclear arms arsenals make it necessary in the view of those who maintain them to conduct nuclear weapons tests from time to time for the purpose of making certain technical adjustments. We cannot be the judge of that. And the policy of the FRG government is a completely unequivocal commitment to a ban on still remaining nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere.

[Chervov] There is no need for further testing of existing nuclear weapons. They have been tested; they need not be tested any more. The arms race, however, is stopped [sic] by nuclear weapons tests. I cannot agree with you under any circumstances when you say that nuclear arms tests are of no significance to the arms race.

Marshal Akhromeyev has made a similar statement. If we adhere to the moratorium for 1 year or 1½ years, then that is a loss for us from a military point of view [he said], a disadvantage because in the meantime the Americans have conducted 21 nuclear explosions--by the end of the year it will be almost 30. That is of great significance to the development of new weapons systems.

[Ruehe] In Reykjavik, General Secretary Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union had proposed a process which would give priority to the question of reducing the explosive force of nuclear explosions per year and to the fate of the treaties concluded in 1974-1975 and that the process could eventually lead to the formulation of a comprehensive treaty calling for a total, final ban on nuclear explosions. What the general secretary alluded to, i.e. a process which could lead to further limitations both in numbers and explosive force--is very close to ideas which we have also developed.

[Falin] This is just playing with words and if we mean to continue doing that, we will never solve any problems. You and the United States are speaking of an "uncertain perspective." But we are talking about definitive decisions within firmly established periods of time.

[Sommer] We are not the proper addressee for that. The FRG government is in favor of a total halt to testing; but it is also aware of the fact that this cannot be achieved in one stroke. But if you are asking us what our position on ABM is, then we say we are in favor of a restrictive interpretation of ABM. We have made that clear to Washington, just as other FRG governments did. If General Chervov asks us whether we are in favor of testing SDI components in outer space, my answer would be: No, we are not because we are in favor of adhering to the ABM Treaty in its narrow interpretation.

[Falin] It will depend on the solution of this question whether the other questions connected to the development of new weapons on the basis of nuclear fission are resolved. That is of immediate concern to you.

In Reykjavik, there were signs of progress on this issue after the United States demonstrated willingness not to examine the conditions attendant to the continuation of nuclear weapons tests but instead the conditions attendant to a ban on atomic weapons testing. We were prepared not to insist that the Americans declare a moratorium--not because this would be a bad procedure but because it would not be suitable for the Americans for various reasons. If the Americans consider it more suitable to institute the ban on the basis of the treaty in a step-by-step fashion, then we are prepared to accommodate them on this matter. But the separate steps--the deadlines, the explosive force, the number of tests--must be defined exactly so that everyone shall know in what year the tests will end completely.

It depends on this whether the efforts with respect to the strategic weapons systems and the intermediate-range systems will be successful. It is all interconnected. This is not formal linkage but it is a reality with which we are dealing

[Chervov] Ratification of the treaties; lowering of thresholds, quotas for nuclear weapons tests--that is all well and good. But we are proposing negotiations on a total test ban. Does the FRG support this position?

[Ruehe] We have already said that this is the goal of the FRG government and that it is in favor of such a procedure of agreeing on conditions for the termination of nuclear weapons tests. In my view, a step-by-step approach is the safest method of reaching the goal in this area as in any other.

[Arbatov] One cannot be just a little bit pregnant. Either you set off these explosions or you don't. As NATO allies of course you have to swallow this American nonsense. But we are under no obligation to do likewise.

We have made a concession to the Americans: we agreed to the ratification of the old treaties even though we are not at all interested in this. That particular train has left the station; those are snows of yesteryear. For the past 10 years, no one has tested anything bigger than 150 kilotons. That has no impact on the arms race.

If anyone were to ask me--this is my own personal opinion--I would remove this from the package. It must be removed; it must be left all by itself. And that will not be easy for the Americans. The Congress, too, like many others in the world, looks at this differently today.

One needs to look at what is behind it. It is not deterrent weapons that are being tested. Tests are being conducted in order to develop weapons with which to wage war; offensive weapons. That has nothing to do with deterrence because even if we reduce our nuclear arsenals by half, there will be five to ten times as many weapons as are needed for deterrence. It is not even SDI that is being tested. If I am mistaken on this, the general will correct me. In most cases, it concerns new types of offensive weapons or explosions designed to demonstrate how military technology will become obsolete in a nuclear war.

There is a direct connection in this present situation between nuclear weapons and abnormality and tension. A safe world with nuclear weapons I cannot conceive of. But the elimination of nuclear weapons alone will not bring about a solution either unless the old ways of thinking are eliminated at the same time.

[Ruehe] Someone from Mars who knows nothing about the relationships here on earth would think, if he listens to us talk, Mr Arbatov, that you are the representative of a small country which has no nuclear weapons and I, on the other hand, were the representative of a world power which has amassed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. But the real situation is exactly the opposite. I just wanted to mention that instead of launching into flaming oratory.

[Falin] The fact is that you really do not have any nuclear weapons-- but on your soil there are thousands of nuclear warheads over which you have no control. I do not know which is preferable.

[Chervov] Control--specifically control of chemical weapons--is not a problem for the Soviet Union. The Soviet negotiator at the talks has stated officially that we would agree to any type of control, including on-site inspection.

The problem is something else. The problem in the United States is that we are calling for control of private firms and multinational companies which account for about 60 percent of the production capacity for chemical weapons. If the American side and you would use your influence to make such controls possible, then we would be prepared to place our chemical industry under control as well. But Richard Perle said: we will never agree to that. It is impossible to control the multinationals; that is beyond our power. What are we to do then ?

If you, as a government representative, tell us that the FRG agrees to controls over the private firms and the multinationals, then we would take note of this position and report to our leadership accordingly.

[Ruehe] The chancellor, the foreign minister and the defense minister have all communicated to the U.S. government this year that they support the British mediation proposal on controls. This proposal calls on each treaty signatory to permit inspections by challenge. The Soviet principle of voluntary controls is not acceptable for this [sic]. Exceptions from inspections by challenge must be kept to a minimum and must be regulated on the basis of precise criteria. Provision must be made for carrying out inspections by challenge quickly in order to prevent deception. The obligation to permit inspections by challenge must not be undercut by means of complementary regulations.

[Sommer] Can inspections by challenge also be carried out at private companies ?

[Ruehe] The British proposal does not contain any precise language on that.

[Falin] There is no provision for it.

[Ruehe] Controls must be carried out in all places where the most dangerous materials are produced. That is completely self-evident.

The subject you have addressed, however, General Chervov, that is the real problem, i.e. that the Soviet Union continues to insist on the principle of voluntary inspection to this day. That, unfortunately, is in glaring contrast to what we have heard here. According to the discussions in Geneva thus far you would want to reserve the right to reject inspections by

challenge and to submit to them only on a voluntary basis. This position is untenable. That is why the Soviet Union must change its position in this regard.

[Chervov] Mr Ruehe, you are not quite aware of the facts. Comrade Shevarnadze has just spoken with Mr Howe, the British foreign secretary, and with Mr Genscher and has told them that we agree to the British formula.

[Ruehe] May I put this on the record ? This is a historic moment!

[Chervov] You certainly may. But I have put a different question to you: Are you prepared to place all private companies and multinational corporations under obligatory control ?

[Ruehe] The control mechanism which is agreed upon must apply to all production facilities where the materials are produced--no matter what their legal structure is like. That is also possible in the Western countries. In the FRG, we are already doing so in an exemplary fashion. That is why it is self-evident that a way must be found and will be found which starts out from what is produced, i.e. from the hazardousness of the materials, and not from the legal status of the companies which produce these materials.

[Chervov] Let me just make one point on the negotiations in Vienna on troop reductions in Europe. The main stumbling block today consists in the absurd ideas of NATO with regard to "control."

We have a subject of negotiation in Vienna. We have a geographic area which has been established by the mandate of the negotiations themselves. Why then are you demanding that our eight western military districts be subject to control ? What do these military districts have to do with the Vienna talks ? That is the main stumbling block in Vienna. If you relinquish this position which is totally unacceptable for us important progress will be made at the Vienna negotiations. Otherwise, we could claim an equal right and demand that Great Britain, France and the United States be subject to control.

[Ruehe] In Vienna a struggle went on for many years about something which is the most normal thing in the world if one really wants disarmament, i.e. that prior agreement is reached on how many soldiers there are on both sides and how this can appropriately be verified. But in this regard the Soviet position has been quite rigid.

Now the West has made a major concession to you by proposing that we do not start out by counting numbers on both sides but by agreeing on reductions and that we then count the reductions and, in the end, determine what is left. To this day, the Soviet Union has not been willing to agree to verification of current strength figures.

[Chervov] I am asking whether it is possible that you alter your position and that these eight military districts are excluded from control.

[Ruehl] I cannot make any statements on details; but I can tell you one thing: there must be these so-called entry and exit points at which the reductions by both sides are verified and the possibility must exist to verify how many soldiers there ultimately are on both sides.

[Chervov] Controls are a touchy matter for both sides. For us, there are no problems. But one must not make a fetish out of controls--or a stumbling block on the road to disarmament.

[Ruehl] At the Vienna MBFR talks we continue to have contrary positions on three issues. The first of these is verification. On this issue, the Western position is the right to on-site inspection without the right of refusal. That has been our position in all arms control negotiations. The Eastern position, on the other hand, is on-site inspection only on the basis of reasonable suspicion, coupled with the right to refusal. Now this means that in every case there must first be negotiations to determine whether the request for inspection is justified. And even then it can still be refused. Now that of course is not a useful kind of inspection as a means of verification.

The second issue revolves around the question of the exchange of information as a basis for an obligation on the part of the participating countries not to increase the size of their armed forces again once the reductions have been made. There have been very lengthy negotiations on this issue since 1973 and that has been an Eastern demand from the very outset. On this, we have now taken the position that the exchange of information must include a breakdown of units down to the battalion level. But that goes too far as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned. The Eastern proposal states that there should only be an exchange of collective and national overall figures. Now that of course is totally inadequate to achieve verification of the remaining units.

The third issue is that of the exchange of personnel. According to the Eastern position, the routine exchange of personnel--this concerns stationed forces, i.e. Soviet forces in Central Europe--should take place apart from the yet to be established permanent control points. In practice, this would mean that several hundred thousand soldiers each year would not be included in the verification process as they move into the MBFR area. This exchange of personnel would remain uncontrolled.

The Western countries have never demanded that the eight western military districts of the Soviet Union be included in the MBFR treaty formula. They have merely stated that these military districts serve as a staging area for the regular, biannual exchange of personnel of the Soviet ground forces in Central Europe, i.e. the MBFR reduction zone and that they should be included to the extent that the Soviet Union at least give notification of major troop maneuvers and troop movements. In other words, this concerns an agreement on notification which we are seeking and not an inclusion in the control system.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union has agreed to this in its entire European area--beyond the 250-kilometer limit which the Helsinki Final Act provided for notification and observation over certain thresholds and to that extent we are satisfied in terms of substance. The next matter to be addressed is how this can be combined with an MBFR agreement. But if that were the only stumbling block, I think we could conclude an MBFR agreement very quickly.

Now we are told that following the declaration by General Secretary Gorbachev on conventional arms control from the Atlantic to the Urals on 18 April 1986 and after the Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact on 11 June 1986 new prospects are opening up. In Vienna, the Warsaw Pact has not opened up any such prospects as yet.

[Sommer] Did I understand this correctly? The Soviet objection to our demand for some kind of inclusion of the eight western military districts has been rendered invalid from the Bonn point of view by the notification agreement reached at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building measures?

[Ruehl] In my view, the notification formula agreed upon at the Stockholm conference makes it easier to reach agreement on an MBFR treaty.

[Falin] Based on what Mr Ruehl has said, I draw three conclusions. First, the FRG side accepts our equal status only in the negotiations. But that does not mean that the principle of equal status, equality and equal security becomes the basis for agreements and settlements which must be the outcome of negotiations.

Second, the control measures are inadequate. For example, troops on the one side are reduced by 1,000 men and by 2,000 men on the other. But the control measures are such that they guarantee complete control, including inspections. But then reduction does not serve as a means of lessening danger but as a means of introducing a specific system of surveillance and verification which is of greater interest to one side than to the other.

Now for the third conclusion which I will and must draw. The conference was given a mandate. But its mandate has been moved in the direction of the Urals and there is no corresponding augmentation in the direction of the West--to the Atlantic and to the far side of the Atlantic. But if that is so--and indeed it is so--at least some questions do arise as they must because this is an instance in which the principle of equality and equal security is being violated.

[Chervov] Mr Ruehl says that the Western countries are adhering strictly to the mandate of the conference. I will unmask him as far as this thesis is concerned because the negotiations and the mandate are expressly concerned with the "mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central

Europe." The armaments, too, are part of the mandate. But now the NATO countries would like to cross out the word "armaments" and say we do not want to reduce the armaments but only the soldiers. We do not agree with this and we never will. Why do you want to alter the mandate ?

[Ruehl] General Chervov, there have been disputes about the interpretation of the mandate from the very start. You yourself know that in the preparatory talks in 1973 that particular aspect of the mandate was the subject of protracted controversy. In the end, the West accepted the term "armaments" but with the proviso that this only referred to equipment of course, i.e. the equipment of those personnel which would be taken out of service. There was no agreement on anything beyond that. We have never agreed to the Soviet position that beyond the withdrawal of personnel the equipment of entire organic units, i.e. the separate weapons systems and other combat equipment should be included.

[Sommer] What was the reason for that ? The American material depots in the FRG ?

[Ruehl] That was one reason and the other was that the nations located inside the reduction zone must of course continue to be able to mobilize and must therefore be able to use the material they have to supply other than active units since they are making a definite contribution to reduction to the extent that they reduce their forces--as opposed to the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain (France did not agree to being included in any event). They are not in a position to dispose over these forces; but they should not in addition be limited in their capability to mobilize.

[Chervov] Now that is a question of principle. When the individual soldier is reduced, what does he do ? Does he simply take off in his uniform and leave his weapons behind ? In contrast to us, NATO divisions enjoy dual support, i.e. all weapons from submachine guns to tanks are stored on West European soil, particularly in the FRG. What we are asking is that when forces are reduced by one division that division should be withdrawn with all its regular permanent weaponry.

We will not agree to having the mobile replacement of our units subjected to controls. That is not a topic of negotiation because here we are talking about 5,000 to 6,000 men who are brought to the Group of Soviet Forces --not from the western military districts, as a matter of fact but from Siberia and the Far East, for example.

But I would like to end my observations on the Vienna negotiations on a positive note. Despite all the obstacles, we now have an opportunity, based on the measures adopted in Stockholm, to bring the Vienna negotiations to a positive conclusion--because one might apply the Stockholm resolution on

inspection might be applied in Vienna as well and all the confidence-building measures worked out in Stockholm could also be applied at the Vienna talks.

[Falin] I would like to make a few brief remarks on the Budapest proposal by the Warsaw Pact. The Budapest initiative has addressed the concern--however justified it may be--which is being voiced in West with regard to the high level of confrontation in conventional weapons. If the West feels that the socialist countries enjoy a serious superiority in some systems which destabilizes the situation, then the socialist countries would stand ready to bring these forces into balance with whatever exists in the West--under the condition that the Western side would establish a corresponding balance in those systems in which we feel the West enjoys superiority.

As in all such initiatives, we will have to agree on goals as a first stage. In other words, we will have to reach agreement on how to achieve lasting peace at a low level of confrontation. If such willingness does not exist, negotiations will be useless. Once there is agreement on goals, we will have to formulate the principles on the basis of which we wish to negotiate. Is the principle of equality and equal security acceptable to the West? And, does the West accept the same criteria in computing the components which make up the power relationship?

[Ruehl] The FRG government is not only consulting with its allies on this particular proposal but also on a plan for controlling conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. This idea has been under consideration in the West for a long time. We welcome the fact that General Secretary Gorbachev touched on it in his Berlin speech in April and that the Warsaw Pact nations have incorporated the idea in their Budapest statement.

What are the consequences of this? In my view, there are three. First of all, we need a regional plan for such talks, i.e. those countries whose territory and whose forces are linked in a geopolitical and military-geographical relationship to one another are brought into a context within the negotiations which corresponds to this relationship.

Secondly, the alliance structures which are the focus of European security and the major part of the military establishments must be taken into account. In other words, while the negotiations between the nations of Europe and the two North American nations which maintain forces in Europe should be carried on, the two alliances (or rather the member countries of the alliances, as is the case in the MBFR talks in Vienna) should negotiate on the appropriate measures, e.g. in particular on reduction of forces and/or reduction of armaments.

Thirdly, a percentage plan for the reduction of forces cannot be expected to solve the problem, as far as I can see, because it would retain all the disparities in the size, structure and deployment of forces as well as the methods used to replace them.

What we need in other words is a structured negotiation process in which the member nations of the two alliances carry on focused talks in accordance with the regions in which they are situated; the forces which they and their adversaries maintain and the forces which can be moved into these areas and which can have an impact on them. This leads to the next point, i.e. that all nations concerned with European security and the Soviet Union (in its European part) must enter into joint obligations and not merely into regional measures; into overarching joint obligations the tenor of which is indicated to some extent by the outcome of the Stockholm conference--as regards the transparency of military establishments, military maneuvers and troop movements. Further work along these lines should be undertaken.

[Sommer] Where do we stand after Reykjavik ?

[Kuehl] Mr Zagladin, with whom we met separate from this roundtable, has spoken of a step forward, of a new stage, an investment in the future. In my view, that is very constructive language which makes it clear that the East-West disarmament process not only must proceed but will proceed.

The chancellor has spoken of a need to make pragmatic use of the understanding already reached. In saying this, I think, he has pointed to a path that leads away from a package deal, an all-or-nothing policy toward a policy which could be described in the following manner: let us do what is possible; let us make pragmatic use of those things on which we agree and let us continue talking about the areas on which we do not agree.

[Chervov] I am much obliged to our colleagues for this frank exchange of views. It was conducted in a civil manner. We were frank and did not hide anything from one another. You probably now have a sense of the fact that there is not only new thinking on the part of the Soviet Union with regard to questions of war and peace and questions of disarmament but also a new optical aspect of action, a new *modus operandi*. We are not only taking initiatives but we also buttress the effectiveness of these initiatives with our actions.

Nevertheless, we must state one concrete approach to the ABM Treaty. We must understand that this is the only foundation on which strategic stability, Soviet-American relations and normal international relations generally rest.

[Ruehl] We continue to hold of course to the zero option on intermediate-range systems. We ourselves have been proposing this since 1981. If we could move forward without stopping for an interim agreement, so much the

better. On the other hand, this would make the need for a concrete commitment to prompt negotiations on short-range and shortest-range intermediate systems down to 150 kilometers even more urgent.

Finally, we continue to hold to the fundamental guidelines on parity and limitations between the two alliances and on equal commitments which hold out the possibility of an agreement which provides for equal security--also for Western Europe vis-à-vis the bigger, stronger, better armed Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

[Falin] I would say that the discussion at this table has shown how many opportunities there are for a frank, honest and objective exchange of views on extremely complex issues which are on the agenda today waiting to be resolved. At the same time, our exchange of views has demonstrated that there is a lot of misunderstanding with regard to the position of the other side on a number of issues. In addition, there are major differences in approach to these issues--including the fundamental approach.

Some time ago, Chancellor Kohl spoke of the need to bring about a situation which would make SDI unnecessary. If the FRG government is still prepared to contribute to such a situation, then that is the safest way toward rapid realization of agreements on strategic arms and intermediate-range missiles.

[Bertram] Let me close on a faint note of uneasiness. Is the approach on arms control on which the two world powers have agreed the correct one? It seems to me that they are operating according to an all-or-nothing principle, i.e. that what is better is the enemy of what is good.

In matters of arms control the bone of contention is always the rules of competition for the arms race. Ronald Reagan has raised the idea of deep cuts; the Soviet Union has taken up this idea and both have since outdone each other in conjuring up an ideal world without nuclear weapons.

It will take a long time to find our way back from these visions to the real world and to recapture many of the military-political developments which were mentioned in this discussion. One day perhaps we will rue the path on which the two superpowers are now embarked--the path which leads to the great visions.

[Sommer] In the name of DIE ZEIT, I wish to express my gratitude for this Moscow discussion. It was a good discussion because it was open, also because it definitely got too rough at times and because it helped clarify matters. I view it as an investment in the future; an investment in our common future.

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[Article by Xiao Ming (3469 3298): "Neither a Success Nor a Failure--The Dramatic Reykjavik Meeting"--first two paragraphs printed in boldface]

[Text] Common needs and different motives brought the U.S. and Soviet heads of state to Reykjavik. It was unusual that the two leaders should have personally held a preparatory meeting for a summit. As far as Mikhail Gorbachev was concerned, he would not be able to stand the blow of a fruitless official meeting. Less risky, the preparatory meeting would enable him to advance or retreat. As far as Ronald Reagan was concerned, the meeting would not only demonstrate his tough policy but also establish his image as a "peace president."

On the question of "Star Wars" both parties refused to make concessions but they did succeed in sounding each other out. After undergoing a "cooling" period, U.S.-Soviet relations will probably be readjusted.

On 10-11 October, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met in Iceland's capital Reykjavik. The dialogue, resulting from a year of unpredictable U.S.-Soviet relations, brought people a little comfort.

Extraordinarily, it was not an official U.S.-Soviet summit but a preparatory meeting held by the leaders of these two countries in preparation for a second summit. This dramatic practice was not only unprecedented in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations but also rare in international relations.

The results of the meeting showed that both parties had discussed some substantive issues. However, due to the extremely vast differences, they did not reach any agreement, nor did they fix a date for the next U.S.-Soviet summit. The media was disappointed by this.

Identical Needs But Different Intentions [subhead]

According to the agreement reached at the U.S.-Soviet Geneva summit last year, Gorbachev should go the United States this year for a second meeting with Reagan. Since the beginning of this year, however, U.S.-Soviet relations have been in a state of upheaval, sometimes improving and sometimes deteriorating. As the year was nearing an end, the United States and the Soviet Union were still unable to fix a date for the summit. As a result of the "spy incident," relations between the two countries were again at a low ebb, dimming the prospects of a summit. In such an atmosphere, on his way to Washington on 19 September to attend the UN General Assembly meetings, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze took with him a letter to Reagan from Gorbachev. George Shultz arranged a meeting at which Shevardnadze personally passed on the letter to Reagan. In his letter, Gorbachev suggested holding a preparatory meeting in the

near future either in Iceland or Britain prior to the official meeting between the U.S. and Soviet leaders. In his reply the following day, Reagan agreed to the meeting on condition that the Soviet Union set free American reporter Nicholas Daniloff. Later, the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers haggled over the matter. A compromise was finally reached on the evening of 28 September and was officially made public on the 30th.

It was a subtle affair. Gorbachev's proposal on holding a preparatory meeting not only reflected his urgent need to ease the tense U.S.-Soviet relations but also showed his uncertainty about whether or not he would be able to achieve any results at the second summit. Given his present conditions at home and abroad, he was unable to sustain the blow of a fruitless official summit. Holding a preparatory meeting, however, was less risky. It would enable him to advance or retreat. In the former case, he could sound out the U.S. position from the highest level and, taking advantage of Reagan's need for a summit, urge the other party to make concessions, thus paving the way for an official U.S.-Soviet summit. In the latter case, he could attribute the failure of the meeting to the U.S. side, demonstrate his sincerity to the people of the world, and justify himself to the Soviet people.

Reagan's quick reaction to Gorbachev's proposal showed that he also needed the summit. Since the beginning of this year, Reagan rejected Gorbachev's proposals for a meeting outside the United States three times. He insisted that the second meeting should be held in the United States. He was worried that if he again rejected Gorbachev's request, the second meeting would probably not be held in the foreseeable future and it would be even more difficult to expect a third meeting. As a person whose term of office would soon expire and who wanted to leave the political arena with the image of a "peace president," Reagan did not want to see this. More important, he realized that Gorbachev had a greater need for a summit than he did. If he could take advantage of the summit to force the Soviet Union to make concessions and to achieve a compromise favorable to the United States, it would not only demonstrate the success of his tough policy toward the Soviet Union and strengthen the Republican Party's position in mid-term elections this year, but also show U.S. sincerity about disarmament, foil the Soviet peace offensives, improve the image of the Reagan administration, and calm down the general discontent at home and abroad about his foreign policy.

Thus, common needs and different motives brought Reagan and Gorbachev to Reykjavik.

Giving Tit for Tat, Neither Side Was Willing To Make Concessions [subhead]

The preparatory meeting did not have a fixed agenda. The Soviet side stressed that the talks would concentrate on arms control issues; the U.S. side, however, wanted to include the four aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, namely, arms control, regional conflicts, human rights, and bilateral relations. During the meeting, four rounds of talks were held, lasting 11 and 1/2 hours. After the first three rounds, the U.S. side announced that both sides had made some progress in certain fields. However, when both sides showed their hands in the fourth round, the negotiations reached a deadlock. Judging from what both sides disclosed, the Soviet Union was ready to make substantial concessions in medium-range guided missiles, strategic nuclear weapons, and on a nuclear test ban in exchange for substantive U.S. concessions in the "Star Wars" program and put this forward as a package deal. In other words, if the United States should refuse to make concessions on the "Star Wars" program, the Soviet Union would not consider other agreements.

In fact, by setting forth a package deal the Soviet Union wanted to re-emphasize the principle of "linkage," which it had no longer stressed at the arms control talks, namely, progress on medium-range missiles and strategic nuclear weapons should depend on whether or not the United States would make corresponding concessions on the "Star Wars" issue.

For some time, with progress on such arms control issues as the medium-range missiles in Europe, there was a growing hope in the United States that the meeting might be able to reach an agreement on one or two arms control issues, thus paving the way for the next official meeting. Cherishing a similar hope, Reagan took with him a U.S. plan: By making some concessions, the United States would strive to reach an interim agreement with the Soviet Union on reducing strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles and, taking advantage of this opportunity, try to fix a date for an official meeting with Gorbachev; neither giving up the "Star Wars" program on any account nor preparing to accept any substantive restrictions, the United States would at most agree upon some compromises on the deadline for complying with the antiballistic missile treaty.

Therefore, the "Star Wars" program became an issue between both parties and a major obstacle to reaching an agreement.

"Star Wars" has always worried the Soviet Union. This is because it not only involves the question of whether or not the Soviet Union can maintain its status as a superpower on a equal footing with the United States, which it has attained through several decades of hard work, but also the question of whether or not the Soviet Union can extricate itself from the arms race, concentrate its energy on domestic construction, and realize the "intensified development strategy" laid down by the 27th CPSU National Congress. For this reason, upsetting, or at least restricting, the development of "Star Wars" has become a most important link in the overall Soviet strategic plan. Prior to the meeting, the Soviet Union had basically understood the U.S. position on "Star Wars". But it did not give up the hope of making the United States a little more flexible on the issue through diplomacy at the highest level. At the meeting, Gorbachev warned Reagan of the consequences of "Star Wars," coupling pressures with promises. On the one hand, he indicated that the Soviet Union was ready to make substantive concessions on arms control, including consenting to the U.S. zero option on medium-range missiles in Europe and accepting a 50 percent cut in strategic nuclear weapons, provided that the United States agreed to limit its research and testing of the "Star Wars" program in laboratories for 10 years. On the other hand, to compel Reagan to submit, he would not hesitate to force a showdown by breaking up the meeting.

As far as Reagan was concerned, the "Star Wars" program would not only enable the United States to take a leading position in space, thus establishing the U.S. strategic superiority, but also spur the development of U.S. high-technology industry as a whole, thus further strengthening its national strength. Moreover, Reagan also wanted to take advantage of Gorbachev's concern over "Star Wars" to pin down the Soviet Union without giving it a breathing spell. Shultz explicitly said after the meeting that the powerful existence of "Star Wars" had enabled the U.S.-Soviet summit to reach a potential consensus. The "Star Wars" program has brought enormous political, economic, and military interests to the United States. For this reason, it would be difficult to shake Reagan's determination to hold on to the "Star Wars" program.

Since the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on the "Star Wars" issue were so wide apart and since neither of them was willing to make concessions, it would be difficult to bridge the gap in a short time.

In Spite of the Fact That Both Evaded Responsibility and Denounced Each Other, They Still Left Room To Maneuver [subhead]

After the conclusion of the Iceland meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union accused each other for the failure to reach an agreement. Reagan stressed that the Soviet Union insisted on revising the anti-missile treaty with the aim of strangling the "Star Wars" program. Gorbachev, however, charged that Reagan's insistence on "Star Wars" had "made it impossible to make any progress." The representatives of both parties indicated that it would be difficult to hold a second summit in the near future. Meanwhile, both parties stressed that progress had been made on certain issues at the meeting and they indicated their readiness to continue the dialogue. Obviously, actuated by their own needs, neither side wanted to close the door of the meeting. They were striving to reduce as far as possible the damage that the meeting might cause to both parties.

Although the Iceland meeting has upset the momentum of U.S.-Soviet dialogue, both parties have basically or nearly reached an agreement on some issues through the highest-level contact. More important, both parties have been clearer about each other's basic positions. Therefore, after a certain "cooling period" in U.S.-Soviet relations, they will probably readjust their asking prices and reconsider the possibility of a summit.

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CSO: 5200/4019

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

EGYPTIAN PAPER DISCUSSES SDI, REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

Cairo AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 30 Oct 86 p 16

[Article by Anis Mansur: "Positions"]

[Text] Modern history changed when President Reagan announced on 23 March 1983 that, "It is inevitable that we embark on 'star wars'--in other words, that the battle be in outer space...far from the earth and people."

The years remaining in this century will not be like the previous ones. They have ended. Mankind will not know mere destruction like that the Torah mentioned in the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. The destruction of Hiroshima will be a very insignificant event. The destruction coming to us at our hands is complete and total!

If we returned to 1960 we would find American, Russian, and European efforts to reach an agreement limiting strategic weapons. These efforts last for years without result. At the same time ICBM's are developed and demolished. In other words, that which is sent from Moscow lands on the White House in Washington, and that which is sent from Washington goes to the Kremlin and enters the office of the Soviet leader and hits him personally. And if it doesn't find him in the Kremlin, it goes looking for him in any other place!

Therefore it was inevitable to search for weapons that overtake these missiles while they are on their path to their target, that shoot them down in the ocean, or blow them up in outer space with the nuclear warheads they carry, before they reach the targets that the computers in the sea, and at the ground stations have set for them.

The Americans invented the anti-missile satellite. This satellite sends a death ray to the missile coming from Russia and renders it dust that circulates around us, or the remains fall to earth and contribute to the deformation of living things, and the generations after that.

The ICBM's must be hit immediately after they leave European skies. This requires the cooperation of satellites, submarines, radar installations in Europe, and air-borne radars!

Then there was the meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. It did not and will not yield anything, because there is no way to deter the missiles or the satellites that attack them, and the Russians don't trust the Americans and vice versa!

What Churchill said during World War II applies to us. We ride a tiger which we dare not dismount. And the tiger is getting hungry.

13,013/9599

CSO: 5200/4601

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: W. EUROPEANS DISAPPOINTED OVER LACK OF INF AGREEMENT

OW180639 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Vitaliy Ilyashenko]

[Text] Space arms research and development is in full swing in the United States. Countless laboratories and centers are involved in their creation. [Video shows work at high technology laboratories and schematics of SDI systems]

Military-industrial corporations have already received large orders for the production of new types of weapons. The star wars program will be implemented over many years and promises billions in profits. For this reason representatives of the military-industrial complex in Congress and in government are doing their utmost to deflect the attack on SDI and remove any doubt about its importance for the defense of the country. They advocate the immediate deployment of space weapons without waiting for the final research results.

Washington must explain its position to its Western European allies, who had placed hopes on the Reykjavik meeting to achieve a reduction in nuclear armaments. They are especially concerned over intermediate-range missiles deployed on the European Continent. The agreement reached on this issue at Reykjavik was wrecked by the U.S. refusal to retreat from its star wars fantasy. This has caused deep disappointment in European political circles. Secretary of State Shultz undertook the difficult mission of talking with the allies. The Secretary of State flew to Brussels a few hours after the close of the Reykjavik meeting. He spoke at the special NATO council session and presented the U.S. version of the proceedings and outcome of the Reykjavik meeting.

West European capitals want to know the truth about the talks. The Soviet Special Missions Ambassador Karpov was received by Great Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher. [Video shows Karpov visiting Thatcher]. He informed the head of the British Government about the Reykjavik meeting's proceedings, and the Soviet disarmament proposals, including those on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Western Europe is showing great interest in Soviet proposals because they would free the continent from U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles. Soviet SS-20 missiles would have been removed too. That is the very zero option which had been submitted by the West Europeans.

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CSO: 5200/1096

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS VIEWS UK NUCLEAR FORCES DEVELOPMENT, REYKJAVIK

LD311907 Moscow TASS in English 1858 GMT 31 Oct 86

["London Playing Into Washington's Hands"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS — TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said in the House of Commons on Thursday that her cabinet will continue the modernisation of Britain's nuclear forces on the "Trident" programme that envisages the purchases of U.S. submarines and more powerful "Trident-2" nuclear missiles. At the same time she deems it necessary to link any possible reduction of nuclear missiles in the framework of a Soviet-U.S. arrangement to chemical and conventional armaments.

Viewing these pronouncements in the context of the situation that has formed after the Reykjavik summit, one should pose the question: Does this stand by London promote the achievement of Soviet-American arrangement in the sphere of arms limitation or, quite the contrary, does it play into the hands of those forces in the USA and Western Europe that seek to prevent the lessening of nuclear menace? The answer is that London clearly has no wish to promote the removal of obstacles on the road to a nuclear-free world and readily plays into the hands of the U.S. Administration in order to complicate the situation that is difficult as it is.

Proceeding from the need to clear the road to detente in Europe, to rid European peoples of the fear of nuclear catastrophe, the Soviet Union made a great concession. It proposed not to take into consideration Britain's and France's nuclear missile weapons and to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. Further advance should be made after this: to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. London reacts to this constructive stand by Moscow in a peculiar way. While the Soviet Union, provided there is an arrangement with Washington, will be reducing its nuclear forces, the conservative government will be building up nuclear armaments which, as is known, are targetted at the Soviet Union. And according to the British and U.S. press these forces are already quite considerable. There is no need to enumerate what kinds of nuclear warheads and in what amounts Britain has. Suffice it to consider their strike power only.

According to the SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MAGAZINE, the number of potential victims of a British nuclear strike in 1985 could be nearly 21 million people, and when the "Trident-2" missiles are adopted for service this index might increase sharply. And a British nuclear strike could destroy nearly half of the Soviet Union's industrial facilities.

And such volumes of the strike power are concealed by the head of the British cabinet when she says that the British nuclear forces are "independent". We have no intention to take these forces into account now, but they in London should not think that the public is unaware that the British nuclear forces are part of the nuclear armaments of the North Atlantic bloc and that it is the NATO supreme allied commander — Europe, an American general, who indicates to Britain potential targets for a nuclear strike.

Nevertheless, the Reykjavik meeting showed that nuclear menace can really be averted. It is only that the solution of this problem should be approached not from the "positions of strength", but from the principles of equality and equal security for all and, certainly, without lumping together things that can be resolved stage-by-stage.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK DEFENSE SECRETARY COMMENTS ON LINKS IN MISSILE CUTS

Leeds YORKSHIRE POST in English 22 Oct 86 p 3

[Excerpts]

THE Defence Secretary, Mr. George Younger, made it clear last night that Britain would accept a deal removing Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles from Europe without tying it to cuts in Soviet nuclear weapons other than the equivalent SS20.

But he gave a warning that any further arms reduction talks would have to be in the round, taking in short-range nuclear weapons, strategic missiles and conventional, chemical and biological arms.

Mr. Younger pulled NATO military commanders back into line after complaints from them last week that a deal on Cruise and Pershing 2 would leave the Soviet Union in a position of overwhelming strength on shorter-range missiles.

He said that while the military chiefs were right to sound warnings, the British Government was not prepared to use their arguments against a deal on the missiles.

Speaking after the first day's session of NATO's nuclear planning group meeting at Gleneagles, Perthshire, Mr. Younger said the Government would accept the partial or complete removal of Cruise and Pershing from Europe.

This would be without a link to another deal on the short-range weapons, an argument which seems likely to be opposed by other members of the Alliance, notably West Germany.

His comments were the first clear statement from the Government that it wants to see a deal not tied to any other agreement and it is also the first time that it has been stated that all other forms of arms must be put together if the Soviets want to talk in future.

Mr. Younger said: "NATO military commanders are quite right to sound warnings but the British Government are not prepared to say that we would be against any deal on intermediate nuclear forces if it does not include conventional reductions, although we would like to see conventional reductions."

The United States defence secretary, Mr. Casper Weinberger, gave a detailed run-down on all that happened at Reykjavik and hopes to have the full unity of the Alliance behind him at the end of the two-day meeting, with agreements to go for a Cruise and Pershing deal at Geneva.

But it now seems likely that European agreement for that course of action will be coupled to a clear message to Washington that talks on other arms cuts should also begin.

Mr. Younger stressed that it was NATO unity which brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. Strong efforts are being made to maintain that unity but three member states, Norway, Denmark and Greece, are annoyed that it was President Reagan's refusal to use his Strategic Defence Initiative, Star Wars, as a bargaining counter which led to the breakdown there.

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CSO: 5240/018

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

LABOR'S KINNOCK TO USE ZERO-OPTION AGAINST THATCHER

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 25 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Nicholas Comfort]

[Text]

MR KINNOCK believes he can embarrass Mrs Thatcher by taking up enthusiastically the "zero option" disarmament plan with which the Prime Minister belaboured Mr Michael Foot during the controversy over the arrival of the first cruise missiles in Britain.

The Labour leader detects signs that since President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev came close to agreement in Reykjavik on the zero option—withdrawal of all American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe—Mrs Thatcher and her Government have cooled towards it.

And he is ready to argue that the Prime Minister only used the zero option as a stick to beat Labour in the run-up to the 1983 General Election because she did not imagine the Russians would ever agree to it.

Government 'delaying'

In a speech in Cardiff last night Mr Kinnock said that at Reykjavik the Superpowers came "closer to agreement on nuclear arms reduction than anyone could have anticipated just a few months ago."

And he claimed that since the inconclusive talks in Iceland the British Government had been "dragging its feet" on the zero option discussed there.

The Labour leader further asserted that in the Commons on Thursday Mr John Stanley,

Armed Forces Minister, had admitted that Ministers would now only support the zero option if it were linked to a parallel agreement on short-range weapons.

"Wrapping the zero option round the Government's neck" will be a central part of Labour's strategy as the party tries to stress the credibility of its unilateralist defence policies in the wake both of the party conferences and of Reykjavik.

Out of step

Mr Kinnock believes he can now truthfully state that he, Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev are all ready for an agreement to remove American Cruise and Pershing II missiles, and the Soviet SS20s they were installed to oppose, from Europe... and that only Mrs Thatcher is out of step.

And with hints from Nato generals as well as from Whitehall that Mr Reagan may have gone too far in showing readiness to agree the zero option in Iceland, he expects the Prime Minister to argue for caution in pursuing it when she flies to Camp David next month for talks with the President.

Mr King, Northern Ireland Secretary, said last night that after the meeting in Iceland "we have the best prospect ever of a real and massive reduction in nuclear arms", and maintained that Mrs Thatcher's Government had from the outset been an active participant in ending the arms race.

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CSO: 5240/018

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK PROTESTORS ATTACK CONVOY OF CRUISE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

LD040604 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 0514 GMT 4 Nov 86

[By staff reporter Mark Hughes]

[Text] Six cruise missile launchers were ambushed by 100 peace protestors early today as they returned from exercises on Salisbury Plain.

There were several arrests during the violent confrontation in which members of cruise watch daubed the vehicles with paint.

They also claimed to have cut the brake cables on some, forcing servicemen to effect emergency repairs.

The attack was so fierce, said onlookers, that the convoy, consisting of about 20 American military vehicles plus supporting police, was forced to halt for one hour.

Its progress back to Greenham Common was at a considerably slower than normal rate, it was claimed by the demonstrators.

The ambush was launched shortly after midnight by a car hidden in a lane off the A303 near Andover.

Its driver waited for police to pass before pulling out into the path of the convoy, forcing it to a halt.

Members of Cruise Watch then emerged from the undergrowth

and began painting the windscreens of the military vehicles.

They also claimed to have cut hydraulic brake cables on some of the launchers.

Devizes police said several arrests were made and that the road was blocked by police vehicles during the incident. The ambush took place at a spot favoured by protestors. It is four miles to the east of Amesbury and close to where Hampshire police hand over the Wiltshire police.

Cruise Watch, closely linked to CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament], monitors the movement of American cruise missiles in Britain and has attacked launchers before.

The convoy involved in today's incident had been on exercises since Wednesday night.

A spokesman for Cruise Watch, Mr Rob Watling, said: "It is another example of how unarmed and untrained civilians can interrupt a NATO exercise. 'I hate to think what would happen if determined terrorists decided to attack this convoy. It is obviously completely undefended and indefensible.'"

No-one at the Greenham Common airbase last night was prepared to comment.

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CSO: 5240/018

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

FRG PAPER SAYS CSCE FOLLOW-UP MUST CONCLUDE BY END OF 1987

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Sep 86 p 6

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "Political Predominance of Superpowers Hampers Conference--Preparations for Third CSCE Follow-Up Underway"]

[Text] Vienna, Sep 23—On Tuesday the planning meeting for the 35 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began in Vienna. The meeting comes in the wake of the first East-West agreement on security issues since 1979, which was concluded yesterday at the close of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). As instructed by the CSCE review conference in Madrid, the ambassadors, gathered in the Redoutensaal of the Vienna Hofburg Palace, are to decide within 2 weeks on a daily agenda, a general outline and the procedural details for the third CSCE follow-up meeting scheduled to take place in Vienna at the beginning of November. But what actually determines the political success and the continuity of the CSCE is the development of relations between the two superpowers. Some CSCE participants view their predominance as a liability. Nobody in Vienna, however, nurtures the illusion that progress will be possible without an appropriate climate between Washington and Moscow. This applies to all three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act: not only to questions of security, but also to the consolidation of East-West economic relations, and especially to the expansion of human contacts and the confirmation of human rights.

What has become clear in Vienna so far is that Stockholm has provided a compromise that could lead not only to an extension of "confidence-building measures" in the area of conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals, but also to progress toward a solution of global strategic issues. The Swiss were disappointed at the dismissal in Stockholm of a neutralist proposal that would have provided for aircraft from the neutral states to be used for reconnaissance in case of suspicious occurrences, but a majority of the delegates seemed comfortable enough with an alternative that makes reconnaissance aircraft the responsibility of the country targeted for inspection.

The Austrian host deems it important to continue confidence-building through political means. Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jankowitsch, who had compared the importance of the Vienna CSCE follow-up to the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, pointed to the differences between words and deeds, which, until

now, have often hampered CSCE process, although many areas have seen progress since Helsinki. Jankowitsch welcomed the resumption of a superpower dialogue that had stagnated for years and in whose absence detente in the Europe cannot be realized. Austrian CSCE experts are not sure if the Vienna follow-up conference will lead to a second phase of the CDE or if the Stockholm results will become part of the CSCE framework. They also see difficulties ahead in squaring U.S. insistence on keeping the coming debates as open as possible with the Soviet demand for confidentiality. It also seems to be Moscow's intention to turn the CSCE forum as soon as possible into a framework for a new security conference dealing exclusively with European disarmament. At this point, the question arises whether or not the negotiations on "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe" (MBFR), which have been going on in Vienna for the past 13 years, will be conducted within or parallel to a new negotiation forum. Neutral observers in Vienna fully realize that MBFR negotiations have been viewed as superfluous for quite some time by an odd coalition of opponents: the Soviet Union, France, and influential circles in the U.S. Defense Department.

Conference officials in Vienna are also saying that they expect difficulties over details to show up once the CDE resolutions are implemented. Possibly, years of tough wrangling with the Soviet Union over the actual degree of "openness" and of its willingness to allow inspections in the military sector lie ahead. This experience has held true over the years and is already putting a damper on the positive expectations that have attached themselves to the fiercely fought-for Stockholm document. In the meantime, spirits in Vienna have been lifted somewhat because of talks between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, as well as President Reagan's renewed offer, advanced in his address to the UN General Assembly, to delay for 3 years a decision on the deployment of a space-based anti-missile defense system, currently being developed under SDF, and, last but not least, because of a fresh desire by both superpowers to stay on the path toward a second summit despite the Daniloff/Zakharov affair and the expulsion of Soviet UN diplomats. A new "ice age" between Washington and Moscow would surely not have brought about such significant progress at the CSCE.

Establishing Equivalency Among the Three 'Baskets'

American negotiators in Vienna see as their first priority to resist the Soviet attempt once more to turn the CSCE into a conference dealing strictly with security issues. Since the Helsinki Final Act, the West and neutral nations have succeeded in both establishing equivalency and equality among the three "baskets," and in bringing the Soviets around to agree to it. This accomplishment, so the Americans claim, is the actual achievement and essential function of the CSCE. They point to the Daniloff case as an example illustrating the importance of the human rights issue. They agree that it is important to increase trust and to decrease tensions in military matters. They also would welcome as a significant and security-enhancing step an expansion of the present parameter of negotiations between the pacts (the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries in the West; the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East) to one extending from the French Atlantic

coast to the Urals, but never at the expense of losing sight of the main objective of the CSCE. For this reason, the U.S. delegation has decided to insist, with the beginning of the planning meeting for the CSCE follow-up, on the intrinsic connection between the three "baskets" in order to prevent the Soviets from reverting to demands, put forth by them since 1954, to set up a European conference dealing strictly with security issues. The Americans are also refuting a frequent European criticism that the CSCE can never amount to much in view of Reagan's conservative policies by claiming that Washington is in fact well aware of the conference's importance. However, if progress is to be made it must happen through required and sober considerations of what benefits both East and West. Apart from that, there is still the task facing the high-ranking group, created during the last NATO meeting of foreign ministers in Halifax, to factually evaluate the possibilities for conventional arms limitations from the Atlantic and The Urals, without disadvantaging the West because of possible asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It is plain then, so Americans say, that on security-related issues are far harder to build a consensus among 35 countries than it is in MBFR or bilateral negotiations.

Such comments indicate that the United States is not willing, either in Vienna or at the bilateral negotiations in Geneva, to sacrifice policy positions for the sake of apparent successes—even when pressured by such NATO partners as the Federal Republic. In addition, already in Stockholm, NATO as well as the neutral countries have learned that the superpowers will revert to a bipolar position—a position created by the possession of nuclear weapons—when they consider it necessary. In Vienna, too, the Western alliance cannot discount the possibility that there will be cases where instead of ballots and consultations, there will be unilateral briefings about deals already concluded. It is certainly no secret in Vienna that it would mean the end of the CSCE follow-up, if it were to drag on into the U.S. presidential election year of 1988. It is for that reason that the follow-up conference in Vienna should, if at all possible, come to an end before the end of 1987.

13196/12851
CSO: 5200/2404

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

CSSR: SOVIET PARTICIPANT COMMENTS ON MBFR

AU221122 Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 41, 15 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Vladimir Chernyshev: "Who Is Putting the 'Sleeping Beauty' to Sleep?"--passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Excerpts] /Europe, which more than once in the course of past centuries has been into the scene of bloody wars, is today, thanks to imperialism, the center of a military confrontation between the two military-political alliances. The concentration of troops and armaments in Europe is particularly dangerous. It is therefore an exceptionally important task, and one that cannot be postponed, to alleviate this confrontation and thus avert the threat of war./

The Vienna talks in the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe could represent a chance in this respect. Regrettably, the preceding 39th round of the Vienna talks ended without results once again. The "Sleeping Beauty," as these talks have been aptly called by the American weekly NEWSWEEK, has been immersed in its deep sleep for almost 13 years and has not awakened even yet. What is the reason? Whose fault is it that a forum of such importance for enhancing the security of our continent has not yet managed to get out of the blind alley?

I participated in the Vienna talks for several years and can now look at them from a distance. I would therefore like to objectively assess the position of individual participants at the talks and to try to understand what it is that stands in the way of progress. Let us first take note of the proposals that have been tabled in the Hofburg Palace.

Western Policy of Obstructions

In the long years of the Vienna dialogue, both the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO states have submitted many a proposal. The socialist countries have been constructively modifying their proposals and introducing into them elements which take aspects of the NATO countries' position into consideration. /The common feature of all proposals made by the Warsaw Pact member-states has been the principle of equality and equal security of all participants./

The proposals by the Western participants in the talks have proceeded all those long years--and, I am sorry to say, continue to proceed to this day--from an utterly different starting point. Displaying intransigence, they invoke the so-called numbers problem and strive to divert the talks from a discussion of the reduction of troops and armaments and the final results of this reduction to an assessment of fabricated "disproportions" in the strength of the two sides' troops in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Later the West backed away from this "numbers problem" somewhat, only to put another obstacle of principle in the path to a genuine reduction of armed forces and armaments /by striving to replace disarmament control with arms buildup control./

It must be said for the sake of truth that the fact that the West has backed away somewhat from the "numbers problem" is due to the socialist countries. The method of overcoming disputes about numbers which they proposed has been accepted by the world public as quite comprehensible and pragmatic. The gist of this method is that--regardless of any disputes and different approaches to the assessment of the numerical strength of the two sides' troops in central Europe--/each side should limit its troops so as to achieve a contractually guaranteed lower level of armed forces in this area that would be the same for NATO and the Warsaw Pact: 900,000 men from each alliance./

In an endeavor to facilitate the transition toward practical steps in central Europe and initiate a real process of reduction and limitation of the arms race, no matter how modest, on 14 February 1985 the socialist countries submitted the /draft of the basic provisions of an agreement on reducing the numerical strength of the ground forces and armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States in central Europe and on refraining from subsequent increases in the participating sides' armed forces and armaments in this area./ At the same time, the socialist countries' proposals concerning the reduction of the troops and armaments of all participating countries retained their validity.

It was only on 5 December 1985 that the NATO countries presented their comments on the socialist countries' proposal from the previous February. They advocated the idea of limiting in the first stage the troops of the USSR and the United States, but excluded arms from the reduction process. For the second stage, they advocated a freeze on the troop levels of all direct participants (again, the commitment would not pertain to armaments).

On 20 February this year, the Warsaw Pact states then submitted an expanded version of their earlier draft of 1985. It retains all of its fundamental provisions but at the same time it substantially develops them, complements them, and defines them with greater accuracy. It considers all aspects of the Western participants' position that appear to be acceptable and proposes compromise solutions on a number of important points, on which the opinions of the participating sides differed.

One is inclined to think that the NATO countries would have appreciated the socialist countries' constructive approach and that in the subsequent round of the Vienna talks (which ended in July) they would have responded to their new proposals in a spirit of goodwill. This has not happened, however. /The Western participants have not abandoned their unconstructive approach and the whole matter has thus become deadlocked./

Verification or Espionage?

Now, then, did the NATO countries respond to the socialist countries' proposals? On 5 December 1985, the Western participants took note of the socialist countries' proposal for an initial reduction by Soviet and American troops and the subsequent non-increase in the level of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. However, they distorted the essence of this proposal and filled it with points that would again cast doubt on the very possibility of reaching an agreement. /By arguing that there is a verification problem and by arbitrarily raising the question of verifying an agreement that does not even exist yet, they are thwarting, in fact, the solution of a problem as urgent as the reduction of the level of military confrontation./

Acting in contravention of the mandate of the Vienna talks and their very name, the Western side seeks to confine the whole matter to a negligible reduction and subsequent non-increase in the numerical strength of troops alone, without providing for any limitation or freeze on armaments. And even this emasculated commitment is used by the Western side merely as a pretext to enforce an artificially construed and both practically and technically unfeasible demand for a recount of members of the armed forces. Added to this, moreover, are verification terms that would in the final analysis unjustifiedly reveal the entire defense structures of states, down to the level of battalions and individual barracks, and thereby interfere in their internal affairs, although this is not necessary to comply with the presumed agreement.

The unconstructive nature of the Western participants' approach has become even more conspicuous now that the Warsaw Pact states have submitted far-reaching initiatives offering the possibility of alleviating the military confrontation in Europe.

The Soviet Union has recently called for a new approach to the problem of lowering the level of conventional forces. As is known, there is an approximate parity in this category of weapons in Europe. Of course, this does not mean complete equality in the number of divisions or in various types of weaponry. The armed forces of the two sides are highly heterogeneous, they have a different structure and different organization. At the Vienna talks representatives of the NATO countries often exploit this fact to justify their unwillingness to reduce armaments. They argue that it is far too complicated to compare disparate types of weapons and to work out "equivalents" for such comparisons. However, this artificial

argument no longer holds water. /The Soviet Union has proposed that the West limit those types of weapons in which it has a preponderance while we would without hesitation remove our surplus in those types of weaponry, in which we have a preponderance./

The socialist countries' constructive proposals, whether they are submitted in Vienna, Budapest, or Moscow, do not meet with the understanding of Western circles, however. The opinion of these circles was expressed straightforwardly by the U.S. secretary of defense when he warned Washington's Western allies that all plans of the socialist countries for a "change in the structure of forces in Europe" must be approached with the utmost circumspection. "You must realize," Caspar Weinberger declared, "that we must resist this vigorously." /In short, the Pentagon does not need a reduction in armed forces and armaments in Europe, but, on the contrary, would even like to augment its military potential./

Some people in the West obviously cannot get rid of dogmatic thinking in the categories of confrontation and give up their illusory plan to gain military superiority. Diktat from overseas paralyzes the political will of some West European governments. The West European countries must, however, manifest this will, especially those that are in the very center of the policy of confrontation being asserted by NATO at the border of the two blocs. Only then will it be possible to make progress at the Vienna talks, only then will it be possible to renew detente on our continent.

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CSO: 5200/1088

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV MEETS WFTU DELEGATION ON REYKJAVIK, ARMS CURB, NFZ

31 Oct Meeting

LD312214 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 86 First Edition p 1

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev has met at the CPSU Central Committee on 31 October with a delegation of the World Federation of Trade Unions, which was represented by Sandor Gaspar, WFTU President, chairman of the Central Council of Hungarian Trade Unions, Ibrahim Zakaria, WFTU secretary general, and WFTU vice presidents — Roberto Veiga, general secretary of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, Karel Hoffman, chairman of the Central Council of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement on Czechoslovakia, Indrajit Gupta, secretary of the All-India Trade Union Delegation, Henri Krasucki, secretary general of the French General Confederation of Labour (CGT), Stepan Shalayev, AUCCTU chairman, and Harry Tisch, chairman of the Central Board of the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions.

They expressed considerations, with due regard for the experience of their countries and know-how of participation in the international trade union movement, on the responsibility of the international working class, in particular, the WFTU, for the preservation of peace, on the new tasks and difficulties encountered by the trade unions at the present stage, how the problems of disarmament and development have drawn close with the protection of the immediate interests of the working people, with the plans of perfecting the socialist society.

Everybody agreed that the Soviet Union's foreign policy, especially its program for the elimination of nuclear weapons, which has been impressively and specifically mirrored at the Reykjavik meeting, opens up new perspectives in the fight for mankind's survival and imposes new enormous responsibility on the working class and its trade unions.

Mikhail Gorbachev characterized the sources which nourish Soviet foreign policy: the essence of the socialist society, the awareness of the real nuclear threat to mankind, the conviction that with all its contradictory and diverse character the present-day world is a mutually interconnected integrity, which has its common problems which dictates the need for mutually acceptable decisions. History and the course of peaceful competition will make the judgment as regards what system is better.

Gaspar, Shalayev Brief Press

LD311807 Moscow TASS in English 1715 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS — "In the course of our conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev, which passed in a heartfelt and comradely atmosphere, we clearly felt that the Soviet leadership attaches much importance to the trade union movement, to its role in the struggle for peace and the rights of working people", Sandor Gaspar, president of the World Federation of Trade Union stated here today.

He spoke at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists.

"The WFTU", Sandor Gaspar went on, "views the Soviet Union as the principal guarantor of peace and stability in the world. The Soviet peace initiatives at the meeting in Reykjavik again show that all nuclear arms in the world can be eliminated already during the lifetime of the present generation and the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe thus eliminated".

"Since the beginning of the year Soviet trade union organizations have had about a thousand meetings with foreign delegations at which pressing problems of easing international tension and of the campaign against the danger of nuclear war were discussed. More than 70 million Soviet working people took part in activities organized on September First alone — the international day of trade union actions for peace", Stepan Shalayev went on.

"A favourable situation for pooling the efforts of trade unions of various orientation in the struggle for peace and disarmament has formed in the international trade union movement after the meeting in Reykjavik", Stepan Shalayev noted. "The earnest of our struggle's success is in unity".

Tisch Speaks at Briefing

LD312210 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1506 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 31 Oct (ADN) — The message adopted by the 11th WFTU Congress in Berlin in September to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to U.S. President Ronald Reagan and UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar was handed over to Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow today. [passage omitted]

The progressive trade union movement throughout the world strongly supports the disarmament proposals submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik. This was stated by WFTU President Sandor Gaspar at an international press conference, at which the delegation dispatched by the WFTU Congress reported on its meeting with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. [passage omitted]

CSSR's Hoffmann Speaks

LD311635 Prague CTK in English 1604 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow Oct 31 (CTK correspondent) — The trade union movement will strive to make workers of all countries understand the real causes of dangerous militarist tendencies and intensify the struggle for nuclear disarmament, World Federation of Trade Unions Chairman Sandor Gaspar said at a press conference here today after WFTU officials meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

Reykjavik showed that the Soviet Union is ready to make every effort to reach the limitation and complete liquidation of weapons of mass annihilation, Sandor Gaspar stressed.

Deputy chairman of the WFTU and chairman of the Czechoslovak Central Council of Trade Unions Karel Hoffmann recalled the proposal of the GDR Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the West German Social Democratic Party to form a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe, which was joined by the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Czechoslovak trade unionists resolutely support this proposal as it corresponds with the interests of all workers of the country.

We want to find a possibility how to help implement this significant initiative, together with partner trade unions in central Europe. Some steps to extend cooperation with trade unions of West Germany and Austria have already been taken, Karel Hoffman said.

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CSO: 5200/1082

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA: WFTU CONGRESS MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV ON TESTING, SDI

PH051201 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 86 First Edition pp 1, 2

["Message of the 11th World Trade Union Congress to M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee" — PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The 11th World Trade Union Congress was held in Berlin, the GDR capital, 16 through 22 September 1986 at a decisive and extremely dangerous moment in our history. The question consists in how events in the world will develop — either human reason will gain the upper hand and realism will triumph in the name of the working people's interests, or the world will slide toward nuclear catastrophe and the destruction of mankind. Also we cannot tolerate the situation whereby vast material and intellectual resources are expended on the arms race. It is disgraceful that approximately 1 trillion dollars a year are spent on military purposes — more than the total income of the countries in which more than half our planet's population lives.

The congress is convinced that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, which poses a direct threat to our planet's security and to life itself on earth, is today the chief obstacle to the balanced and comprehensive development of the world economy. It is rightly maintained that if mankind is not able to halt the arms race then the latter will destroy it.

Research by specialists indicates that ending the arms race will help to put an end to mass unemployment. This possibility must be taken into account against the background of the terrible growth in unemployment and underemployment from which many countries suffer.

The world trade union movement consistently strives for international agreements to halt and reverse the arms race. A specific proposal to conclude an agreement on a 10-percent cut in arms spending was advanced at the Second UN General Assembly Special Session in 1982. If that proposal had been adopted at that time, it would have been possible to secure considerable sums for profitable capital investments and to support international economic cooperation by increasing aid to developing countries and to millions of people who are today deprived of the means for a worthy existence.

The 11th World Trade Union Congress voices its resolute disagreement with any further escalation of the arms race and insists that space be free of nuclear weapons, as the overwhelming majority of UN member states demands. What is needed to preserve security in the world is not the "Star Wars" strategy but the strategy of creating jobs, the strategy of combating poverty, and, as peace-loving forces throughout the world demand, the strategy of universal international security on the basis of friendship and cooperation among all countries and peoples.

The 11th World Trade Union Congress supports all proposals by individual countries or groups of countries that make a contribution to the disarmament program. Therefore the congress welcomes the moratorium announced by the Soviet Union on nuclear weapon tests and calls on the United States and other nuclear powers to follow this example. The Soviet proposals for the destruction of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 accord with the wishes of working people and the peoples. The congress fully supports these initiatives aimed at ending the arms race and at disarmament, as well as the proposals advanced by the Eighth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Harare at the beginning of September 1986 and by the "Delhi Six" countries in their "Mexico Declaration" and other disarmament initiatives by various political forces and mass organizations.

On behalf of 296 million organized working people on all continents the congress, at which 432 trade union organizations from 147 countries are represented, believes that the United Nations and all its members, primarily the United States and the USSR, must without delay take measures to conclude international agreements on ending the arms race and all nuclear tests, on eliminating nuclear and other kinds of mass destruction weapons, and on redistributing the funds released as a result of disarmament measures towards accelerating socioeconomic development. Measures must be taken in all countries to switch military enterprises to the production of peaceful output.

The congress once again states its conviction that the strategy of peace and disarmament has now become the decisive constituent part of the strategy of international development in ensuring a better life for all mankind.

The 11th World Trade Union Congress urges you to pay attention to these acute international problems and to take into account the hopes and aspirations of working people throughout the world, who have openly demonstrated at all levels their nonacceptance of the arms race.

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CSO: 5200/1082

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: UN COMMITTEE DEBATES DISARMAMENT ISSUES, SDI, TIGHT

USSR, PRC Oppose Space Arms

LD300133 Moscow TASS in English 0013 GMT 30 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 30 TASS — TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Chernyshov reports:

Delegates of the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly view prevention of the militarisation in space as the task of historic importance. The debate in the committee on concrete items of the agenda pertaining to disarmament have been keynoted by the thought that the "Star Wars" programme should not be allowed to dash the hopes of humanity for a world without nuclear arms.

The Reykjavik meeting posed acutely again the question why SDI is the symbol of the obstruction of the entire process of nuclear disarmament, director of the Institute of Space Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Roald Sagdeyev said on Wednesday. The historic lesson of the meeting shows that there is a real hope for a political road of averting nuclear menace, the road of complete elimination of nuclear arms. In the light of this meeting it becomes particularly clear that the large-scale SDI programme should become pointless, even to its supporters.

The Soviet representative debunked all attempts to present SDI as a "defensive" programme, called the attention of the international community to dangerous military-strategic consequences which the change of the existing strategic doctrine based on nuclear balance will inevitably entail.

There is a peaceful alternative to a spread of the arms race to space: exploration and uses of space in the interests of entire humanity, he said. American science, American technology achieved outstanding successes in this sphere. One would like to hope that American strategic thinking will match the genius of the American people in technology.

China tabled on Wednesday to the First Committee the draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution expresses the confidence that the development of space arms systems entails a qualitative escalation of the arms race which is dangerous as it is, aggravates the situation in the world still more. The PRC urges all states, particularly those having large space potential, to promote vigorously the achievement of the aim of peaceful uses of outer space, to take sooner effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in space.

Israelyan Urges Test Ban

LD312235 Moscow TASS in English 2114 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 31 TASS — The Soviet Union has always strongly advocated and continues to advocate a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the opening of full-scale talks on the issue, said USSR representative, Viktor Israelyan, speaking today in the First Committee of the 41st session of the UN General Assembly. In Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to the message from the leaders of the six countries it was stated that.

"At present, there is no task more immediate and important than ending all nuclear testing. We associate this step with the beginning of movement down the road leading to a nuclear-free world".

The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests is an important self-contained disarmament measure. We believe that the nuclear states could address this issue already now, without waiting for the outcome of the talks that are under way on other aspects of the arms race, Soviet delegate declared. The particular urgency of the problem of banning nuclear testing is also due to the fact that as a result of the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, declared by the Soviet Union from August 6, 1985, there has emerged an entirely new situation favorable to an early solution of this problem.

If the Soviet moratorium were to be joined by the United States, a serious and responsible and stockpiling of the most destructive weapons. To miss the opportunity that has opened up would not be simply a manifestation of indifference for the future of mankind but a criminal act, Viktor Israelyan added.

A declaration of a moratorium by all the nuclear powers — to be followed up with a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests — would have just about the same significance for making further progress. In a situation of world-wide silence at all the nuclear test sites, it would be possible to concentrate the efforts on charting the shortest possible routes on the map of roads leading to a safe world, a world without nuclear weapons.

In introducing its proposals for banning nuclear tests, the Soviet Union stated that it was interested in enforcing a most stringent verification of such a ban, including international verification. The Soviet Government's consent to the installation of American monitoring equipment in the area of Semipalatinsk clearly proves it. The USSR has more than once expressed its readiness to use the offer by the six countries of "five continents" to provide assistance in verifying the cessation of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection, if the other side, too, accepts the offer. The Soviet Union has also expressed its positive view of the proposal to organize a meeting of experts of the said six countries together with Soviet and American specialists in order to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of verifying the cessation of nuclear tests, Soviet representative stressed.

All this attests to the fact that there is no problem with the Soviet Union as regards the verification of a ban on nuclear test. In essence, we agree with any forms of verification. The United States' position is blocking concrete negotiations on this problem, which has long been ripe for solution, Viktor Israelyan stated.

It becomes increasingly clear that Washington is motivated by the desire to retain for the United States the possibility of qualitatively upgrading old types of nuclear weapons and developing new ones and thus carrying on the nuclear arms race. The true reason for the U.S. Administration's reluctance to renounce nuclear explosions is the desire to upset the existing balance of forces to their own advantage.

A weighty contribution can and must be made by the United Nations to achieve progress toward the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear test. The U.N. efforts in this major area should be redoubled and made more dynamic and purposeful.

Resolution on New Weapons

LD040043 Moscow TASS in English 2306 GMT 3 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 3 TASS — A large group of socialist and nonaligned countries, among them the Soviet Union, has submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly for consideration.

The draft resolution bans the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

It calls on all countries to utilise scientific and technological achievements only for peaceful purposes and to take effective measures to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and, if they do emerge, to begin talks on banning them.

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CSO: 5200/1083

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S 'LOMEYKO INTERVIEWED ON REYKJAVIK, CD, VIENNA CSCE

DW101400 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0438 GMT 7 Nov 86

[Interview with special USSR Envoy Vladimir Lomeyko by correspondent Loffle in Vienna on the 'Zehn Nach Fuenf' program; date not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Loffle] What is your impression of the U.S.-Soviet talks?

[Lomeyko] They left a bitter taste, because the U.S. delegation demonstrated that it wanted to revise the Reykjavik talks, that is, to forget what was achieved there. What they propose is a mixture of old concessions and proposals made by the Soviet Union in the hours of talks between Gorbachev and Reagan. [passage omitted]

[Loffle] If the Reykjavik meeting marked some progress, would you go so far as to say that Vienna was a step backward or just confirmation of past antagonisms?

[Lomeyko] [Passage omitted] At the moment it is not a question of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, but of the position of the Americans themselves. The Soviet Union is and remains loyal to the Reykjavik talks. The Americans, however, have different positions. At least two groups are fighting with each other. One wants to consider Reykjavik a basis, while the other want to revise it, probably because it does not want a nuclear weapons-free world at all.

[Loffle] The big powers' delegations to the Geneva conference on effective disarmament measures will get together today at the suggestion of the Soviet Union in a session that was not previously planned. Can a new Soviet initiative be expected there?

[Lomeyko] I think that the Soviet Union has proposed enough initiatives. The solution to the disputed issues, the solution to the problems, does not depend on new initiatives, although new proposals from both sides are not ruled out. I think that at the moment the matter is basically as follows: Either you want to make progress and develop what was achieved in Reykjavik, or you want to retreat. That is the most ticklish problem of the current situation.

[Loffle] Shevardnadze came to Vienna mainly for the opening of the third CSCE follow-up meeting. At press conferences, you and some of your colleagues outlined some of the main Soviet points in connection with implementing the Helsinki Final Act. What are the main points?

[Lomeyko] The Helsinki Final Act is a comprehensive document. [Passage omitted] It includes all the issues, including military, economic, and humanitarian. We agree the world situation is depicted not just by the Final Act. The world needs a stable situation. It needs security and lasting and just peace. In other words, all components — political, military, economic, and humanitarian problems — must be resolved and safeguarded. Peace depends not on one, but on three baskets. Therefore, the Soviet Union emphasizes all these problems. [Passage omitted] If, for example, man wants to live safely, free, and just — man is the central figure of the whole story and the whole situation — he must live free without fear of nuclear death, free of the fear of unemployment, and free of the fear that his rights could be somehow damaged or threatened.

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CSO: 5200/1083

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA INTERVIEWS SWEDISH PREMIER CARLSSON ON CSCE, MORATORIUM

PM301125 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Swedish Premier Ingvar Carlsson by own correspondent M. Kostikov: "Doing Everything Possible for Disarmament; PRAVDA Interview With I. Carlsson" -- date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Excerpts] M. Kostikov, PRAVDA'S own correspondent in the north European countries, asked Ingvar Carlsson, Swedish Prime Minister and chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party (SAP), to answer a few questions of an international nature.

First of all I. Carlsson noted the great significance of the results of the recently concluded first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from the viewpoint of present-day political and military realities. What is impressive, he stressed, is that the Stockholm Conference was able to achieve a specific, significant result in the military respect. I am sure that this result will aid work to achieve detente not only in Europe but also on a global scale and that it will have a positive influence on talks on issues relating to security and disarmament and also on talks at other forums.

Asked about Sweden's attitude to the unilateral Soviet nuclear test moratorium, the prime minister replied:

The Swedish Government welcomed the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests for various reasons. As early as 1963, after the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater came into force, Sweden sought a total ban on nuclear tests, that is, an end to underground explosions as well. In our opinion, a multilateral treaty of this nature to end all nuclear tests would effectively prevent the continuation of nuclear weapon developments and could pave the way to a real reduction in nuclear arms. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1082

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET WRITER HITS ADM CROWE COMMENTS IN FINNISH PAPER

PM071123 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Nov 86 First Edition p 3

[L. Savanin "Rejoinder": "In a Distorting Mirror"]

[Text] The Finnish newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT has published an interview with Admiral W. Crowe, chief of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was in Finland on an official visit. In it the American guest generously complimented the Finns on their "political maturity and peace of mind" and emphasized that Finland's foreign policy status accords in the highest degree with "the interests of the free Western world and has a favorable influence on equilibrium throughout the region."

I do not think the Finnish people need such compliments. Traveling a complex and thorny section of path in history, they themselves found the line that is known in the world for its peace-loving thrust and enjoys deserved recognition. The example of Finland, which is underpinned in its foreign policy activity by the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, convincingly shows how, guided by truly national interests, a country that has embarked on the path of peaceful coexistence can enhance its international prestige.

The Soviet Union values highly Finland's efforts to preserve a stable situation in the north of Europe and the continuity and realism of its foreign policy course. For its part, our country has repeatedly confirmed its adherence to the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the region in the belief that such zones are the real way to a nuclear-free Europe.

In the interview Crowe expatiated at length on tension in northern Europe. And he groundlessly maintained that the Soviet Union is to blame for this. [paragraph continues]

As for the buildup of the U.S. military presence in the region and the increase in the number and scale of NATO exercises held there, in the admiral's opinion this is "symbolic" support for the northern NATO countries.

Mr Crowe's assessments of the results of the Stockholm conference were equally "modest." According to him, it was unable to do anything to ease tension in the waters off the European Continent.

Of course, many things still could not be agreed on in Stockholm. However -- and the progressive public points this out -- the Stockholm document, which embodies the collective efforts of all countries, represents a package of political and military measures leading to a reduction in military confrontation in Europe. And if NATO had displayed good will and the desire to reach a compromise at an earlier stage of the conference, we could probably have been speaking even now of unprecedented steps to stabilize the situation on the European Continent, including the maritime expanses.

The transatlantic guest also tried to comment on the results of the Reykjavik meeting. In this, however, he chose a very "original" version of their interpretation. While acknowledging certain progress in the Soviet-American dialogue, Crowe accused the Soviet Union of "bringing up a completely new element at the talks not in the final hours but in the final minutes" and claimed that "the United States had no time left at all to weigh, analyze, and study that proposal."

But it is not a matter of minutes, hours, or even days, as Mr Crowe tries to maintain. The fact that the accords in Reykjavik did not take the shape of practical agreements clearly reflects attempts by certain U.S. circles to fix the clock of history their own clockface showing the passing of time not forward but backward, as in a distorting mirror.

Assessing the results of the Soviet-America meeting, President M. Koivisto of Finland declared: "The Reykjavik talks have brought the international dialogue on disarmament issues to a completely new stage. The results achieved there are exceptionally valuable. There is no going back to the time before Reykjavik." This is precisely the attitude of the Finnish people and of all people of good will in the world to the results of the meeting in the Icelandic capital. They will not accept the political ruses of Mr Crowe and such people, who are now seeking to bury everything positive achieved in Reykjavik. Peace-loving mankind sees in these actions the stubborn resistance of the American military-industrial complex to the elaboration of practical decisions to curb the arms race and totally eliminate nuclear weapons.

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